Prologue: Strategies
Union Plans
As the firing on Winstead Hill grew louder it became apparent that the battle was unfolding further north than Rosecrans had planned on. Rosecrans called a conference for his generals in Franklin to discuss the sudden change in the situation. As the generals entered the command headquarters Rosecrans began by stating unequivocally that:
“We must attack to drive them back to the West Harpeth and away from Franklin. The enemy has already shown themselves on Breezy Hill and appear ready to fight us there. The question is do we attack straight ahead as they seem to want us to, or do we seek to attack them someplace other than Breezy Hill?”
Before his officers could answer Rosecrans offered his own vision of how the coming battle should play out.
“Major General Thomas, you will take your men and move on the isolated and unguarded West Harpeth River crossings west of Carter’s Creek Pike. You will then turn eastward and sweep to the south of the West Harpeth. McCook will attack frontally against Winstead Hill to pin the enemy in place while I move Gorman’s men forward to Franklin in support. Lastly, Crittenden, you will move south and cross the Harpeth River beyond the enemy right flank.”
Thomas was the first to speak up. “My cavalry can move forward for the westernmost West Harpeth River crossings to get south of the river right away." He then differed from Rosecrans's opinion by suggesting that his infantry move directly for the Carter's Creek Pike and the main crossing over the West Harpeth rather than use one of the isolated and disconnected crossings further to the west.
After Thomas spoke Maj. Gen. Alexander McCook began to explain his reservations. “Given the unknowns of Rebel strength, dispositions, and intentions, it seems prudent to initially focus on the conservation of our forces. To best accomplish this, I would encourage concentrating our forces by having the three wings positioned such that we can quickly support each other should the Rebels try to focus on any one of our columns. I would think it unwise for any of our columns to stray too far from the center until we know more about the enemy. While I dislike giving the Rebs the initiative, our cause may be well served by taking advantage of their hubris and aggressiveness to adopt a counterpunching strategy in the early part of the coming battle. By concentrating our forces, we can perhaps gain a decisive local superiority on one of their attacking columns.”
McCook’s arguments were well-received, and the commanding general thought about the proposal of his subordinates for a bit before opting to follow his advice and alter his plan. Thomas would now move directly east towards Franklin rather than southeast towards Carter’s Crossing or to the unguarded westernmost river crossings. He would thus come to the Union center and be closer to the other wings of the army.
On the left flank Maj. Gen. Thomas Crittenden would move for McGavock’s Ford over the Harpeth River as Crittenden believed it was the key to protecting the left flank of McCook’s advance against Winstead Hill. “I believe,” Crittenden told the others, “that control of McGavock’s Ford, as well as Hughes and Mill fords, before I cross my Wing in force, is essential to establishing a strong defensive position around Winstead Hill with McCook. If the Rebs control McGavock’s Ford, then General McCook’s position will soon become untenable.”
With the leaders now in full agreement as to their plans the gentlemen parted ways and rode back to their commands. Up ahead the Rebels on Winstead Hill were identified as infantry and the firing increased in intensity.
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The map above shows the general Union plans as decided upon at the start of the battle. The discarded plans to strike across the unguarded fords to the west and/or to cut across country to reach the Carter's Creek Crossing quicker are shown as well.
Confederate Plans
To the south, along the Columbia Pike, the Confederate generals were huddled together around a roaring fire set up alongside the pike to warm the columns of men marching past after wading through the West Harpeth River. Soon arrived from the scouts moving towards Franklin that the enemy had marched rapidly southward and were even then just a few miles up the road. Troopers from the 14th Alabama Cavalry Battalion confirmed this and reported the Federals moving south from Franklin along the Columbia Pike in great numbers. An estimated corps, at least, of men would soon be moving up the opposite side of Winstead Hill while Polk’s men, just to the south, were starting to scramble up the other side. To the west, Wheeler's cavalrymen reported Union troopers riding rapidly to Carter's Crossing and blocking the advance of Hardee's men. A battle was now imminent.
Bragg, anxious to overcome the reputation he had earned in Kentucky, was spoiling for a fight. Around him generals Polk, Hardee, Price, and Breckinridge were awaiting orders.
“Polk, you and your corps will advance on Winstead Hill to engage the enemy and hold them as long as you can without incurring too heavy of losses. General Price, your men are the nearest to Polk’s and you will take all but two of your brigades to his assistance. The final two brigades in your line will begin to entrench around the Columbia Pike river crossing and form a line for the rest of the army to fall back upon from Winstead Hill, should it be needed. Breckinridge, you will move up your corps in support of Polk and Price. On our left flank, Hardee, you will counterattack those Yankee cavalrymen reported to be already crossing south of the river and regain Carter’s Crossing. You will then deploy your corps defensively to guard our flank from the southern side of the West Harpeth River. The two cavalry brigades under Armstrong and Wharton will be detached from their infantry corps and sent east to the Lewisburg Pike. They will work in conjunction with Buford’s Cavalry Brigade to guard and picket the Lewisburg Pike and the crossing point over the West Harpeth along that road.” Bragg asked his generals if they had any questions or comments. After some discussion about whether or not to more stoutly defend Winstead Hill it was decided to go with Bragg’s plan of defending it only so long as the advantages of terrain and losses were on their side. Once pressed hard enough, or if losses became too heavy, they would fall back for the West Harpeth River line.
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The generals parted to ride to their separate commands as the Confederate cavalry on the Columbia Pike was grappling with the lead elements of the Union horde moving south.
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The map above shows the general Confederate plans as decided upon at the start of the battle. Bragg began the battle determined to fight it out at Winstead Hill as long as practicable. To the south the Confederates were outflanked as Buford's lone cavalry brigade was all that blocked Crittenden's Wing from advancing directly south.