Part Four: Carter's Crossing
Making Contact
As the fighting on the Lewisburg Pike between Crittenden's men and the Confederate cavalry heated up, action to the far west also seemed imminent. As Thomas’s Wing came down the Carter’s Creek Pike, just after 1 PM, the Confederate guns south of the river opened fire. Cleburne’s artillery, without any rifled long-range pieces, did minimal damage on the Federals as they approached. McCown’s Division, which had been dispatched to join Cleburne only after Thomas's men were spotted, was only now scrambling to reach blocking positions near the river crossings. Luckily for the Rebels, McCown’s artillery, far superior to Cleburne’s, was rumbling into position before the Federals could bring up their own artillery. Bragg was concerned about the delay in setting up the artillery and the unfavorable ground south of the crossings. “Our short-range artillery is only good if they attack us directly, otherwise it is not powerful enough to hurt them. They also have higher ground on their side of the river which will send a plunging fire down atop many of our pieces. I envy their position. It may be hard for you to find a place to hit them from your side,” he wrote Hardee.
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Hardee had little time to worry about the artillery as he also needed to position McCown’s three brigades to best defend the river crossings. “I am tempted,” he told Bragg, “to concentrate McCown's Division at the Walker House - it's no good putting five brigades defending Carter's Crossing if he attacks through those fords to the east, currently defended by just Wood's Brigade.” Bragg concurred, “You don't need all those brigades ready to repel an attack on the river’s edge. It will be hard for them to successfully rush across such a narrow expanse. I encourage you to spend whatever time you have building defensive works in depth in anticipation of a heavy day of battle on the morrow.”
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Thomas's Wing arrived steadily along the pike. They began moving into line out of the effective range of the Rebel artillery and then waited for their own guns to come up in support. Just over the river they could see Zahm's troopers still in the woods to the west of the Rebel position around Carter's Crossing. All seemed well at the moment.
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Wheeler's Trap
As discussed in Part Two, the cavalry brigade of Col. Lewis Zahm rode across the unguarded fords early in the day and positioned themselves on the western flank of Carter's Crossing. Once on the Rebel flank they moved into line and dispersed skirmishers to remain in close contact with the enemy as both a distraction and a threat as Thomas's main attack moved up the Carter's Creek Pike. Unfortunately for them, the Confederates were not about to let an enemy cavalry brigade idle the day away on their flank without attempting to drive them back or capture them. Brig. Gen. Joseph Wheeler led four of his cavalry regiments around the Union flank to verify that the Union troopers were not supported by any other Federal units. Once he established that they were alone, he moved in to captured them in whole. Hardee sent word to Wheeler to take his time in the action as the enemy showed no signs of movement or activity. Zahm and his men were completely unaware of the peril they were in.
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Zahm's unprepared brigade being outflanked and surrounded by Wheeler's men.
At 1:40 PM, Bragg wrote to Hardee that it was time to, “move and destroy the enemy cavalry to the west. We can't let them get away.” Hardee gave the order and the infantry of Polk’s and Johnson’s brigades advanced directly against the dismounted troopers of Zahm’s brigade. Simultaneously the riders of Wheeler’s four regiments moved against the Federal rear to block their lines of escape. Only brief fighting ensued as the Federals units were quickly overwhelmed on all sides. Zahm could only keep his men in line and begin moving to the rear in the hope that he might somehow find an exit and salvage something of his brigade. But it was all in vain.
The brief battle around Zahm’s Brigade did not last long. The first to be captured was the 3rd Ohio Cavalry and then the 1st Ohio Cavalry. By 3 PM the last of the Federals were captured. Zahm and his entire brigade were swallowed up by the Confederate attackers. Wheeler had succeeded in confirming the Federal troopers were not a part of any larger force, determining that they were isolated to the south of the river, and then cutting them off from escape once the trap was sprung. With that the Rebel western flank was secured and Hardee could turn his full attention to the growing threat of Thomas's men along the pike.
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Zahm's Loss:
Commentary
Zahm's brigade began the battle with a simple objective of determining where the enemy flank. This they accomplished in a timely manner. From there it all went wrong. Rather than remaining mounted and riding to gather more intel farther to the south, the brigade made the cardinal error of dismounting and becoming stationary behind enemy lines. They further exacerbated the error by moving into woods where their line of sight was cut down to just 125 yards. This allowed Wheeler's men to ride around them wholly unseen and get in behind them. Zahm's men were likely lost the moment they dismounted, but there was absolutely no hope for them once Wheeler's men cut them off from the fords behind them. The brief fight between Zahm's men and the Confederates resulted in a just a handful of Confederate losses, but Zahm's entire 1,062 men were lost in the fighting. In the end the move to cross the river with Zahm's brigade alone was a risky one. Had the men stayed mounted and conducted a guerilla campaign to distract and confuse the Confederates it would have been far more successful. Instead, the result was the disheartening loss of a cavalry brigade which exposed the Union's own western flank to Confederate probes from the other side of the river.