Part Three: The Lewisburg Pike Action
Moving for the Lewisburg Pike
After the Union officers finished their morning meeting Crittenden rode back to his Wing to get his men moving southward as quickly as possible. Crittenden’s first move was to dispatch his cavalry brigade, under Brig. Gen. David Stanley, southward towards McGavock’s Ford over the Harpeth River. Behind them the rest of Crittenden’s Wing would begin their march south to reach and cross the Harpeth River. The expectation was that they should utilize the Lewisburg Pike to drive southward and reach the West Harpeth River later in the day. To support Crittenden's movements, it was decided that the 973-man cavalry brigade under Col. John Minzer (from Gorman's Wing), then arriving north of Franklin, should be detached to bolster the Union column moving for Lewisburg Pike. Altogether nearly 18,500 men were now moving for the Lewisburg Pike.
Observing these moves from across the Harpeth River, Brig. Gen. Abraham Buford ordered his Confederate cavalrymen to disperse and picket the fords over the river with the intention of challenging any enemy movement along the Lewisburg Pike. But it became evident very quickly that overwhelming Union numbers were heading for the Lewisburg Pike. Bragg stated to his commanders that, "We have observed an enemy infantry column to the east who appear to be heading to get to the Lewisburg Pike as quickly as possible. In front of the infantry column, we can see Yankee cavalry being deployed in various spots for observation and to view the possible crossings that the infantry coming up will use to possibly gain access to the Lewisburg Pike. We have just one cavalry brigade, Buford's, on the pike to block things. However, we now also observe another full brigade of enemy cavalry coming up the pike towards Buford from Franklin." It was decided that Brig. Gen. Frank Armstrong's Cavalry Brigade, of Price's Corps, would be detached at once to ride eastward at all possible speed to reinforce Buford. But more forces would be required in order to keep the Federals from driving south on the Lewisburg Pike and beyond the Confederate flank.
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Bragg suggested sending Price's Corps, then about to move up in support of Polk's Corps fighting on Winstead Hill, to the east to defend Lewisburg Pike. Doing so would leave Polk's Corps without assistance even as it was being hard-pressed by McCook's attacks. Bragg queried his commanders on this idea and found them in agreement that Price should be sent at once to block the Lewisburg Pike. Leaving behind Brig. Gen. Martin Green's brigade to begin constructing trenches and breastworks along the Columbia Pike as a fallback position for Polk's Corps, if needed, the rest of Price's Corps was ordered to right-face and move eastward. Price's 11,119 men thus turned away from the sound of the fighting on Winstead Hill and began a long cross-country march from the Columbia Pike to reach the Lewisburg Pike three miles to the east.
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The armies begin to move forces for the Lewisburg Pike soon after the battle begins. (Remember you can click the map to expand it)
Movements on the Pike
Crittenden’s men were crossing to the west of the Harpeth River over McGavock’s Ford by 11 AM. Led by Stanley’s and Minzer’s cavalry brigades, the large Union column was now in a position to move either south on the Lewisburg Pike, directly towards the crossing over the West Harpeth about seven miles away, or even march directly west and come in on the left flank of McCook’s men who were then still engaged with the Confederates defending Winstead Hill. But American flags were soon spotted atop Winstead Hill and word arrived that McCook's men had taken the high ground and driven back the Confederate defenders towards the West Harpeth River.
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From their newly won position the Federals could get a panoramic view of the battlefield. To the southeast of Winstead Hill could be seen the slowly snaking line of Price's Corps as they moved cross-country towards the Lewisburg Pike to the east. “This could indicate,” Rosecrans wrote his generals, “that the enemy has no ready force moving directly north on the Lewisburg Pike to oppose us. We may want to continue our advance on that road to reach the crossing over the West Harpeth.” His commanders were in agreement that Crittenden should continue on his course south, brush aside the Confederate cavalry, and get ahead of the enemy column before it reached the pike.
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Buford's cavalrymen were joined by Armstrong's Cavalry Brigade about 11:40 AM. Together the 3,800 cavalrymen formed a line contesting the Union advance south on the pike. Buford wrote to Bragg that, “I believe with some cautious maneuvering our cavalry can slow up this enemy column giving us more time to deploy further south.” The Union cavalry brigades only lightly engaged the numerically superior Confederate cavalry while waiting for the infantry of Crittenden's Wing to arrive. Once the infantry joined the fighting the progress became faster as the Confederates began suffering heavier losses.
