The advance of the VI Corps was doomed almost from the start. Franklin’s decision to launch a three-pronged advance along three roads seemed like a good idea except that none of the three roads were within easy supporting distance of one another. The Nine Mile Road and the Richmond and York Railroad line were about a mile apart while the Williamsburg Road was over a mile and a half south of the Railroad line. Franklin committed a single division to each road but because of detachments sent to guard river crossings on the Chickahominy the actual strength headed down each road was much less than it should have been. Further, there were no connecting roads between the three lines of advance. For one column to support either of the others would require a time-consuming march through fields and woods.

 

On the Nine Mile Road Franklin wisely concentrated all of Howe’s division of 6,600 men to move westward. This large force did good work against the Confederates moving along this road and were able to make some early progress against them until they were reinforced and their line stabilized. It was at this point that a fresh division along this line of advance might have helped break the stalemate – but Franklin had no reserves.

 

The nearest help for Howe’s division was along the Richmond and York Railroad a mile to the south. Here Newton’s division, less one brigade which was sent north to guard the Chickahominy bridges, numbered just over 4,000 men. These men may have been able to shift north to come in on the flank of the Confederates blocking Howe but the stubborn resistance of Walker’s Confederates, reinforced by elements of Hays’s Louisianans, soon stopped Newton’s brigades in their tracks. Again, the Federals had no reserves to call upon and the advance was halted.

 

The Federals might still have made some progress had Smith’s force along the Williamsburg Road turned northward at this point to come in on Newton’s left and turn the Confederates out of their position. Instead, Smith, with only one brigade as the other was guarding rear areas near Savage Station, continued to advance to the west. This single brigade, with nearly 2,600 men, made good progress against the Confederate cavalry at first. But, just as had occurred on the two other roads to the north, they became stymied once the Confederate infantry came up to contest their advance. With no ready reinforcements Smith’s was forced to halt his advance.

 

What appeared to be a real opportunity east of Richmond at 8 AM vanished by 11 AM. Franklin’s 19,000 men were overextended and only about 13,200 men joined in the advance along the three roads. Confronting them, at first, were just elements of Early’s Division rapidly marching from the Chickahominy where they had been recalled by Lee to shore up his defenses east of the city. Early came into line just in the nick of time as Franklin’s advance had only just began. Early’s men occupied whatever advantageous ground they could and made Franklin’s advance a tough one. Early’s 9,100 men were divided largely between the Nine Mile Road and the Richmond and York Railroad. This meant that Early’s 9,100 men opposed just 10,600 Federals on those two roads. If you include the 1,600 cavalrymen of Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade the Confederates were actually superior in number along these two lines. To the south, along the Williamsburg Road, the lone brigade of Smith’s moved so far away from Early’s area of control that they ventured into Hood’s defensive lines. Hood, whose men were then engaged against those of Porter’s to the south, was still able to spare a brigade of infantry to contest the Federal advance. Here also the numbers were even and no Federal headway could be made.

 

Altogether the Confederates entered into the fighting east of the capital with 13,671 men if you include all of Early’s Division, both cavalry brigades under Fitzhugh Lee and WHF Lee, and Anderson’s Brigade of Hood’s Division. By 11 AM, when the Federals stalled, they had lost just a combined 1,455 men. Few of these units were heavily fatigued and none were in any real damaged condition. Of the roughly 13,200 infantrymen Franklin brought into the fighting that morning there were 1,370 casualties. While these losses are nearly even the Federals had expended greater energy and were more fatigued for their efforts. While Franklin’s corps was still a large force to be reckoned with he lacked the strength at any singular point to continue his offensive.

 

The Confederates did a masterful job east of the capital. The timely arrival of Early may have saved the battle for them as Franklin’s divisions were aimed right for the heart of the city. Early’s decision to advance until he met the enemy was a wise one as it kept the fighting as far from Richmond as possible and allowed other forces in the rear time to come up and maneuver as needed. By 11 AM most of Taliaferro’s Division had recrossed the Chickahominy to the south and were moving to reinforce Early. Their presence would hardly seem necessary as Franklin’s offensive power was spent even by this point. But Lee had no way to know this and he wanted to support Early should the Federals come forward again. If they did not attack, and if Jackson was his usual aggressive self, he might even use them offensively to throw back Franklin and capture the key positions at Fair Oaks and Savage Station.

 

But before we see what Taliaferro’s arrival would bring let us return to the south and Porter’s advance. We had left the Federals just as they successfully captured the Gunn Woods and were preparing to assault the Confederate lines around Battery #17.