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Part One: Along the Columbia Pike

Action around Winstead Hill
 

Even as the generals rode back to their commands the fighting had already broken out near Winstead Hill. Post’s brigade, of Davis’s division, formed into line at the head of McCook's column and began moving south on either side of the Columbia Pike. Encountering the 14th Alabama Cavalry they opened fire and inflicted 46 losses on the Confederate horsemen who quickly fled back up the Columbia Pike. Carlin’s and Woodruff’s brigades, also of Davis’s division, then moved up on Post’s left while behind Davis the other two divisions of the wing marched towards the sound of the guns.

 

The Confederates on the other side of the hill rushed forward to reach the crest of Winstead Hill ahead of the Federal troops. Cheatham’s Division took the lead with three of his four brigades heading directly onto the high ground. The fourth brigade, under Brig. Gen. Daniel Donelson, moved east to form the right flank of the division facing the more open ground east of the hills. Behind Cheatham’s men the second division of Polk’s Corps, under Maj. Gen. Jones Withers, moved east to refuse the right flank of the Confederates guarding the Winstead Hill area.

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Map #1.jpg

The map above shows the area around Winstead Hill as the two forces began battling over the high ground around Columbia Pike.

The infantrymen of Stewart’s Brigade were the first to make contact with the Federals from Davis’s division at 10:20 AM. Firing erupted around the Winstead House as both sides collided in the woods and hills surrounding the property. The battle spread to the east as additional forces came together along the base of Winstead Hill.

 

McCook rode back to meet with Rosecrans who was watching the fighting from the Carter House while awaiting the arrival of Gorman’s Wing from the north. McCook told Rosecrans that, “We must take this high ground. But to do so we will likely take heavy losses. Depending on how large the enemy force there really is will determine how many. If they have a full corps with guns, it could get very bloody, but I think we have to commit to taking it fully.” Rosecrans pondered only briefly before nodding and commanding McCook to commit all his men to the task. The battle for Winstead Hill grew heavier as Johnson’s division came into line aside Davis’s and they pushed together against the Confederates defending the heights.

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For the Confederates on Winstead Hill the fighting was not progressing well. Union regiments had pushed quickly up the hill and prevented them from fully deploying ahead of the attacks as they had planned. Further, the nearest reinforcements for Polk's Corps were being dispatched to a different part of the battlefield where events were escalating even faster than along the Columbia Pike. For the moment Polk's Corps was on its own. This, along with the redoubled Union efforts against Winstead Hill, forced them to reevaluate their position on the high ground. Polk told Bragg that, “the fighting here is problematic. We are not going to be on the winning side here of who dishes out more pain in the way of losses. We can't continue to stand and fight without better odds. My only recourse is to withdraw from the hill, and because of disruption in our ranks, it will have to go slowly. Support can come none too soon!” Bragg had no other choice, given the Union’s strong push on Polk’s left flank, and the lack of ready reinforcements, then to allow Polk to fall back to the south.

 

As Bragg observed the fighting from his headquarters south of Winstead Hill he was joined briefly by General Price. Price's Corps, even though they were the closest assistance for Polk's troubled divisions, were moving rapidly for another part of the battlefield where they were needed even more. A few miles to the south Breckinridge's Corps was moving up and would arrive soon to reinforce Polk's line - but until then it would be a close thing. Bragg spoke briefly to Price as his men moved eastward and away from the fighting on the Columbia Pike, “If we can just get Polk and Breckinridge linked together, we should be able to put up a very good fight to hold the river crossing here on the Columbia Pike. If they then advance on our works we can inflict heavy casualties on them.”

 

Back on Winstead Hill, Polk’s men began a fighting withdrawal to the south as they contested McCook's advance. Confederate artillery finally opened fire from their positions south of the hill in support after the Confederates cleared their line of fire. But the Union infantry was not deterred as they followed up the Confederates as they fell back from their positions. The 35th Illinois was the first unit to reach the far side of Winstead Hill, at 11:20 AM, and view the panorama stretching for miles before them south of the hill. Confederate artillery positions were fully revealed, as were the Confederate lines as they fell back in disarray. The Columbia Pike could be viewed for over a mile southward and revealed no fresh enemy columns rushing north to support the enemy units now retreating.

Confederate Retreat
 

With the line on Winstead Hill now broken there was nothing to do but keep falling back under the cover of the artillery to the rear. Polk wrote Bragg that, “The Yanks continue to press mightily… they hold Winstead Hill in force and have brought up artillery support as well and soon they will begin shelling our positions down in the valley.” Bragg rode to the scene of the fighting to view it for himself and talk to Polk. After some discussion it was decided that Polk would keep falling back on the western side of the Columbia Pike while Breckinridge would come up in support to the east of the pike when he arrived. Bragg hoped they would be able to link together north of the Chaffin house about a mile from where the Columbia Pike crossed the West Harpeth.

 

Hardee also viewed the scene as he consulted with Bragg behind the lines. “I wonder whether the Yankees will push at all or choose to consolidate on Winstead Hill. I think that might tell us quite a lot about the wider Union strategy. If they don't push, then that strongly suggests to me that they don't plan on pushing for the Columbia Pike crossing, which in turn suggests to me they see a better chance of grabbing one of the other two pike crossings we currently hold.” Bragg replied to say that, “Either they are going for the Columbia crossing or they are waiting on support. I would think they would want to push on as quickly as is possible. They have to know time is hurting them, each minute that passes means one more ton of dirt we've been moving to form defenses.”

