Chapter One: South of Richmond
I. Early Maneuvering
II. Buildup Around Battery #17
III. Gunn Woods
IV. Mahone's Brigade is Attacked
V. Editor's Comments
Early Maneuvering
Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson’s Division, of Longstreet’s Corps, was ordered to move directly south from Richmond in response to the reports of enemy landings at Varina. Anderson’s brigades marched the four miles and took up a new position along the established embankments south of the city where Stephen D. Lee’s Cavalry Brigade had encamped the night before. With the infantry now holding the southernmost inner defensive works Lee’s cavalry brigade was freed to ride south to scout the countryside. Along the James River the CSS Patrick Henry also began to churn south to investigate the rumors of Union forces around Varina’s Landing. Leaving the protective cover of the five-gun heavy artillery battery at Drewry’s Bluff was risky but the need for accurate intel around Varina’s Landing made it necessary.
Beyond the sight of Anderson and S. D. Lee were the massed Federal forces of Hooker and Porter. At 5 AM Birney’s division of the III Corps began moving northward on the Varina Road with orders to scout the enemy positions south of Richmond and to attack if possible. On Porter’s front the men of Griffin’s division were marched up the New Market Road while Sykes’s men backtracked to the Darbytown Road and advanced northwest from there to move somewhat parallel to the other Union divisions. This move would also decrease the distance between the VI Corps left flank and that of the three other Union corps south of the Chickahominy. All of these forces were screened by the two cavalry brigades led by Brig. Gen. John Farnsworth and Col. David Gregg.
The early advance of the Federals south of Richmond
Once the sun was up high enough in the sky the two converging forces began to spot one another from the few pieces of high ground south of the capital. General Hooker wrote to Porter that, “The forward line of enemy entrenchments were found to be empty and we moved over them. We are progressing as planned and will continue to do so unless we find the enemy firmly entrenched behind more favorable ground. General Reynolds assures me his Corps is fast approaching Varina’s Landing and will be moving inland very soon. My intention at this point is to sweep and clear the enemy’s right flank and then move to take Richmond. We may also drive them into your own corps along the New Market Road and Darbytown Road and crush them between us. I do have some concerns about the enemy gunboat spotted on the James but I trust our own naval ships to deal with this slight threat. This battle must proceed and if we move quickly enough, we may deny them the good ground. I will move rapidly before they discover our strength.”
As Hooker continued his ride northward loud thuds began to reverberate from the direction of the James River. The CSS Patrick Henry, mounting two 8” Columbiads, opened long range fire on the Union cavalry scouting ahead of Hooker’s main column. The five-gun battery at Drewry’s Bluff added its own extreme long-range fire to that of the gunboats. Hooker looked at his watch to see the time was twenty minutes past 5 AM. The Federal cavalrymen were scarcely affected but a handful of men were wounded or killed in the early shelling. In order to support Hooker’s columns, and to silence the Rebel gunboat, the three Federal gunboats on the James were all dispatched to steam upriver and engage the Confederates. A fourth Union gunboat was anchored at Varina to protect the movement of Federal reinforcements over the river and would not be available until late afternoon.
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First Skirmishing of the Battle
Colonel Gregg, leading his cavalry brigade along the New Market Road, shielded the advance of Griffin’s V Corps division behind him. Ahead on the road, around Dr. Farmer’s residence, a slight elevation about two miles south of the main Confederate embankments offered an excellent view of the surrounding countryside. There a battalion of the 15th Virginia Cavalry had halted to observe the oncoming blue cavalrymen. The Federal troopers though were less than a mile from this position and Gregg ordered an immediate advance upon the stalled Rebel horsemen. Hoping to reclaim the high ground two of Gregg’s regiments charged the Virginians and drove them back with just a slight loss to both sides. Stephen Lee, realizing his position was too far forward, retraced his steps northward to the main Confederate line now occupied by most of Anderson’s Division. Stephen Lee’s other cavalry units to the west also fell back along Osborne’s Turnpike, ahead of the oncoming Federal columns, and into the Gunn Woods.
