Part Five: The Battle Escalates on All Fronts
Plan "A"
With McCook halting his advance after successfully taking Winstead Hill, the Confederate high command took a moment to reevaluate the overall situation and plan a large counterattack. The impetus to do so was an aggressive proposal by Polk who stated that, "I believe I can quickly shift my forces east of Columbia Pike and into the East Woods. From there I can move north to flank the Yanks up on Winstead Hill. Breckinridge should deploy into the West Woods woods on the other side of the pike and advance. We would both be under the cover of the woods. Between our two corps, I believe we could make the Yanks fall back. Or, if the yanks move straight south off the high ground, they will have to contend with an enemy infantry corps on each of their flanks.” Bragg and the other generals debated the merit of this proposal before Bragg decided to gamble and act aggressively. “I intend for Polk to move north towards the flank of Winstead Hill. The Yankees will either back off the ridge, or risk letting us penetrate all the way to Franklin. Breckinridge will put pressure on their opposite flank west of the pike. All of this will likely happen after darkness falls as it is already past noon.”
With that decision the Confederates began to shuffle around their forces out of the sight of the Federals then entrenching on Winstead Hill. Leaving Vaughn’s and Stewart’s brigades to block the Columbia Pike, along with the corps artillery, Polk led the rest of his corps into the woods east of the pike. Breckinridge, minus Brown’s Brigade which had been detached to build trenches near the Columbia Bridge, moved to the west of the pike and towards the West Woods between Carter’s Creek Pike and Columbia Pike.
​
Plan "A" is shown above with two Confederate corps attacking either flank of Winstead Hill.
From Plan "A" to Plan "B"
Even as Bragg's Plan "A" went into effect, events elsewhere were rapidly progressing. Crittenden’s aggressive movements against Price’s Corps along the Lewisburg Pike greatly worried Bragg and his lieutenants. If Price were pushed back to the river, or if the Federals turned to the west and got behind the Confederate center, the Rebel army might be forced to ingloriously flee to escape capture. Bragg met again with Polk and Breckinridge and laid out the situation for them. “The enemy evidently has decided to entrench up on Winstead Hill and attacking them there would expose our own flanks and rear. Meanwhile, Crittenden's Corps has fanned out in a wide arc, not necessarily bent on heading directly for the West Harpeth, but on fanning out to advance west and south on a broad front.” Bragg then proposed that the two nearest divisions from both Polk and Breckinridge be detached and sent under wooded cover to strike Crittenden’s flank and rear as he battled Price in his front. Bragg summarized that, “By attacking like this we seize the initiative against Crittenden, we apply superior numbers in our fight there, and do so with some surprise as we maneuver from several different directions. We will continue to hold the Columbia Pike with the other divisions of your corps against any advance by McCook."
Breckinridge and Polk agreed that an attack on Winstead Hill would be too risky with the enemy now behind their own right flank and driving south. The day would also be nearly over before any attack could be launched on the Federals atop Winstead Hill. Even under the best circumstances it might simply fail because of a lack of time to exploit any success. Under the new Plan "B," Breckinridge would dispatch Preston’s Division, and Polk would move two brigades of Withers’s Division, to the southeast to attack Crittenden in flank and rear. The columns were to stay under the cover of trees so as to launch their attack unseen upon Crittenden. Breckinridge was to use Stevenson’s Division to deceive the enemy, by circularly marching over open fields, to convince the Federals that a larger force was heading westwards from Carter’s Creek Pike. Cheatham’s Division, of Polk’s Corps, would setup with the Corps artillery to block any Federal advance directly down the Columbia Pike.
​
Plan "B" is shown above with two Confederate divisions moving to attack Crittenden's flank.
Crittenden's Advance
Along the heights of Winstead Hill the Federal observers noticed only some of the Confederate maneuvers to attack Crittenden, but not enough to warrant any concern or changing of their general plans. The only note from Rosecrans to Crittenden stated simply that his corps was now “attracting more attention.”
Crittenden was enjoying his success in driving back the Confederate cavalry and looked forward to the continuing the battle as he moved further south on the Lewisburg Pike. Rosecrans felt so confident of Crittenden's success that he ordered him to dispatch the 1,693 men of the Pioneer Brigade back to Franklin in the rear. The defeat of Zahm's cavalrymen caused concerns that a Rebel cavalry raid might seek to get in behind the Union army. The Pioneers were to defend the town and the approaches from the west. Crittenden did not object to the transfer but neither commander had any notion that the day was about to get a whole lot bloodier.
