Chapter Four: Diversions
I. The Plan
II. Sykes Attacks
III. Longstreet
IV. Sykes Driven
The Plan
By 9 AM the area south of Richmond had already become the bloodiest part of this battlefield. Mahone’s Virginia Brigade had just surrendered in the Gunn Woods and two full Union corps were rapidly concentrating for a drive on Battery #17 along the main line of Confederate embankments. The Federals were advancing with Hooker’s III Corps and Porter’s V Corps while Reynolds’s I Corps was moving up from Varina’s Landing as quickly as possible.
The III and V Corps were aligned in a slightly jumbled manner as their lines stretched over two miles in length. Sykes’ V Corps division, supported by Gregg’s cavalry brigade, was on the right flank facing towards the Beveridge house. To his left came Sickles’s III Corps division facing northward and pointed directly at Battery #17. To his left the V Corps division of Griffin was just getting back into order after capturing Mahone’s brigade and were preparing to advance north out of the Gunn Woods to attack Battery #17. The Federal left was composed of Hooker’s other III Corps division under Birney and reinforced by the cavalry brigade under Farnsworth. These men were to advance nearer the James River in an attempt to outflank the Confederate line on that side. Altogether these forces numbered about 29,467 men at 9:00 AM. Reynolds’s corps would bring another 16,355 men into the battle when they arrived sometime after noon.
Confronting these forces were those of Longstreet’s Corps. Mahone’s defense of the Gunn Woods had allowed Longstreet enough time to consolidate his forces along the embankments to contest the Union advance. DH Hill’s large division was on the Confederate right nearest the James River. If you recall Longstreet enthusiastically hoped the Federals would attack him nearer the river where DH Hill’s men were strongest. “Hill will be ready to greet him. It's going to be fun,” he had written to Lee. To Hill’s left was the partial division of Anderson who had already suffered the loss of Mahone’s Brigade in the Gunn Woods. Anderson’s Division, further weakened by the detachment of Wright’s Brigade and part of Pryor’s, was shifted to the center of the Confederate line near the Beveridge House. To Anderson’s left came the remaining division of Longstreet’s Corps under Hood. Hood’s Division stretched further to the left than the Union right flank did and he was actually beyond the Federal flank when the attack was launched. Longstreet could count on about 18,445 men, between Anderson and DH Hill, to defend the southern embankments around Richmond. Hood’s 7,000 men would largely miss the fighting to the south but would play an important role on the flank.
There was no way that Porter or Hooker could have known that they were facing hardly better than even odds in the coming battle. They had hoped to catch Lee unawares and drive over the embankments before substantial enemy reinforcements made the position impregnable. Unfortunately for the Federals, that moment had already passed. Griffin, whose division was on the front lines all morning, could see the strength of the Confederate embankments ahead and sent Porter a message that, “I have no real desire to assault those fortifications at Battery #17.” Sickles, likewise, reported to Hooker that, “My boys are trying to take cover and prepare for a mass assault on their lines, but we are taking massive casualties while doing very little damage to the Rebs behind their works. I would like to reiterate that I expect a very high body count with this assault. I do expect to take it, but the troops might not be worth much after doing so, and I expect I am going to lose more than I kill. I understand the need to break thru but I have my doubts. But I guess if we can break them here, it will be the last entrenchments we need to storm before we get to Richmond.” Despite such misgivings Porter and Hooker remained committed to the attack.
Sykes Attacks
The first Federal division to launch their attack was Sykes’s division on the right flank at 9 AM. Sykes’s three brigades, just over 6,100 men, advanced over an open field west of the Beveridge house and towards the main Confederate line of embankments. Sykes brought thirty cannons with him along with his division which included the U.S. Regulars whose reputation for steadiness in combat would be tested this day. The advance over the fields was immediately contested by Confederate artillery from emplaced guns along the embankments and an additional twenty-four pieces brought up by Anderson. Wilcox’s Brigade alone manned the embankments facing Sykes and were spread out every 125 yards to cover as much ground as possible. Hood’s Division was on Wilcox’s left flank about a quarter-mile to the north while Featherston’s Brigade was on Wilcox’s right where the lines changed facing from east to south.
Porter had believed that Sykes’ front was “clear” earlier in the morning but this illusion was quickly dispelled after they arrived opposite the Beveridge house and the Confederate embankments came into view. Reasoning that by attacking the Beveridge house line they could pull Confederated units away from the area around Battery #17 Porter ordered the attack to commence. Porter wrote to Hooker that, “I hope that Sykes’ division will be able to assist in putting pressure on the Rebs to keep them from shifting troops south.” Thus, Sykes’s division would be used as a diversionary attack in order to draw men and attention away from the area where the main attack was to occur around Battery #17.
Sykes began his full attack at 9:20 AM. Sykes spread out his three brigades along a front nearly a mile long with Maj. George Andrews brigade of regulars and Brig. Gen. G.K. Warren’s brigade on the right and Lt. Col. Robert Buchanan’s brigade of regulars on the left. Between them a half-mile gap existed in the line where the Federal guns were deployed to fire directly into the Confederate lines. Buchanan’s brigade aimed their attack towards the woods where the enemy lines bent to the west and where some trees allowed them to take cover as they advanced. Andrews’ and Warren’s brigades shifted north toward the gap between Wilcox’s left and Hood’s right.
