Chapter Two: Command Decisions
I. McClellan Acts
II. The Chickahominy Line
III. Confederate Movements
McClellan Acts
McClellan looked anxiously southward for the expected arrival of Porter’s V Corps on Franklin’s flank all morning. His orders were clear but still Porter’s whereabouts remained a mystery. At 7 AM it was confirmed that small arms and artillery could be heard from the direction of the James River. Soon the smoke from the firing thickened and the noise intensified signaling that a battle had been initiated by one side or the other. McClellan was further perplexed as his orders had been to avoid any general battle until the siege artillery had arrived and was in place. Scouts were reporting that Porter had failed to take the Charles City Road and instead seemed to be advancing towards Richmond. Further, Hooker’s III Corps was moving from Varina’s Landing directly north towards Richmond where the heavy firing was heard. McClellan rapidly sent messages to both Franklin and Sumner to make themselves ready for any eventuality but to hold at all costs. McClellan’s chief of cavalry, Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, brought him his first full report at 8 AM about what had occurred to the south. Porter had, indeed, taken the wrong road and had advanced directly towards the Confederate embankments south of Richmond. Hooker’s corps was moving in coordination with Porter’s and the two generals seemed determined to bring on a general engagement south of Richmond. Reynolds’s line of march would also take him directly to the area south of Richmond once his corps arrived on the field.
McClellan was stupefied when he learned this information and could not understand how his orders had been so badly misinterpreted. He suspected treachery on the part of his generals but did not have time to dwell on that now – his own career and reputation were on the line should he fail in this, his second attempt to outflank Richmond. The Army of the Potomac must be victorious, and it was up to him, as always, to be its savior when events conspired against him. Pleasonton revealed that the first two lines of the Confederate works were empty and that Porter was engaging the enemy in their final line of entrenchments around Battery #17. Should Porter succeed in driving the enemy from this position the Rebels would be forced into the open fields where heavier Union guns would surely drive them back into and through Richmond. Pleasonton suggested that Porter might need a diversion to draw more Confederates away from his front in order to succeed in the attack.
No sooner had McClellan digested this information than a courier arrived from the north with even more news. Sumner was reporting that the Confederates were active north of Chickahominy and threatening an attack on his corps. What was to be done?
With the events spiraling out of control McClellan felt there was little he could do to stop the coming battle. With the Confederates in strength both to the north and the south it seemed to him that they might just be weak in the center. McClellan, emboldened by the idea of possibly taking Richmond in a battle which seemed to be destined to occur, called Maj. Gen. William Franklin to his headquarters. Perhaps fate would allow him to succeed since it seemed predetermined that there would be a battle this day. McClellan directed that Franklin advance eastward at once. “The Rebs are splitting their forces,” he told him, “some are going south towards Battery #17 and others going north. That might leave them weak in the middle. Your corps advancing in that direction should make them think twice about sending any more units either north or south and we may even find the road open to Richmond.” McClellan hoped that having his largest and best corps in the center of the battlefield might now be the hammer with which he could knock down Richmond’s door. With his heavy artillery arriving at Savage Station within a few hours he would in a prime position to take the Confederate capital and finally prove to one and all that he really was the military genius he knew himself to be.
“Is my Corps to defend their current line or fall back to rejoin Franklin’s corps and the remainder of the army?” asked Sumner in a message sent to McClellan. Sumner had indicated that the Rebels were on the move north
​
of the Chickahominy in an eerie recreation of the events of the Seven Days Campaign earlier in the year. McClellan wrote to Sumner that, “you will continue to build breastworks, but will be prepared to fall back if pressed. I've looked all over for some route whereby your corps could get to and cross the Chickahominy without being observed, but I have had no luck in that regard. We may be better off abandoning our position to the north and consolidating our army south of the Chickahominy. You are to stall the enemy as long as possible, bluffing the Rebs into thinking you are really planning to make a stand, then move southward to link with the VI Corps.”