​
Crittenden’s advance continued and the general was amused to see that the Confederate cavalry had been beaten so badly and pushed aside from their position astride the Lewisburg Pike. He mentioned to Brig. Gen. John Palmer, leading one of his divisions, that, “I’m surprised the Reb cavalry was out there without infantry support close behind.” Palmer agreed, stating, “I think it is because they don't have any. They are throwing their cavalry towards us as their infantry must not have caught up yet! We are winning the race to the river!” Palmer then sent Col. William Grose’s brigade directly in column down the Lewisburg Pike in pursuit of the fleeing cavalrymen through a heavily wooded stretch of road. After about a quarter mile the Lewisburg Pike opened up again and ran through a large open field near the Cotton Port Plantation. It was only then that the Rebel yell filled the air and firing erupted on all sides of the suddenly trapped Union infantrymen.
​
The real battle for the Lewisburg Pike had begun.
​
The Confederate counterattack by Price's Corps.
Battle along Lewisburg Pike
As soon as Grose's leading regiments stepped into the open fields beyond the woods the order to attack was given. Price ordered his brigades to surround and destroy the leading units of Grose’s brigade then caught in the pincer movement. Bragg wrote Price that, “it is my belief that all of Crittenden's forces are widely dispersed in a large arc. You will need to advance and attack all along the line, not only to trap the leading enemy units, but through the woods as well to strike other parts of Crittenden’s line. In the woods we may have the opportunity to catch them spread out based upon the way they have been advancing against our cavalry. We need to give Crittenden a bloody nose! The long and short of it is that you should put everything into the effort! CHARGE!”
Grose’s 23rd Kentucky was cut to pieces while the 24th Ohio was routed rearwards into the 110th Illinois of Hazen’s brigade who, likewise, joined the stampede. Grose’s 36th Indiana and 84th Illinois held their positions at the edge of the woods despite being flanked and fired upon from all sides. Further to the west the center of Crittenden’s Wing was struck by the Texans and Arkansans of Price’s Corps who drove back the dismounted Federal cavalrymen screening the infantry’s front. Only on the extreme right flank of Crittenden’s corps did the Federals escape the onslaught as the Confederate line only extended a half-mile west of Lewisburg Pike. Despite the losses and the Confederate success, Rosecrans was confident that their plan was still working and did not change any orders for his army. The plan to advance south on the Lewisburg Pike, to attack in the east at Carter's Crossing, and to defend the heights around Winstead Hill, remained in place.
​
Limited Federal counterattacks caused little disruption to Price as he continued his attack against Crittenden on the pike. Bragg, viewing the battle from afar, turned to Polk and told him that, “Price really did a number on them! I believe I see more than one enemy unit routing back to the north. It is amazing to me that the enemy is deploying in single regiment formations, a happy melee rich environment for an attacker! I think Price can move up and trap even more units.” Bragg advised Price to refuse his left flank as he waited for reinforcements from Withers and Preston to arrive to counterattack Crittenden’s right flank. Bragg then turned to view Winstead Hill again and could only see shovels and picks swinging as the Federals entrenched, “The blue boys up on Winstead Hill are still entrenching and sitting tight. Lovely!” Breckinridge chimed in as he checked the sun which had begun to cast longer shadows, though it was only 2 PM, “If they only knew what a favor they were doing us digging in on that hill. Bless their hearts!”
​
The fighting grew in intensity as Price’s men repeatedly meleed against Grose’s brigade along the Lewisburg Pike. The 24th Ohio and Grose were quickly captured after being surrounded and isolated. Elsewhere the Federals were driven back northward ahead of Price’s Corps. But Confederate Brig. Gen. Louis Hebert was wounded in the fighting and carried from the field. Despite the loss of one of the best brigade commanders in the army, morale remained high for the men in gray.
​
Bragg sent the following note to each of his commanders as he evaluated the situation at 2 PM:
Right now, with Price's ferocious attack and the textbook entrapment of the enemy cavalry on Carter’s Crossing Hill, we have the seized the tempo of the battle. By concentrating combat power, with the use of keen observation accompanied by smart tactics, we have managed to throw the unwary enemy back on his heels. We are dictating the course of things overall. The earlier actions of delay and obstruction used by both Buford and Armstrong, though painful with their losses, have helped to set up this tide that even now is rapidly turning into a tsunami of good fortune on the Lewisburg Pike. Throughout the contest we have maintained flexibility, allowing for a range of possible options in regard to defense, maneuver, and taking the fight to our foes on our own terms. Although the struggle is far from over, I can say with some confidence, this day is won. We have only to work now in the few hours remaining of daylight of this the first day of battle to improve our odds for victory on the morrow. Having rested the initiative from the enemy I can tell you we will not settle for a "let's see what happens" kind of play. Where we can shape actions, we will. Where we can seize an advantage, we will. We must continue to be audacious, skillful, and nimble. We must continue to use the full range of tools given to us in our haversack, be they the spade work that time and geography affords, smart resource planning and force distribution, and the fierce power of the attack symbolized by the "Rebel Yell." My, I almost pity those poor boys in blue across the way...let us carry on.