Within these woods the infantry brigade of Brig. Gen. William Mahone, of Anderson’s Division, were just coming into line. Mahone had been ordered south from the main Confederate position in order to “give the advancing enemy cavalry some grief,” according to Anderson. He was to “fall back after firing a few volleys unless the enemy fails to materialize. If the enemy does not appear soon fall back as I fear you may be flanked from the west.” Lee’s cavalrymen setup on Mahone’s vulnerable western flank and kept a close eye out for any enemy units coming through the thick woods. Mahone’s brigade consisted of 1,854 Virginians in five veteran regiments.
Observing this early action Porter was satisfied with the outcome so far. He wrote to Hooker that, “You certainly drove off the cavalry in front of you! I don't know why they would have ridden away so quickly. I thought they had a decent skirmish line formed. I would have left them where they were for a while longer in order to give any trailing infantry and artillery more time to deploy. That could indicate they have no infantry nearby. My advice to you would be to continue to advance your forces as rapidly as you deem appropriate. Their cavalry is falling back so there isn't as much need for stealth as I thought there might be.”
Things were not nearly so quiet as Porter supposed north of Hooker. Anderson now had seen enough to know he was dealing with a larger force of Yankees than he had previously estimated. He sent back word to Longstreet that there was “a lot of infantry coming up from the south on the Varina and New Market roads.” Confederate cavalry would continue to picket the eastern approaches should McClellan advance from that direction but a battle south of Richmond seemed imminent.
Buildup Around Battery #17
The two main roads heading towards Richmond from the south were Osborne’s Turnpike and the New Market Road. These came to a point just beyond Battery #17 on the Confederate’s southern line of embankments. This coming together of the roads became the focal point of the Union advance and also of the Confederate concentration. It was here that Anderson established his headquarters at the Childress House while his division occupied positions along the embankment facing south and southeast.
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For Porter and Hooker these roads offered the quickest way to strike at the enemy line. Further, because of a slight elevation in the terrain, Porter observed to Griffin that, “the New Market Road is hidden from the view of the Rebel embankments around Battery #17 until you get within point-blank range. This might allow you to get your infantry deployed without being under enemy fire or even observation.” Porter sent a courier to Hooker requesting his assistance in the attack by making a direct movement up the Osborne Turnpike and into Gunn Woods. Hooker replied that he would continue to drive as quickly as possible northward to join in the attack once launched. Lastly, Porter met with Sykes who was leading his trailing division northwestward under the cover of trees and along the Darbytown Road. Porter hoped Sykes might get around the enemy forces at Battery #17 and drive against a weakened eastern flank. With the III Corps and Griffin aiming at Battery #17, and Sykes moving to outflank the Confederate line, things were quickly escalating.
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Just to the north Longstreet was not nearly so oblivious to the buildup of enemy forces as Porter might have hoped. Longstreet wrote Lee that, “I can't believe that they will attack the emplacements around Childress house across the open fields. When enemy units approached the Gunn Woods I saw some then turning east down a minor road so they are probably looking at attacking through the western side of the forest
and through the valleys on that side where we can't get lines of sight. I hope to have D H Hill ready to meet them if they attack there.” Neither was Longstreet unaware of Sykes’ column which had been spotted intermittently as it moved. “I believe there is also an attack force moving against us along the Darbytown Road. If he does approach in that manner I will see him on that road and delay them until Hood can come down from the north to hit him in the flank and rear.”
Gunn Woods
The Gunn Woods stood just south of the main Confederate line of embankments held by Anderson’s Division. The woods bordered the embankments at one point and then stretched southward to the Gunn House over a mile away. Altogether they created a one and a half square mile area of heavy woods, randomly interspersed with small clearings, just south of Anderson’s forming lines. Osborne’s Turnpike ran north to south through the woods creating a covered approach to the Federals to move right up to the Confederate line without being observed or fired upon by the defenders. With the realization that the Federal force was larger than anticipated Anderson now knew he needed to hold these woods, and the road, as long as possible. D.H. Hill’s large division was even then moving south from Richmond and would arrive in another hour to more than double the number of men in the entrenchments facing the Yankees.