The Chickahominy Line
​
As Taliaferro’s and Early’s Divisions disembarked from their trains in Richmond they were met by Stonewall Jackson at the station. They would move to the northeast and cross the Chickahominy to link with AP Hill’s Division marching south from the Rappahannock. Together they would crush the Union forces north of the river and then drive east to outflank McClellan’s whole army and force them to abandon their campaign. Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalrymen would take the lead in the movement to scout the way ahead. The assignment fell to Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton’s Cavalry Brigade which were encamped north of Richmond. They had ridden hard for the crossings in the early morning but upon reaching them they were stopped cold as the bridges, so recently intact, were in ruins before them. Hampton bristled as he sent back word to Jackson that the movement to attack the Federals north of the river, visible in the distance on the hills around Mechanicsville, would need to be delayed. Jackson could do little except order the bridges rebuilt as quickly as possible. He had no intention of actually attacking the strong Federal position north of the river though. Instead, he hoped to swing around it to the north and outflank them from their position if possible. Just as soon as the bridges were repaired that is. From the north A.P. Hill’s large division was still moving southward for Atlee’s Station. Their line of march would bring them into a prime position to lead the advance against the northern flank of Mechanicsville and the Union forces beyond it.
By 6 AM the Federals of the II Corps could see the Confederates rebuilding the bridges on the Chickahominy but were confident of being able to hold their embankments against any direct enemy assault. It was then that a Union patrol returned from the north to inform Sumner that there was a large enemy force, estimated to be over 10,000 men, quickly approaching Atlee’s Station. Sumner, whose orders were preemptory to hold his current position, did little to respond to this new intel beyond sending a courier to McClellan with the new information. He would continue to hold where he was until he heard back. Afterall, the report could be mistaken.
The Federals prepare a fighting withdrawal north of the river as AP Hill's divisions and Taliaferro's prepare to engage them.
At 6:40 AM the 186 men of the 2nd South Carolina Cavalry, of Hampton’s Brigade but detached to serve with A.P. Hill’s Division this day, arrived at Atlee’s Station. They were the vanguard of AP Hill’s Division and they moved rapidly to scout the area south of Atlee’s and towards Mechanicsville. These riders were soon spotted by the Federal cavalry brigade under Brig. Gen. William Averell stationed along the Shady Grove Church Road on the Federal’s northernmost flank. Averell sent a courier to Sumner alerting him to the appearance of Confederate cavalry. “I am not concerned,” Sumner wrote in reply. “It may just be a scouting mission, or it may be the tip of a large column. Either way, we have the entire II Corps nearby and can respond rapidly to any threat.”
It was then that McClellan’s order to hold his current line but also to fall back to the southern side of the Chickahominy if pressed arrived. But Sumner was in a more combative mood than usual this morning and he continued to entrench his men rather than starting southward with his wagons and artillery as he probably should have done. By 8 AM Hancock’s division, in a reserve position behind Howard’s division, was actually being divided and sent in multiple directions. Two brigades were sent to reinforce Averell’s cavalrymen on the Shady Grove Church Road and a third brigade was sent southward to observe the Chickahominy crossings below Mechanicsville. Rather than making haste to fall back, as originally intended if they were pressed, they were still preparing a stubborn contest of the ground. Sumner rationalized that, “if the Rebs do mount an attack in force, we'll see them coming in plenty of time to react.”
Confederate Movements
For Jackson the morning was a long one. His early intentions to cross the Chickahominy were thwarted by the damaged bridges and he had to wait while they were rebuilt. Jackson had hoped to bring both Taliaferro’s and Early’s divisions with him over the river to link with A.P. Hill’s division to drive against the Union flank. Events elsewhere on the battlefield though were quickly changing his plans. To the south Longstreet reported heavy Union columns approaching Richmond from Varina’s Landing. Longstreet had already committed all three of his divisions to the southern and southeastern portions of the Richmond lines. This left miles of unguarded embankments vacant. Lee could not let his center remain so vulnerable and had no alternative but to direct Jackson detach forces to defend the city. Confederate cavalry was working hard to picket the roads but already Union forces were spotted in strength around Fair Oaks. “I am moving Early’s Division to Nine Mile Road where they will observe and defend against any Union attacks from that direction,” Jackson wrote Lee. Early’s four brigades, nearly 9,200 men, would come into line near the New Bridge Church against the Union’s VI Corps just then being ordered to advance by McClellan to the east.
By 8 AM then the Confederates were moving both defensively south of Richmond and offensively north of it. To the south Longstreet’s Corps was holding the entrenchments facing the Federals moving north from Varina’s Landing while to the north Jackson’s Corps was split on either side of the Chickahominy River. A.P. Hill was moving from Atlee’s Station to attack the Union’s right flank along Shady Grove Church Road while Taliaferro’s Division was moving over Meadow’s Bridge to reinforce Hill and help to turn the Federal position. Just to the south of the Chickahominy Early’s Division was moving along Nine Mile Road to block and engage the Federals of undetermined strength moving westward towards Richmond.