Chapter Five: Battle of Richmond
I. Confederate Position
II. Sickles Attacks
III. The Advance of Griffin
IV. Along the James
V. Into the Breach
VI. Losses
Confederate Position
Even after the capture of William Mahone, along with most of his brigade, the Gunn Woods remained a contested area. Anderson had advanced Wright’s Brigade and part of Pryor’s into the woods in an attempt to punch a hole for Mahone to escape through. Failing in this the Confederate reinforcements were then unable to extricate themselves and were soon engaged with Birney’s division from the south. These forces were soon overwhelmed and largely routed out of the woods and back into the Confederate embankments. The only Confederate achievement during the fighting was the mortal wounding of Col. Thomas Stockton whose brigade was driving them back. Of the 2,096 combined men of Wright’s Brigade and the 8th Florida of Pryor’s Brigade who entered the Gunn Woods, there were 359 casualties left behind when they were driven out of them. With the Federals now in full possession of all of the area south of Battery #17 it was merely a matter of time before the battle roared northward.
The Confederate embankments stretched from the James River on the right flank eastward about a mile and a half until it turned abruptly northward near the Beveridge house. Along this line of embankments both Osborne’s Turnpike and the New Market Road crossed the Confederate defenses and merged just beyond Battery #17 in the center of the Confederate defenses facing southward. The embankments ran through open ground but was strengthened sporadically by randomly constructed abatis which were still left over from the campaign of six months before. The Confederates had also been hard at work building breastworks atop the embankments to further strengthen their lines.
During the morning hours Anderson’s Division had been centered on Battery #17 facing south. But as the morning wore on Anderson’s Division was continually weakened as he shifted men into the fighting in Gunn Woods. By 9 AM Anderson’s Division was weakened by hours of fighting and numerous detachments sent southward. Longstreet now reorganized his front by shifting Anderson’s Division away from the critical Battery #17 area. Mahone’s Brigade had been nearly wiped out earlier and its few hundred survivors were sent rearward as a reserve. Wright’s Brigade was now reforming in reserve after escaping the Gunn Woods and was largely fatigued. This left Anderson with three largely fresh brigades with which to defend the center of the Confederate line. Longstreet ordered Anderson to shift these brigades to the left while DH Hill’s Division took over the right and center of the Confederate defenses stretching from the James River to Battery #17. To DH Hill’s left then were placed Anderson’s remaining brigades with Featherston’s Brigade at the bend in the line as it twisted from east to north near the Beveridge house. To Featherston’s left was the brigade of Cadmus Wilcox (then engaged heavily with Sykes’s Division). In support of these two brigades was the small Florida Brigade of Brig. Gen. Roger Pryor’s set back a few hundred yards.
D.H. Hill’s men aligned largely facing southward utilizing Anderson’s old breastworks and positions. Defending the critical embankments near Battery #17 were the Alabamians and Georgians of Brig. Gen. Alfred Colquitt’s Brigade. To Colquitt’s right were the men of Iverson’s Brigade, then Rodes’s Brigade stretched to anchor the line on the James River. In reserve were the men of Ramseur’s and Ripley’s brigades.
Taking the men of DH Hill’s Division and Featherston’s Brigade (those which would play the largest part in the coming battle) the Confederates had 12,672 men on their southern defensive line. When you include the reforming units of Mahone’s old brigade, Wright’s Brigade, S.D. Lee’s Cavalry Brigade, and the 8th Florida there were actually 15,577 men available to man the defenses. Further strengthening the southern defenses were 38 artillery pieces along the mile and a half line which mostly fronted open fields.
Although DH Hill knew that the Federals were coming in large numbers he was not concerned in the least. “The Yanks seem to be in a very aggressive mood,” he wrote to Longstreet. “We will dampen their enthusiasm.”
Sickles Attacks
At 9:20 AM Hooker ordered his artillery forward to provide close support for the coming assault on Battery #17. Advancing 36 pieces up to within 375 yards of the Confederate main line the Federals unlimbered their pieces within easy range of the Confederate defenders. Counterbattery fire quickly disabled 4 pieces but the others unlimbered rapidly and a full scale artillery duel was underway. Hooker sent a quick note to Porter that, “I have sent forward my artillery pieces to support the attack. I stand ready for your word to advance the infantry.” Porter sent the courier back to Hooker with the simple order to “Attack!”