Union Response
From Winstead Hill, Rosecrans was watching the events carefully and decided now was the time to call a council of war with his generals. He asked each to, “Make a careful assessment of our affairs and offer your views with respect to the need to alter our plan. The Rebels are clearly setting up for a defensive battle as they maintain all the main crossings over the West Harpeth. Do we shift to the defensive on our flanks and push up the middle?”
Thomas was the first to respond to Rosecrans:
I recommend concentrating to attack in the center.
I can pull back, maintain the observation of Carters Crossing and either move through the thick woods to form the right flank of an attack south; or, move all the way back to Franklin and then south on the Columbia Pike to stack up behind McCook. Crittenden would support McCook as able on his left.
Crittenden then spoke up to Rosecrans to adamantly oppose Thomas’s suggestion:
Thomas needs to attack with everything he’s got! He has got to make the Rebels pay for bushwhacking Zahm’s troopers. They are defending the river crossing mainly with artillery. We will never have a better opportunity to capture it. This is the battle right here, attack and win or pull back and lose. McCook should make an all-out attack to support Thomas. The Rebels look to be weak in the center. I am going to attack to, but I have my hands full after kicking up a hornet’s nest on the pike.
With his impassioned argument he was able to sway Thomas and gained his support. McCook also stated his opinion that, “I hate the idea of Thomas going against entrenchments, but I have to believe that might be our only and best course of action now, especially given the relatively limited Rebel infantry in that area.”
Rosecrans weighed the options for a moment before giving his orders:
Well men. We are in a jam. We can't sit tight and let the enemy further fortify the line along the river. They appear to be moving folks from their center to deal with Crittenden’s attack in the east. I think that if we are to win the battle, Thomas needs to stick with the goal of taking Carter's Crossing. Attack! McCook, it is time to get your people headed southward along the Columbia Pike once more. Stick to the east of the pike. This will likely relieve pressure on Crittenden and get the Rebs off the high ground in front of you. Glory or Infamy! Forward!
​
Tough Decisions:
Commentary
As the battle escalated on all fronts, we must go back to the original decision of why McCook's advance halted on Winstead's Hill in the first place. After the success of taking the high ground the Federals were poised to keep driving southward along the Columbia Pike. The appearance of Confederate reinforcements moving in all directions likely rattled the Union commanders from their vantage points atop the hill. Glimpsing only bits and pieces of moving columns through the trees caused more speculation and concern over Confederate plans than would have occurred had they not seen the glimpses at all. McCook's almost wholly fresh wing was then halted on the heights and reinforced by Gorman's Wing once they arrived from the north. This decision to halt had a domino effect across the battlefield as Price's Corps was able to be diverted eastward to Lewisburg Pike and Breckinridge was able to reinforce a reformed Polk south of Winstead Hill.
​
This domino effect nearly caused a major Confederate tactical error which was only narrowly avoided at the last moment.
​
The Federal halt, I believe, caught the Confederates off guard as they anticipated a continued assault to the south. Bragg was willing to gamble that the Federals on Winstead Hill were switching to the defensive because the main bulk of the Union army was on their flanks to the east and west (Carter’s Creek Pike and Lewisburg Pike). Bragg did not know that this was not the case. He unwittingly chose to attack the most heavily defended and reinforced part of the Union army at Winstead Hill. Bragg ordered the roughly 25,000 men of Polk's and Breckinridge's corps against the heights to try and drive back the Union center to Franklin. The obvious issue for Bragg was that there was simply no good way to attack Winstead Hill across the open fields to the south. Bragg planned to avoid these open fields by ordering nearly all of Polk’s and Breckinridge’s men into the thick woods, devoid of any trails or roads, on either side of the pike, to commence long flanking marches to land on both Union flanks.
There was no way this was going to end in anything other than disaster for Bragg for numerous reasons. McCook and Gorman were on great defensive ground and for Bragg’s men to outflank them and force them back, as he hoped, would have required a stroke of unimaginable luck. Additionally, he would have launched his attack against a numerically superior enemy behind prepared defensive lines on higher ground. The Federal flanks had commanding views and were unlikely to be taken unawares. The Confederates were moving without artillery support or supply wagons as there were no trails or roads to use in the woods they were to advance through. Lastly, Bragg’s men would have spent most of the afternoon marching and would have had only an hour of daylight left (at most) to attack before night fell. Whatever surprise was achieved would have vanished with the fall of night.
