There was very little real action along Carter’s Creek Pike during the morning and early afternoon. When the day began Hardee’s entire corps (12,892 men) was within two miles of Carter's Crossing with Wheeler's cavalry brigade screening the advance. Initially opposing them were just the 1,072 men of Minty's cavalry brigade. Minty led his brigade across the creek to scout across the river only to be pushed back over it by Wheeler's troopers almost immediately. Minty then fell back to higher ground a half-mile northeast of the crossing to contest and Confederate advance over the river to its northern side. 

 

Rather than advancing across the river to attack Minty's small brigade, the Confederates halted and began to defend the river crossings. This decision was prompted by two things. First, the Confederate commanders had identified McCook's Wing along Columbia Pike and Crittenden's Wing along Lewisburg Pike to the east, but they had been unable to identify where Thomas's force was located. They were also aware that additional reinforcements had been sent to Rosecrans from Nashville (Gorman's Department of Arkansas troops) but did not yet know when or from where they would reach Rosecrans's army. Second, the appearance of Zahm's cavalry brigade on the southern side of the West Harpeth River, coming against their western flank from the direction of the unguarded fords, caused significant concern that a larger enemy force might be rolling towards them on their left. These two considerations brought Hardee's Corps to a halt and prompted their transition from an offensive to a defensive force. Accordingly, Bragg ordered Hardee to keep McCown’s Division out of sight and to the rear of the Confederate left flank. As he told Hardee, “Do not commit the whole of McCown's Division to any course of action until we have observed the location and movement of the unseen enemy infantry column(s). Otherwise, secure the area and set up defenses." With only Cleburne's Division at his disposal, Hardee dispersed the division to guard four river crossings stretching nearly two miles along the river. This greatly weakened Cleburne's ability to build defenses and offered him very little depth during the morning. The arrival of Zahm's troopers on his flank caused Cleburne to eventually dispatch half of his division to block and observe them on his left flank. This left just a thin line of grey infantrymen guarding the crossings around Carter's Creek Pike. 

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What if Hardee had continued his advance over the river? Hardee would have crossed with a large force and been able to drive northeast on Carter's Creek Pike after slicing through Minty's screen. But already moving southwest on the same road was Thomas's larger Federal wing. It seems plausible that the two forces would have collided along the pike in the thick woods somewhere between Carter's Crossing and Franklin. The Federals would have held the advantage as Zahm's troopers would have still been tying down part of Cleburne's men and Wheeler's men south of the West Harpeth leaving Thomas a reduced enemy corps to deal with on neutral ground. It seems likely that Hardee would have fallen back to the river after coming into contact with Thomas. A quick pursuit by Thomas would have struck Carter's Crossing before Confederate defenses could be constructed and probably would have succeeded in pushing back the Rebels from the river. I believe it was a good move by Bragg and Hardee to halt at the river and construct defenses when they did. This ensured that any Union force moving in their direction would run up against an enemy deployed on advantageous defensive ground. 

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The decision to halt McCown's Division was another controversial decision which bears examination. McCown's men were halted two miles away from Carter's Crossing and left in a concealed position for a number of hours. The reasoning was that if a Union force had crossed the unguarded fords that having McCown prepared to counterattack their movement was necessary. This is sound reasoning. But it did leave Cleburne's Division badly thinned out as they struggled to guard the crossings, construct defenses, and observe and block Zahm's troopers. When the large Union column was eventually spotted heading down Carter's Creek Pike, McCown's men were out of position and rushing to reach Cleburne in time to defend the river. The decision to hold McCown's very effective artillery back with the main part of the division was an even more controversial one. Cleburne's own artillery was of poorer quality and could hardly expect to damage the oncoming Federals from any distance other than pointblank. Holding back McCown's Division, while conservative in philosophy, was a proper decision to make. But the failure to better utilize McCown's artillery was an error which would leave Cleburne's Division ill-prepared to counter the larger and more numerous enemy guns. 
 

The decisions of the Federal army bear an equal examination as the early decisions concerning this flank would have long-term ramifications later in the battle. Rosecrans had numerous options for the deployment of Thomas's Wing when the battle began. As discussed in the Prologue, it was decided that Thomas should move to Franklin rather than directly over West Harpeth's undefended crossings or even directly against Carter's Crossing. The argument to consolidate the army in a central location was a wise decision which made perfect sense. Unfortunately, after consolidating Thomas with the main bulk of the army, he was then ordered right back to the same general area where he was already operating earlier in the morning. This placed Thomas's Wing out on the army's right flank and away from the other wings in the army where support could be counted upon should it be needed. Additionally, Thomas's men would now face an enemy force of unknown strength across a river with only a few crossing points. 

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The most critical error for Thomas had been the dispatching of Col. Lewis Zahm’s small cavalry brigade across the unguarded fords to the west. Zahm's unsupported troopers could expect to do very little aside from scouting and acting as a distraction against the Confederate forces they discovered south of West Harpeth River. That would have been a preferable outcome to the one in which they soon found themselves. Zahm's men were dismounted, limiting their mobility, and sent into thick woods with skirmishers deployed, limiting their visibility, and sent to feel out an enemy force they knew was much larger. The better move would have been to split Zahm’s men into roving bands and continue southward individually in an attempt to far outflank the Confederates and get into their rear. They could have observed the enemy from well behind their known lines and possibly captured supply wagons or leaders left unguarded. In their current positions they have been unable to gain any additional knowledge of the Confederates south of the river and are being rapidly outflanked by Wheeler's brigade riding up behind them. It remains to be seen whether Wheeler will be able to cut them off from the fords to their rear and trap them south of the river.

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With the clock approaching 1 PM the Federals are now moving towards Carter’s Crossing over the West Harpeth River. Whether Thomas will boldly advance on the Confederates scrambling to prepare is unknown. But if the Federals are going to attack they should do so immediately as McCown’s Division is still an hour away and the defenses have not yet been completed. Confederate guns are out of position and the best opportunity that the Federals will have to cross the river quickly is right now. Neither side had used the morning very productively on this flank and the afternoon is shaping up to be an interesting one as a result.