At 9:40 AM Brig. Gen. Daniel Sickles mounted his horse and under a hail of gunfire ordered his full division forward against the main Confederate line. Three brigades of infantry, 6,402 men, charged up and over the slight ridge in front of the Confederate position and into full view of the Confederate defenders. Hooker, watching from a nearby hill, spoke to his chief of staff as he watched the charge. “Sickles’s boys have left the cover of the ridge and charged the Rebs! God help them.” Revere’s and Carr’s brigades slammed directly into Colquitt’s Brigade around Battery #17 while the Excelsior Brigade of New Yorkers stuck Featherston’s Brigade at the bend of the Confederate line. The Federals were soon being cut down like wheat before the scythe in front of the Confederate embankments. An attack directly against Battery #17 was repulsed with heavy losses and the Federal line was thrown back all along the front. Only on the right flank did the Excelsior Brigade, partially aided by the cover of the forests, have any brief success at all in their movements.
For Revere’s and Carr’s lines the fire was too intense to withstand. Only twenty minutes after it began the troops were already streaming rearward and away from the heavy fire. Of the 4,453 men of those two brigades 610 were casualties in those first twenty minutes. The Excelsior Brigade had lost an additional 200 men but were still clinging to the woods in their front hoping to find a way through Featherston’s Brigade to dislodge the Confederate center. The 71st and 72nd New York breached the Confederate embankments at 10:20 AM and held desperately to their position as Confederate reinforcements from S.D. Lee’s Cavalry Brigade and Mahone’s old brigade rushed to the area.
Emboldened by the breakthrough on the right flank of the division Sickles ordered his other two brigades to renew their assault on Battery #17 at 10:40 AM. Brig. Gen. Joseph Carr, conspicuous in his gallantry this day, led his brigade from the front and once more charged the embankments at Battery #17 only to be thrown back once more. “I can't say as I have ever assaulted stronger embankments before,” Carr reported to Sickles, “I am beginning to think they are invulnerable.” Just as with their first attack this second attack was easily repulsed with heavy losses as Confederate defenses were simply too strong. Colquitt, whose brigade was dishing out the heavy enemy casualties, remarked to Col. Grimes that the Yanks “must be piled up two deep in front of the ramparts and they'll be three deep once I fire back at point-blank range. I guess if at first you don't succeed, attack the same place where you got butchered last time!”
It was at this moment a singularly odd event occurred that surprised the combatants on both sides. The 5th North Carolina of Iverson’s Brigade, fighting north of the Gunn Woods against the left flank of Sickles, became unsteadied and began to flee from their portion of the embankments. The heavy smoke caused some confusion as the men were fired on from multiple directions. The 5th North Carolina, with 552 men, routed towards the Union lines rather than back towards safety as they should have. The 5th North Carolina was quickly captured by Sickles’s men in the confusion around Battery #17.
Col. George Hall, commanding the Excelsior Brigade, continued his unequal fight in the woods near Battery #17. But as he tried to hold on to his hard-fought toehold he was mortally wounded about 11 AM. By 11:20 AM, with their commander killed and their lines reduced and exhausted, the New Yorkers had no choice but to retreat to safety eastward. The retreat quickly became a rout as the Confederates counterattacked and regained their full line of embankments near the bend.
By 11:40 AM Hooker had no choice but to call off the attack. “General Sickles,” he wrote, “go ahead and pull back your units in front of Battery #17.” Sickles’ bloody attack had been called off permanently having gained nothing more substantial than a brief lodgment at the bend in the Confederate lines. Sickles had gone into the action at 9:40 AM with 6,402 infantrymen in his three brigades. Both Carr and Revere were engaged just briefly, but bloodily, in front of Battery #17 in two separate charges. The Excelsior Brigade enjoyed more sustained success but paid a higher price as they too were eventually driven back from the Confederate lines with heavy losses. Sickles’s division was reduced to 4,599 men from 6,402 just two hours earlier, a loss of 1,949 men (30%).
