Introduction: Setting up the Battle
Campaign Background
Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Kentucky Campaign during the fall of 1862 had not gone according to plan. While Bragg’s army managed to penetrate into Kentucky all the way to nearly the Ohio River, they were not met by the thousands of volunteers they had hoped would rally to their colors. After the inconclusive battle at Perryville in October the Confederate forces in Kentucky decided to withdraw from the state and retreat back into Tennessee before the winter came. The end of the active campaign also brought an end to the tenure of Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell as commander of the Union forces. President Abraham Lincoln chose to appoint Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans in his place and directed him to conduct an offensive to drive back Bragg’s army from Middle Tennessee.
Throughout November and early December the Union Army of the Cumberland concentrated and refitted in Nashville, Tennessee. Rosecrans delayed his offensive plans due to weather, supplies, and an abundance of caution. Repeated requests to Lincoln for reinforcements were rebuffed as Lincoln had no more men to spare at the moment. It wasn’t until the disastrous Battle of Fredericksburg that Lincoln realized that the success of any offensive move by Rosecrans was now imperative to the war effort. He agreed to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland by stripping the Mississippi River garrisons and sending them to Nashville. With the reinforcements soon to arrive in Nashville Lincoln directed Rosecrans to begin his offensive at once. Lincoln hoped that Rosecrans might give the nation a victory to end the year on a more positive note before the Emancipation Proclamation went into effect on January 1, 1863. Rosecrans still hesitated. Meanwhile, Bragg’s army vanished from Rosecrans's front.
For Bragg the winter had been a bad one. After encamping at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the army was beset by leadership quarrels and accusations as the high command turned on itself looking for scapegoats for the failed Kentucky Campaign. President Jefferson Davis visited the army in early December to judge for himself the condition of the army. But Davis found the army in better spirits than he had imagined and was pleased by Bragg’s continued insistence on a renewed campaign to retake Nashville before the Federals could fully reform and entrench in the city. Davis was convinced the best way for the army to get over the failures in Kentucky was to launch another active campaign and so decided to send Bragg whatever reinforcements he could from Mississippi and Alabama to support him.
In mid-December Bragg moved westward for the town of Spring Hill south of the West Harpeth River. Hoping to approach Nashville from the weaker side he then turned northward towards Franklin and then the state capital beyond that. Rosecrans soon learned of Bragg’s movements to approach Nashville from the south and decided the time was now right to move against him before he approached the city's incomplete defenses. Hoping to catch Bragg in the open, Rosecrans moved south from Nashville for a direct confrontation with Bragg’s army.
On the morning of December 29 Rosecrans watched as his army moved south towards the West Harpeth River along the Columbia Pike south of Franklin. Just ahead was Winstead Hill through which the pike ran to reach the open fields beyond in the West Harpeth River plain. Atop the hills scattered gunfire was heard and Confederate horsemen were suddenly coming up the pike. The battle for control of Middle Tennessee was beginning.
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The Battlefield Map as shown from above. Each of the three main pikes are listed. The five objectives on the map are marked with yellow stars. For a better view click on the map to expand it. Note that the northern side of the map is on the right-hand side.
Union Backstory
Rosecrans’s army moved south for Franklin, Tennessee, with McCook’s Wing in the center, Thomas’s Wing on the right, and Crittenden’s Wing on the left. Rosecrans had hoped to cross the West Harpeth at numerous points to attack Bragg south of the river. But with the battle now unfolding north of the river he would have to make adjustments.
Union cavalry scouts reported that the bulk of Bragg’s army was now north of Spring Hill and preparing to cross the Harpeth River via the Columbia Pike. Other columns were spotted to the west and east of the pike, but the Confederate cavalry shielded their numbers effectively. The Union cavalry, divided equally between the Union corps, knew they were outnumbered and chose to stay closer to their infantry support as the two armies came together.
Behind the central column of McCook’s Wing were the long-awaited reinforcements sent by Lincoln. A full two divisions from the Department of Eastern Arkansas under Brig. Gen. Willis Gorman were marching southward in a hurry to join Rosecrans's army. Their added strength would give Rosecrans a full 65,000 men in order to attack and defeat Bragg’s army south of Franklin.
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To the right the Union's Order of Battle is listed. Two Wings consists of three divisions and two Wings of two divisions. The Federals have a total of four Wings, ten Divisions, thirty-one Brigades, and four Cavalry Brigades.