Luckily for the Confederates, events along the Lewisburg Pike rapidly changed their plans.
The Union attack along the Lewisburg Pike was the strongest and best led of the Union attacks thus far. The Confederate cavalry had been driven back with heavy losses and Crittenden's men were advancing steadily on the pike. But Price's Corps had reached that pike and gotten in front of Crittenden without him realizing it. It wasn't until Grose’s brigade recklessly pursued the beaten Confederate cavalry, and moved into the trap laid by Price, that the Federals were aware of the presence of a large body of enemy troops on the pike. But while Grose’s brigade was badly mauled, the rest of Crittenden’s Wing was still prepared to fight. Price’s Corps was aligned wholly to protect a concentrated Union push south on the pike. His left flank was very weak and afforded him little protection. Further, a possible Union change of direction to attack to the west would place Crittenden’s men behind Polk and Breckinridge and unhinge the Rebel center.
The Confederates wisely realized this and canceled their foolhardy attack plans on Winstead Hill. Instead, Withers’s and Preston’s divisions would be detached from their parent corps and sent to attack the flank of Crittenden as he drove south. This was a very good move by Bragg as it sought to force Crittenden to change directions and fight enemies on multiple sides.
But two issues remain a concern for the Confederates. First, do they have enough daylight to complete the movement of Withers and Preston to the east and attack Crittenden before daylight runs out? Second, does weakening the center of the army leave it vulnerable to a sudden attack south by McCook along the pike? The Confederate center has been reduced to just 12,000 men opposite the over 30,000 around Winstead Hill.
For the Federals, the mood was one of increasing frustration as the Confederates seemed to be everywhere on the battlefield. But Crittenden’s impassioned speech to the officers to attack on all fronts changed the mood. With Rosecrans giving the necessary orders for a general advance the prospect of a bloody and violent end to the day seemed assured.
But did Rosecrans make the right decision?
Let's begin with the proposed attack south on Columbia Pike. This is definitely the correct move to make. Confederate units have been spotted heading east from the Columbia Pike so it is known they are shifting men around. Attacking with McCook and Gorman will put a huge amount of strain on Bragg’s center which rests on very poor ground. If the Rebels break in the center it will be very difficult for them to recover as their two wings will be miles apart without any connecting roads.
The decision for Crittenden to continue his attack on the Lewisburg Pike is also a good one. Neither side has any real advantage on the pike, so it makes sense to continue the bloodletting and grind down the Confederate forces. Rosecrans could have no way of knowing that two Confederate divisions are heading for Crittenden's flank currently. What will happen when they arrive remains to be seen.
But the decision to order Thomas to attack is the riskiest and most controversial of them all. Thomas faces an impossible task of attacking an entrenched enemy, on higher ground, across a river. A frontal attack simply will not work. At least not without strong artillery support and numerous bloody attempts to force the crossing under the muzzles of enemy guns. Even then there is no guarantee that success will be the end result. Thomas’s artillery pieces are not yet in a good position to support the attack and the infantry is moving on a single line directly into a funnel of enemy guns and rifles. It will be a massacre.
A safer move would have been to have Thomas spend the remainder of the day getting his artillery emplaced on higher ground than the Confederate pieces across the river. This would put the Union artillery in a perfect position to open a blistering fire at dawn with the entire corps primed to attack at the moment the Rebel lines began to weaken. It would also pin Hardee in place and keep his force from moving elsewhere while McCook and Crittenden attacked the other parts of Bragg’s army.
​
Thomas's original suggestion to Rosecrans that his corps move back around to support the center, while leaving a blocking force at Carter's Crossing to prevent any Confederate attack over the river, was discarded far quicker than it should have been. Doing this would have left nearly 13,000 Confederates neutralized on a quiet part of the battlefield while the real battle occurred elsewhere. Nearly all of Thomas's Wing could have been moved to bring an overwhelming concentration of force down upon the Rebels in tandem with either Crittenden's or McCook's wings. This would have been the best usage of Thomas's Wing at this point.
But Rosecrans has ordered the three separate attacks and his commanders are all preparing to advance.
I expect the next few hours before nightfall to be chaotic, bloody, and ugly. Crittenden’s men will be in a scrappy fight along the Lewisburg Pike while McCook’s men, reinforced by Gorman’s, should begin to drive back the Rebel center. Can the Confederates hold? Or, will the Union overpower them along one of those two roads and drive them back to the river? On Thomas’ front, can any success be gained before nightfall? There are lots of things to watch for as we move forward!
​
The plans of both armies are shown above. The Confederate counterattacks by Withers and Preston are to strike Crittenden's right flank and Price attacks his center. The Federals are planning a general advance on all three pikes to reach the West Harpeth River.