For the Confederates the brigades of Colquitt and Featherston brought 4,148 men into the fighting around Battery #17 and the bend that morning. By 11:40 AM they had lost just a combined 230 men. Only if you take into account the freakish occurrence of the capture of the 5th North Carolina and their 552 men does the attack even approach anything like comparable losses. Even with that factored in the Federals still lost more than 2 to 1 in the attack. Had the 5th North Carolina not panicked in the heat of battle though it would have been better than an 8 to 1 loss ratio in front of the Confederate embankments for the Union attackers.
The Advance of Griffin
As the division of Daniel Sickles advanced against Battery #17 to their right flank the division of Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin now turned northward from the Gunn Woods to attack the embankments west of Battery #17. Griffin’s division had been engaged most of the morning with Mahone’s and then Wright’s brigades and had already suffered moderate casualties by late morning. Starting the day with 6,772 infantrymen in his three brigades Griffin had lost 937 men, including brigade commander Col. Stockton, in the Gunn Woods. Griffin’s remaining 5,835 men were fatigued and weakened even before the attack began. Confronting them would be the still largely untouched 1,839 North Carolinians of Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson’s brigade. Iverson’s Brigade positioned themselves behind embankments and had 13 artillery pieces studding their lines for immediate support.
Griffin ordered the brigades of Barnes and Sweitzer to advance against Iverson’s defenses while Stockton’s old brigade remained in reserve in the Gunn Woods. The Confederate defensive fire was devastating, and the Federals could do little against such resistance. Iverson’s Brigade fought well and fended off the attackers with ease. Only in the center did the 5th North Carolina show its lack of discipline when, after suffering only minor losses, they fled from their lines and towards the Union center. As covered earlier in this chapter their capture was completed by Sickles’ division but it was Griffin’s men who dislodged them from their position. Despite this success the attack immediately fell apart as the rest of Iverson’s men held. The reformed brigade of Brig. Gen. Marcus Wright rushed forward into the hole created by the 5th North Carolina and took a measure of revenge as they poured a fresh fire into the Yankees just beyond the embankments. Griffin, realizing he could make no progress here, ordered his men back into the woods within 20 minutes and saw no reason to renew the assault as Sickles had on his right.
In just those twenty minutes his men had been exposed to the enemy fire he had lost 320 men. While Iverson’s Brigade lost a total of 571 the 5th North Carolina accounted for 552 of those. The other three regiments in the brigade suffered just 19 casualties in holding off the Federal attack on their front.
Along the James
Brig. Gen. David Birney’s division represented the left flank of the Federal advance near the James River. Despite being supported by Farnsworth’s Cavalry Brigade there was still too much land to cover and not enough men to cover it with. Brig. Gen. John H. Ward’s brigade had been detached by Hooker to support Sickles’ division in the center and this left Birney with just two brigades on the left flank. Robinson’s brigade, already engaged earlier in the Gunn Woods, was held in reserve to protect against any counterattack leaving only Brig. Gen. Hiram Berry’s brigade for offensive action. Berry’s large brigade consisted of 2,781 men in six regiments and had missed the earlier fighting in Gunn Woods.
At 11:20 AM Berry’s brigade, hugging the river’s edge, advanced northward against the Confederate flank. Abatis slowed the Federal advance sufficiently for the Confederates to quickly reinforce the area and contest the advance. The 2nd and 30th North Carolina, of Ramseur’s Brigade, were rushed to the embankments there and unleashed a heavy volley into the Federals beneath the embankment’s walls. The rest of Ramseur’s Brigade were positioned facing south limiting the action to just along the banks of the James. Berry’s men stubbornly clung to their small lodgment along the Confederate line but were soon being driven back. Rather than trying to run the gauntlet of enemy fire back to the Federal lines the 17th Maine, 37th New York, and 3rd and 5th Michigan all fled north under the protection of the riverbank’s edge to escape the enemy fire. Berry rode among these units trying to rally them and get them back into fighting order. The Federals had long wished to get behind the Confederate position but these units now found themselves cut-off and without support along the James. Grimes (commanding DH Hill’s Division) sent word to Hill that, “It looks like the Federals who fled north of our position will be easily captured with the assistance of our cavalry.”