Fighting on the Pike
Price's Corps moved steadily eastward from the Columbia Pike and finally began to reach the Lewisburg Pike about noon. Reaching the Cotton Port Plantation, the column then turned northward to take up a position blocking any further Union advance along the pike. Excluding Armstrong's Cavalry Brigade and Green's Brigade on detached service, Price's command was composed of six infantry brigades totaling 8,701 men along the pike. Crittenden was leading ten infantry brigades with a total just over 16,000 southwards on the pike.
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But for the Federal spotters atop Winstead Hill it became increasingly obvious that the Rebels had won the race to get ahead of the Union column on the pike. Rosecrans sent a message to Crittenden that, “I’m afraid the Rebel column has reached Cotton Port ahead of you. The supply wagons visible from Winstead Hill moving east are likely the end of the Reb column moving that direction.” Crittenden was undeterred and would push on and fight the Confederates along the pike.
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Price ordered the cavalry to his front to delay the Federal advance as long as possible to give his men time to concentrate and form up around Cotton Port. He would then attempt to ambush the Federals in the woods to the north of the plantation. At 1 PM the Federal infantry moved forward rapidly and caught many of the Confederate cavalry in the open fields along the pike. A galling fire unhorsed many a Confederate saddle and the momentum rapidly shifted to the Federals as they pushed southward. Confederate cavalry scrambled to escape the Federal wave as they charged southward with both cavalry and infantry leading the attack.
Bragg could see and hear the increase in firing from his position along the Columbia Pike. Price sent him word that, “The Yanks are making a hard push because they believe our cavalry units are delaying them too much. This will work well for our planned ambush. Once contact is made, we'll only have a few turns to blast away before he gets his line together and starts a slow proper advance. Unless our surprise causes a big rout that is. If that happens then we can push to him back to the north.”
Crittenden’s men continued to push back the scattered and outgunned Confederate cavalry southwards. Price’s infantry units, standing unseen just a few hundred yards to the south, listened to the fighting but did not leave the cover of the woods. Price hoped that Crittenden would continue southwards and leave himself open to a surprise counterattack.
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It was at this point that the action along the Lewisburg Pike became the most critical on the battlefield. Bragg would soon begin sending additional units to the east to reinforce Price and stop Crittenden's Wing from pushing to the south. But before we get into that action, let's return to Carter's Creek Pike where Thomas's Wing is moving towards Carter's Crossing and the waiting forces of Hardee's Corps.
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Lewisburg Pike:
Commentary
The early maneuvering along Lewisburg Pike was an example of extreme risk-taking which just happened to payoff for the Confederate forces. With the Lewisburg Pike only defended by a singly cavalry brigade it was obvious from the start that the pike could become a highway beyond the Confederate flank if left unprotected. Bragg and his generals had to decide whether it was worth it to move Price's Corps to Winstead Hill and support Polk's faltering corps or move east and hope they would arrive in time to block the Lewisburg Pike. Their decision to send Price eastwards was a bold one which was very risky given the current situation atop Winstead Hill. Rather than trying to divide the corps to accomplish both objectives, Bragg chose to keep Price's men together and send the entire corps on a cross-country march while hoping that Polk's Corps would be able to hold in the center until Breckinridge's Corps could arrive in a few hours.
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Whether or not the plan worked then depended on the ability of the Confederate cavalry to hold Crittenden back as long as possible north of Cotton Port. The two cavalry brigades deployed on either side of the pike and took about 750 casualties in the fighting as they gave ground slowly. Crittenden's men took less than half that number of losses, but their progress was slowed appreciably. This allowed Price's men to reach Cotton Port on the Lewisburg Pike largely unseen. The gamble worked and Price's men were now astride the pike ahead of Crittenden's forces. Had McCook's Wing continued their attack on Columbia Pike with more aggression it is possible that Bragg would have been forced to use Price's men on Winstead Hill rather than sending them to the east as he did. Or, had the Confederate cavalry failed in their objective of delaying Crittenden, the Federals might have made it far enough south on the pike to block Price's access to the road and fought him off before he ever reached it.
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The combination of events which allowed Price to reach the Lewisburg Pike ahead of Crittenden's attackers was very fortunate for the Rebels. But Price's Corps was still outnumbered over 2 to 1 and Crittenden's men were still very fresh as they moved south on the pike after pushing back the Confederate cavalry. Would Price's forces be able to hold Crittenden back?