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Below is the Spring Hill to Franklin Map showing the starting locations of the Union forces on the field of battle. Note that only Union forces are shown on this map. Thomas's Wing is to the west while McCook's is in the center and Crittenden to the east. Gorman's reinforcements are approaching rapidly from the north and will begin to arrive within an hour. Remember that you can click on the map to expand it.
Confederate Backstory
Bragg’s Army of Tennessee arrived in Spring Hill where substantial reinforcements awaited them from Mississippi. Maj. Gen. Sterling Price had led the remnants of the old Army of West Tennessee northward after their failed campaigns of the fall to reverse the losses around Corinth, Mississippi. Price’s men, eager for revenge, formed a new corps under Bragg for the coming campaign. Maj. Gen. John Breckinridge was promoted to corps command, and the army's divisions shuffled, to give Bragg four corps of two divisions each for the coming battle.
Bragg’s army began to cross the West Harpeth River early on December 29. Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk’s Corps took the lead while being followed by Price’s Corps and then Breckinridge’s Corps. All three corps were moving north along the Columbia Pike towards Franklin. To the west the corps of Lt. Gen. William Hardee moved on the left flank to cross the river along Carter’s Creek Pike. To the east of the Columbia Pike only the cavalry brigade of Brig. Gen. Abraham Buford advanced along the Lewisburg Pike to guard the army’s weaker right flank.
As the march began on December 29, Confederate cavalry soon reported the rapid advance of Union forces from Nashville. Bragg had hoped to fully cross the river before the battle began but up ahead the sound of firing could already be heard from atop Winstead Hill.
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To the right the Confederate Order of Battle is listed. There are four corps, eight divisions, twenty-eight brigades, and four cavalry brigades.
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Below is the Spring Hill to Franklin Map showing the starting locations of the Confederate forces on the field of battle. Note that only Confederate forces are shown on this map. Three corps move along the Columbia Pike while only Hardee's men are on the Carter's Creek Pike. The Lewisburg Pike is guarded by only Buford's Cavalry Brigade.
Victory Conditions
In the scenarios I create I do not use the traditional victory conditions. Instead, I use objectives and casualty limits to determine the victor in the scenario.
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Winning with Objectives
There are a total of five objective hexes on the map. The side which controls three of five objective hexes at the end of the scenario will be declared the victor. These five objectives were selected for numerous reasons. To begin with the three objectives along the West Harpeth River each sit along a Pike which would have been an obvious crossing point for any army moving in this region. These three points are spaced out and offer almost no easy east-west maneuverability between them. This will make shifting men back and forth very time-consuming and difficult for the Confederate defenders. Any Union attack will be equally as difficult if they concentrate exclusively on the three pike crossings and ignore the twelve other crossing points spaced out along the river. Two of these are in Union hands at the start of the battle and offer a clear path across the river (albeit a roundabout one to the west). Assuming the Confederates use just 1,000 men to guard each of the thirteen crossing points in their possession then a full corps will be needed to protect the line along the river. This will greatly reduce the number of men available for battle north of the river.
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Franklin was chosen as an objective point as it would force the Federal army to not abandon their line of communication back to Nashville. This was an obvious choice for an objective point.
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Lastly, the high ground in the center of the map at Winstead Hill was another easy choice. I placed units from both sides in a position to rapidly clash atop the heights from the very start of the game. The Confederates will arrive on the heights just one turn before the Federals do. If played well the Confederates may be able to hold the heights for an extended period and force the Federals to expend time and manpower to drive them back from the objective. If forced back off of Winstead Hill, there are few areas which offer any geographical advantages for the Confederates until they reach the West Harpeth River.
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Winning with Casualties
The reality is that many of the games we play are borderline unrealistic bloodbaths in which commanders have no need to rationalize their losses because there is "no tomorrow". Actual Civil War generals were constantly reminded about the importance of keeping their army intact and of minimizing losses for both political and military reasons. Even the most bloodiest of battles rarely saw casualties exceed 35% of the available men engaged for either side. Therefore I have set casualty limits for both sides which will automatically result in a defeat should they lose too many men in the battle.
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The Confederates have 55,000 men on the battlefield in total. They can take up to 38% losses in the battle (20,900 men). Artillery losses do NOT count towards this total – only infantrymen and cavalrymen.
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The Federals have 65,000 men on the battlefield in total. They can take up to 35% losses in the battle (22,750). Artillery losses do NOT count towards this total – only infantrymen and cavalrymen.
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If either side crosses their threshold for casualties it results in an automatic win for the other side.