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Map #3.jpg

The Confederates planned to fall back to within a mile of the West Harpeth River if pressed after the initial Union success atop Winstead Hill. 

Union Inaction
 

Additional Union forces now occupied Winstead Hill even as the Rebels retreated. Union artillery soon unlimbered on the heights and began raining shells on the Confederates in the valley below. Behind McCook’s Wing, the two divisions of Gorman’s Wing had begun to arrive from Franklin to reinforce the effort along the pike. With two full wings coming into line around Winstead Hill the Federals were poised for a strong push southward along either side of the Columbia Pike. But Rosecrans ordered the advance to halt as additional Confederate forces were seen moving to the north along Columbia Pike to reinforce those they had just driven back.

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Gorman rode to meet with McCook to ask where to put his troops into the battle as they arrived. McCook ordered him to move his divisions to either side of his own corps to extend his line in both directions - east and west. McCook’s men would begin to entrench upon Winstead Hill to make sure they could hold the position if the reinforced Confederates opted to counterattack to retake the high ground

 

Polk used this gift of time being provided to him to reorganize his men and take up a more forward position than was originally planned. Rather than falling back to within a mile of the West Harpeth River, their line was now over a mile further north and just south of Winstead Hill. Breckinridge's Corps would soon be arriving to extend Polk's left flank west of the Columbia Pike as well. Despite some long-range artillery shots by the Union artillerymen, the retreat of Polk’s Corps was uneventful after fleeing off of Winstead Hill. “Well, now we know for the moment that the Yanks intend to sit on the hill and consolidate their forces building defenses,” Bragg declared to Polk and Breckinridge at 1 PM. What would their next move be?

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Winstead Hill:
Commentary

 

The battle began with both sides grappling for control of the high ground around Winstead Hill. The Confederates of Polk’s Corps numbered 13,286 as they approached the high ground. Already through the gap were 51 Tennessee sharpshooters and the 59 men of the 14th Alabama Cavalry Battalion. Opposing them were the 16,898 men of McCook’s Wing moving south on the Columbia Pike from Franklin. The Federals quickly brushed aside the enemy cavalrymen and prepared to storm the high ground as soon as they could.

 

It was then that the Confederates made the first error of the battle. They quickly withdrew the 51 Tennesseans holding a key blocking position along the pike in order to save them from being wiped out by the oncoming Federal forces. By sacrificing the 51 infantrymen in a blocking action they might have been able to gain another 20 minutes of time to bring up their forces and fully deploy on Winstead Hill. Instead, they fell back into the gap and allowed the Federals to move forward a few extra hundred yards and start the attack as quickly as possible. This meant the Confederates were unable to fully deploy and prepare their lines on the high ground before the Federals were atop them. What could have been a defensive bastion for the Confederates was wasted as a result. The left of Cheatham’s Division was also unsupported as Withers’s Division was sent to his right flank to guard the gap east of Winstead Hill. While covering that gap made some sense, it left Cheatham without any support. The Federals soon found his weak left flank in the air and exploited it.

 

The next most natural support for Polk’s Corps were then the men of Price’s Corps who might have arrived within two hours to double the number of defenders around the high ground. But Price’s men were ordered to the east and so Polk was left to fight alone. With his left flank turned by McCook, there was nothing that Polk could do except fall back and concede the best ground on the battlefield to the Yankees.

 

For the Federals it had been a much easier morning than they had anticipated. The prospect of trying to attack a fully deployed enemy force on the high ground to their front was not appealing. Hoping to avoid this they attacked rapidly forward and with reckless abandon. The audacity succeeded as the Confederates were struck hard and soon were overwhelmed by the superior Union numbers then on the hill. To the east the gap around Winstead Hill was never utilized as the Federals occupied it but never advanced beyond it. The battle for the high ground took precedence and they quickly succeeded in their objective to gain that ground.

 

The Confederates of Polk’s Corps had suffered 1,207 casualties in the fighting around Winstead Hill and as they fell back south along the Columbia Pike. Over 1,000 of these came from Cheatham’s Division which had done the majority of the fighting against McCook’s Corps. For the Federals it had been an easy morning considering what they had accomplished and what they had prepared themselves for. Only 1,093 of McCook’s men fell in the attack on Winstead Hill.

 

By 1 PM the battle for Winstead Hill had ended. It was firmly in Union hands, and they had halted to consolidate, fortify, and regroup, on the high ground. Soon the sounds of battle from elsewhere drowned out the sounds of digging shovels as McCook's men entrenched.

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But the question of why the Union opted to halt their attack even as the enemy fled before them must be addressed. For the Federals, the fear of the unknown to the south likely caused them to become overly cautious after their victory on Winstead Hill. They had been able to observe Confederate units moving around the battlefield far to the south from their vantage points atop Winstead Hill. But where these units were disappearing to was still unknown. They were also able to observe the oncoming arrival of Breckinridge's Corps as they crossed the West Harpeth River and moved to support Polk. The combination of seeing all these moving parts likely influenced their decision to halt and fortify what they had won rather than risk their early success by rushing forward too quickly. 

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Was the decision to halt and fortify the high ground the right one? Has the fighting atop Winstead Hill really come to a close? Only time will tell. 

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Map #5.jpg

The halting of the Federal attack atop Winstead Hill has allowed the Confederates to stop their retreat southward just a mile south of the Union held heights. Polk's men are shifting south of the pike while Breckinridge's arriving corps is moving to the north of it. 

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