By 1 PM the four units of Berry’s brigade behind the Confederate lines had been corralled and were fighting pinned against the river. For Berry it was a maddening moment. Just downriver the Federal gunboats had, at long last, arrived on the scene and were lobbing long-range shells at the Confederate lines – but they were too distant to save them at them moment. Meanwhile, to the east, a loud cheer and crash of musketry filled the air portending that something critical was occurring just beyond his line of sight. But for Berry the battle was over. With no way to escape the murderously enclosing circle around his regiments he would have to surrender. Berry ordered his men to cease firing as a white flag was flown and the colors lowered. The Confederates had little time to celebrate, Berry noticed, as they yelled for his men to move to the rear and out of the way. Berry marched with his 1,226 men north for Richmond as prisoners of war.
Into the Breach
Watching the slaughter and surrender of Berry’s brigade the Federals were disgusted at their inability to break the Confederate line to rescue their comrades. Stiff Confederate resistance all morning had thwarted them at every turn around Battery #17. As Brig. Gen. David Birney rode along his lines he still had one brigade of organized and rested men available for action. Brig. Gen. John Robinson’s brigade had spent the past few hours in a ravine shielded from the Confederate guns and resting after their earlier action in the Gunn Woods. Robinson had kept a close eye on the Confederate works to his front and saw a window of opportunity now that the Rebels had turned their full attention on Berry’s brigade. Robinson reported to Birney that he believed he could break the Confederate line and turn the Confederate flank around the James River. Birney, anxious for any progress, agreed to his plan and ordered him to attack. Robinson took the position at the head of his brigade and ordered a charge at 1 PM.
Robinson’s sudden rush caught the Confederates unprepared and the 12th North Carolina of Iverson’s Brigade and the 3rd Alabama of Rodes’s Brigade were routed from the embankments north of Gunn Woods. All hell had broken loose along the Confederate front and for the first time all day the line seemed ready to give way. The necessity of quickly closing the 250-yard gap in the Confederate line was not lost on Grimes as he rushed to send any reserves he could into the battle. “Damnation!” he exclaimed as he met with the colonel of the 48th Georgia, “There is a gap in the line and the rancid blue tide immediately poured through the western ramparts of the embankments. Your men will counterattack, sir!” The 48th Georgia, of Wright’s Brigade, along with the 44th Georgia of Ripley’s Brigade, were hurled into the breach in a desperate counterattack. Confederate cannon fire from both flanks tore holes in the blue lines and the resistance stiffened along both flanks of the breakthrough.
Despite the counterattack Porter urged Griffin to support Birney. “Don’t let the enemy stop you,” he signaled Griffin. “The gap still exists, and you can get several units through the line and firing into the flanks of the Rebels.” More Yankee regiments sprang from their positions in the woods and regiments from Sweitzer’s and Stockton’s brigades of Griffin’s division joined the attack with Griffin at their head. Union regiments were packed close together and the carnage was severe but the opportunity seemed to be the best one they had had all day.
Brig. Gen. David Birney, riding right up into the front lines as they battled the Confederates, was struck by a minie ball and mortally wounded just as the Confederates counterattacked once more. The units around him, seeing their general go down, lost heart and began to rout rearwards. As violently and suddenly as it had begun – the attack fell apart. Robinson took command of the division and ordered the broken remnants of his brigade to retreat back to their starting points. Griffin’s units, being torn apart by enemy artillery fire, fell back in disarray. The breakthrough, so promising at first, had become a slaughter as the Confederates rushed to seal the gap in their lines. DH Hill, observing from nearby, wrote to Lee that, “Those people in front of our ramparts have suffered badly and will suffer some more as they turn and run.”
The Federals were, indeed, suffering badly. An ill-advised supporting attack directly against Battery #17, by Birney’s last uncommitted brigade under Brig. Gen. John H. Ward, was bloodily repulsed and Ward wounded in the effort. Col. Jacob Sweitzer, trying to rally his men, was then struck and killed just inside the Gunn Woods. Everywhere along the southern embankments the Federals were routed away from the Confederate lines with heavy losses.