Warren’s 5th New York took the lead in the assault on Wilcox’s left where a gap in the lines allowed him to rush behind the main line unopposed. Four Confederate artillery pieces had just unlimbered in the fields behind the lines when the 5th came charging forward. Unable to limber up quickly enough the guns were overran and spiked by the New Yorkers. The loss of the four guns was acutely felt by Wilcox whose brigade was supposed to be covering them. Wilcox took full responsibility and wrote to Anderson that he was, “Sorry about the gun losses on my front. Due to poor troop placement I absent-mindedly left a gap in the line that let them through. Fortunately, those enemy units that punctured our line are now trapped behind them. Such boldness must not go unpunished on their part!” Three regiments of Andrews’s regulars then charged the 9th Alabama in their embankments but were easily repulsed with heavy losses. “I should not have ordered this one,” Andrews told his aide. “The odds were poor, even though we were attacking from the flank.” Over on Buchanan’s front another charge by US Regulars was repulsed by the 11th Alabama. The Alabamians narrowly held their ground against the sudden onslaught. Wilcox’s stubborn defense was important one as it protected the many field pieces Anderson had brought up and bought time for reinforcements to shift into the battle.
Confederate counterattacks were quick to come against the Federal regiments. The 5th New York, having driven the furthest, was the main target and they were soon routed behind the Confederate lines. Benning’s Brigade of Georgians, sent by Hood, were then sent south to plug the hole between Hood and Wilcox. Striking the right of Sykes they forced Andrews and Warren to fight facing both north and south as they were caught in a pincer movement. Despite these setbacks the attack continued as the Federals tried to break Wilcox’s line by wrapping around their flanks as best they could. But the Confederate pressure was simply too much and the Federal units began to flee rearward.
By 10:20 AM though the attack was broken. Sykes now informed Porter that he was “attempting to pull my boys together and not give up the entire flank” of the army. Further reinforcements from Hood, Law’s Alabama brigade, had smashed into Andrews’ flank and driven them from the field. Warren and the 5th New York were isolated behind enemy lines, and Buchanan’s men were now trying to fight their way out of the woods they had used to approach the enemy lines. Four Federal cannons had already been abandoned as enemy infantry had been deadly accurate and taken down many of the gunners as they attempted to wheel the pieces up to point blank range. Another four pieces were disabled by enemy counterbattery fire. There was little Sykes could do now except attempt to regroup whatever was left of his division and try to reform at some other point.
Longstreet
Riding just behind Wilcox’s Brigade Lt. Gen. James Longstreet was a conspicuous target atop his horse. Having rebuffed the advice of his staff to retire to a safer place Longstreet continued to watch as the 5th New York was shot to pieces by Confederate artillery and infantry. A remnant of the 6th United States, now down to just 14 men, were in a nearby ravine and unable to make it back to their own lines. Spotting the Confederate officer on a nearby hill the men decided that if they were to be captured anyways they might as well make a desperate attempt to bag a Confederate officer beforehand to salvage their honor in some way. Little did they know they were about to make the biggest capture of the war up to this point.
Moving through the ravine the Federal band quickly came up behind Longstreet’s position and with rifles drawn ordered him to surrender. Despite being surrounded by thousands of his own men and behind his own lines there was nothing Old Pete could do but hand over his sword to the Federal corporal who demanded it. Quickly mounting the nearby horses of Longstreet’s staff the Federals ran the gauntlet of enemy fire and shells to return to their own lines with their high-profile prisoner. Meeting his old West Point classmate, Maj. Gen. George Sykes, did little to improve Longstreet’s mood as he was ushered rearward.
Word of Longstreet’s capture sent Federal morale soaring as Porter wrote to Hooker that, “That just might knock the wind out of the Rebel defenses!” But while Longstreet’s presence would be missed it hardly reversed the setbacks to Sykes’s division since they had launched their ill-fated attack just over an hour earlier. D.H. Hill now became the Corps commander by virtue of seniority and his division fell to Col. Bryan Grimes. Hill, still holding a grudge against Longstreet from the first Peninsula Campaign, hardly regretted the misfortune of his fellow general and kept the Confederates in their lines just as they already were.
Sykes Driven
As the Confederates counterattacked out of their embankments they flung back Sykes’s men to the southeast and away from their lines. Brig. Gen. G. K. Warren attempted to rally his men but was struck by an enemy shell and instantly killed. His brigade dissolved almost instantly. A half-mile away Maj. George Andrews, leading a brigade of regulars, was wounded and carried from the field. Union cavalry and horse artillery helped to stem the Confederate tide around the Union artillery position but the damage to Sykes’s division was catastrophic. Between 9:20 AM and 11:20 AM Sykes lost two brigade commanders and 2,930 of 5,866 men. The division was wrecked. Those units which maintained their organization were now too fatigued to be effective any longer and were removed from the front to rest and refit.
The main target of the Union attack had been the brigade of Cadmus Wilcox situated facing eastward near the Beveridge house. Wilcox had gone into the battle at 9:20 AM with 2,248 men in his five regiments. In the two hours of fighting behind his defensive works he suffered just 293 casualties. The supporting brigades of Benning and Law also suffered only light casualties totaling 281 men. Altogether the Confederates lost just 574 men to the Union’s 2,930.
But Sykes’s attack had taken place as way to bog down and prevent Confederate forces from reinforcing their lines elsewhere. Was Sykes successful in this regard? We now turn back to the area around Battery #17 as the main Union attack is launched.