Mahone’s brigade built breastworks and were well-placed in the woods with their flanks covered and good fields of fire through some clearings near the road. Mahone’s men were joined by the Jeff Davis Legion and two battalions of the 15th Virginia Cavalry. Mahone sent back word to Anderson that he would “contest the area as long as feasible” but fall back to the north rather than risk being cut off by the oncoming Federal columns. Although his western flank was now guarded by dismounted cavalrymen it remained the weakest part of his line.
At 7:00 AM the first contact was made on Mahone’s front when the 8th Illinois Cavalry advanced on foot and skirmished with the Jeff Davis Legion. Mahone’s infantrymen joined the firefight and the Illinoisans were soon caught in an unequal contest. The 8th Illinois fell back but soon other Federal units were rushing into the woods to flush out the rebel units. Nearby cavalry regiments from both Gregg’s and Davis’s brigades were dismounted, and supported by the 2nd Maine infantry of Barnes’s brigade, and sent to attempt a flanking movement around the Confederate western flank in the woods. From the south along the turnpike the division of Brig. Gen. David Birney was moving from column into line to add their significant weight to the growing battle.
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These developments did not go unnoticed by either Mahone or Anderson. The Confederate cavalry of Stephen Lee were ordered out of the Gunn Woods at once as it became a standup infantry engagement in which they were overmatched. For Mahone, his orders were to wait 20 more minutes to allow D.H. Hill’s division more time to occupy positions in support of Anderson before also falling back. Mahone sent back word that he felt the main enemy attack was coming directly from the south. Longstreet was in full agreement and wrote to Lee that, “It definitely looks like Anderson is the target with the enemy’s main force coming through the Gunn Woods. Looks like a frontal assault forming. By the time they attack D.H. Hill will be ready to greet them. It's going to be fun.”
No sooner had the courier bearing this message left Longstreet when a sudden crash of musketry was heard from the south and the Gunn Woods came alive with gunfire. Was this the sound of Mahone’s rear guard or had something gone awry in the plans?
Mahone's Brigade is Attacked
At 7:40 AM the Federals launched their general attack in the Gunn Woods. Dismounted troopers and infantrymen alike advanced through the woods against Mahone’s men and the quickly falling back rear units of Lee’s cavalry brigade. Union troopers managed to get in behind some of Mahone’s men from the west and now threatened to cut off their line of retreat north on Osborne’s Turnpike. Anderson, observing this from his headquarters, sent word to Longstreet that it appeared they were attempting to isolate and cut-off Mahone’s brigade. But with so many Federal units now converging just south of the main Confederate position it would be risky to launch a counterattack to try and throw back the Federals in an open field fight.
The 18th and 22nd Massachusetts, of Barnes’ brigade, meleed a battalion of the 15th Virginia cavalry and routed them rearwards while other Federal units worked their way around the Mahone’s flank capturing the turnpike leading to Anderson’s position. Birney’s division pressed Mahone from the south to keep the pressure on as the Confederates became overwhelmed. Mahone rode along his lines encouraging his men and sent a courier to Anderson with the admission that he had begun his withdrawal, “twenty minutes too late!” He would attempt to escape through the thick woods to the west and try to work his way back up north to friendly lines as best he could. Anderson, discouraged at the turn of events, sent word to Pryor and Wright to have their brigades move southward in support of Mahone.
Col. James Barnes, leading a brigade of Griffin’s division of the V Corps, was putting in a fine performance this morning. It was his men that had worked around Mahone’s flank and had cut the turnpike in their rear. Col. Thomas Stockton, leading Griffin’s third brigade, came in on Barnes’ right and faced northwest into the Gunn Woods to guard the Union flank against any enemy sorties to save Mahone. To the south Brig. Gen. John Robinson’s brigade of the III Corps was pressing Mahone’s other flank while Federal cavalrymen were still skirmishing in the woods and adding their firepower to the fight.