Losses
The Union casualties carpeted the ground in front of the Confederate embankments by midday. Any thought of a quick attack and drive past the Confederate embankments was now put to rest as the surviving Federal units fell back in disorder. Realizing the further futility of attacking Porter rode up to Hooker and ordered him to stand down. “You've tried hard all along the southern salient and I gave a good push with my men. Neither of us had any success. Pull back and rest.” The III and V Corps must regroup and fall back. Reynolds was only now arriving on the field with his fresh corps but the attacks had already been repulsed. To continue the attack with Reynolds, whose corps represented the last fresh large Federal unit, would be foolhardy. Reynolds men would be needed to support the Federal lines as they fell back should the enemy surge out of their embankments and attack the crippled remnants of Porter and Hooker. Porter knew his support of the quixotic offensive plan of Hooker and Reynolds had been disastrous. Undoubtedly McClellan was engaged to the north as firing had been heard from that direction all day. Porter hoped that his own actions had somehow allowed McClellan an opportunity to strike at the other part of Lee’s army with more success. But he doubted it. Whatever new plans were to be made would have to come from McClellan. Porter was exhausted and would be happy to turn full tactical control back over to Little Mac.
The actions around Battery #17 had begun just after the capture of Mahone’s Brigade at 9 AM. The combined strength of the III and V Corps, along with two brigades of cavalry, totaled some 29,467 men at that time. By 2:20 PM the Federal attacks had ended but with little to show for it. As they fell back the commanders assessed their losses and were shocked to see the carnage left behind them on the battlefield. The III Corps lost 43% of their number along with three brigade commanders (Hall, Berry, and Ward) and a divisional commander (Birney). Just 7,988 of 14,109 men remained in the III Corps as they took cover in the Gunn Woods to regroup.
For Porter’s V Corps their attacks had been equally devastating. Porter lost 44% of his 12,255 men in the attacks. Sykes’s division was hit the hardest with over half of its men killed or wounded on the field. Porter’s corps now numbered just 6,865 men as they backed away from Battery #17 and the Confederate embankments. Porter had lost four brigade commanders (Andrews, Warren, Stockton, and Sweitzer) in the attacks leaving just two of his brigade commanders still with their original units.
The cavalry brigades in support of the attacks suffered less as they never directly attacked the embankments. But action on the flanks and with Hood’s infantrymen bloodied them and they lost a combined 561 men during the fighting.
Between 9 AM and 2:20 PM Porter’s continuous attacks cost the Army of the Potomac a combined 12,072 men. The III and V Corps were all but wrecked in the attacks and their officer corps devastated. Though they still had a combined strength of nearly 15,000 men their exhaustion and demoralization from the failed attacks would make them unreliable moving forward. Whether or not McClellan could somehow inspire these men to keep fighting would remain to be seen.
For the Confederates the action around Battery #17 was intense. Ammunition shortages and an overextended line were constant threats but never caused them to falter. The strength of the Confederates on the southern embankments was roughly 18,445 men when the attacks began. This includes Anderson’s and DH Hill’s divisions along with S.D. Lee’s Cavalry Brigade. Hood’s brigades under Law and Benning were only briefly engaged with Sykes’s division during their attack and played no other role in the defense of the southern embankments so they were not included here. The defenders were in strong positions and were able to inflict lopsided casualties on the Yankees at every point along the line. In the five plus hours of fighting the Confederates lost just a combined 2,297 men. This is more than a 5:1 ratio and is proof of the effectiveness of their defensive fortifications and positioning. Were it not for the unfortunate confusion in the 5th North Carolina, which caused their 552 men to flee the battlefield and be captured almost without a fight, the losses would have been even more uneven. Undoubtedly the greatest Confederate loss was that of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet who was captured at the high-water mark of Sykes’s attack. Despite Longstreet’s loss it had been a good morning for the Army of Northern Virginia on the battlefield.
Artillery losses are harder for me to gauge for numerous reasons. But the Union artillery was concentrated heavily against Battery #17 and could do little damage to the Confederate artillery behind their embankments. All together the Federals lost about twenty artillery pieces during the fighting and another ten pieces as they fell back. The Confederates lost about seven and a number of those were from Sykes’s penetration of the Confederate line early in the fighting.