Hooker, directing the growing battle from his saddle, took time to dictate the following message to Porter: “The skirmish in the Gunn Woods goes well. I regret the delay in our advance towards the enemy’s main line but I believe we have a very good chance to bag between 1,500 and 2,000 rebels in the Gunn Woods.”
As the losses mounted for Mahone in the woods his units became disrupted or routed completely. By 8:40 AM the Federals of Barnes’ and Robinson’s brigades, with assistance from the Federal cavalry, had succeeded in isolating over 1,000 men of Mahone’s Brigade. The two brigades sent to relieve Mahone, Pryor’s and Wright’s, were now too late to save Mahone. Wright’s Brigade, advancing under the cover of the Gunn Woods and supported by the 8th Florida of Pryor’s Brigade, collided with the Federals of Stockton’s brigade and exchanged some heavy fire. Colonel Stockton ordered a counterattack and managed to rout the Floridians and Georgians in his front. Wright’s other units could now only attempt to fall back northward to escape the Gunn Woods themselves.
For Mahone, the end had come. At 9 AM Federal attacks forced the capitulation of the 16th, 41st, and 61st Virginia regiments and the Jeff Davis Legion of Stephen Lee’s Cavalry Brigade. Mahone was escorted rearward by a detachment of Robinson’s Pennsylvanians to sit out the remainder of the battle. A quick note was sent by the Pennsylvanians and passed to some Georgians of Wright’s Brigade reading that, “You have our assurances that General Mahone and his men will be treated well.” In no mood for such pleasantries Brig. Gen. Marcus Wright angrily replied that the battle was far from over. The battle had only just begun.
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With Mahone’s Brigade now cleared from the woods the Federals were free to continue their advance northward against the Confederate embankments. Had Mahone bought enough time for Longstreet to prepare?
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Before we continue with the battle on this part of the field let’s head to the north where the morning had passed much more quietly for those on the Chickahominy River.
Editor's Comments
The action in the Gunn Woods was a one-sided affair. Mahone’s Brigade was well positioned as a blocking force against units marching from the south along Osborne’s Turnpike but they were vulnerable to enemy units turning their own eastern flank via the New Market Road. This is precisely what happened. Once Mahone was outflanked there was little left that he could do as his main route of retreat was cut off. Any possibility of retreating back through the woods to the northwest was also hopeless as Federal units, fresh and in good order, seemed to swarm them from every side. In just over an hour the Federals managed to nearly wipe out Mahone’s once strong brigade. Having begun the day with 1,847 men the five Virginia regiments suffered 1,406 casualties and were removed as an effective fighting force. The 6th and 12th Virginia managed to extricate themselves from the trap but were both heavily fatigued and reduced in numbers. By 9 AM Anderson’s Division had been reduced to 7,369 men from their full-strength figure of 8,884. This amounts to a loss of 1,515 men, or about 17% of Anderson’s force, from the fighting in the Gunn Woods and the area around it. Stephen D. Lee’s cavalry losses were 505 men from the morning battle in the Gunn Woods bringing Confederate losses to a total of 2,020. The Federals of Birney’s and Griffin’s divisions, and the cavalry brigades supporting them, lost a combined total of 1,177 men in the fighting in Gunn Woods and the surrounding area.
As originally stated by Anderson the chief goal of Mahone’s mission was originally to ambush and give the Union cavalrymen a bloody repulse. This morphed into a delaying action once the full strength of the Union advance became clear. Mahone could have accomplished the delaying action with just a regiment or two and moved the rest of his brigade back closer to the main lines for safety. Instead Mahone’s full brigade remained over a mile to the front of Anderson’s Division where they were easily cut-off, isolated, and captured by an overwhelming and well-coordinated enemy attack. Despite heavier losses than were necessary the main goal of delaying the Federals was successful. The Federals were delayed south of the strengthening Confederate lines around Battery #17. Anderson’s Division would be reinforced by D.H. Hill’s Division on one flank and John Bell Hood’s Division on the other while the fighting went on in the Gunn Woods.