Part Ten: No Rest for the Weary
Rosecrans's Headquarters
In the town of Franklin, the Federal high command met after darkness had fallen. Rosecrans asked his generals for their opinions on the next course of action to follow before dawn the next day. McCook was the first to speak up. Even after the success of Hovey’s division driving back the Confederate force in the West Woods he, surprisingly, favored abandoning the initiative just won. “Seeing now that the way over Carter’s Crossing lies open to us, and given that Hovey's attack is unlikely to succeed on its own, I suggest re-assigning Hovey's Division to reinforce Thomas's Wing in the attack on Carter’s Crossing. I think our best bet is concentrating on that crossing over the creek. Thomas has already worn down the enemy at the crossing there. I rather doubt we will be able to get across the river on the other main roads as the Rebs have had time to entrench and fortify ahead of us.” Crittenden seconded the motion and favored concentrating all available forces with Thomas’s Wing to push over Carter’s Crossing, “I reiterate my previous counsel that all available resources should be directed toward supporting Thomas in that noble endeavor.” Thomas himself was less sanguine of success on his front, “I'll take whatever is offered, but it's still going to be a tough and bloody slog.”
Surveying the room, Rosecrans must have wondered what success against Carter's Crossing could be divined after hours of fruitless and costly attacks had already failed. McCook's argument that the enemy was likely to spend the night fortifying meant only that Carter's Crossing would be even more formidable come morning. The likelihood of a successful attack by Thomas, even if strongly reinforced, remained very small. It was at this point Rosecrans took full charge of the situation and decided to follow his instincts rather than listen to his generals on the matter.
“Here are my orders," Rosecrans began. "The high ground across from Carter's Creek is occupied by Confederate forces of at least equal strength to Thomas. The Rebs can reinforce at that location faster than we can and I believe they will do just that. The Rebels are defeating us in the casualty counts and, as a result, I don't think they will make any dramatic offensive moves that will expose them to heavy casualties. Any attacks are likely to be diversionary. We now need to avoid continued fruitless assaults which the one across Carter’s Creek has now become. But we do have to attack to retrieve the strategic initiative and the battle. I think the best opportunity lies in the center and it is presently where we are best able to concentrate and go after the most accessible crossing over the river. Achieving this concentration also will enable us to prevent significant shifts of Rebel forces from one flank to the other."
Rosecrans laid out his map on the table in front of the generals and began to issue orders.
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An overhead view of Rosecrans's orders for the second day of battle.
“Thomas, continue to pound with your artillery. Call off your infantry assaults--you don't have sufficient power to press past them at this point. Get some people off to your left before night falls where they might join the battle in the center in the morning. McCook, get your people moving directly south on the Columbia Pike. Let’s push them back! Crittenden, concentrate as best you can to create assault teams that will move out at dawn, you will attack then to support the movement on the center by coming in on McCook’s left.”
Silence.
The generals took in the orders but were not pleased with them. McCook objected first. “Thomas's forces are already NEXT to the crossing over the river! Your proposed axis of approach in the center forces us to cover a LOT of open ground, facing almost certain enfilading fire from woods on both flanks, in addition to multiple well-prepared defenses between us and the objective. Nevertheless, I will comply with your plan if you remain unmoved by this rationale.” Crittenden, likewise, objected to the plan and favored a continued attack by Thomas. Ironically, only Thomas held his tongue though he admitted his men’s “hearts just aren’t in it” after coming so close to the objective only to be ordered back.
Rosecrans was firm though. “Although Thomas is close, he simply will not be able to take that crossing because of the enemy’s strength there. The Reb's can cycle numerous regiments to hold the high ground and we will be used up assaulting them with little hope of success.” With that Rosecrans confirmed his orders and called for his orderlies to retrieve the horses for his officers. Crittenden was in disbelief as he mounted his horse. Turning to the others present he recited part of Tennyson’s famed poem but rearranged the words for the occasion:
“Forward, the Union center!”
Was there a man dismayed?
Not though the soldier knew
Someone had blundered.
Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.
Into the valley of Death
Rode the Union center
Not the Valley of Death
Even as Crittenden objected to the attack into the "Valley of Death" of the Confederate center, the Confederates were retreating from it. McCook no longer faced an entrenched enemy as the Confederates fell back southward to escape the flanking attack by Hovey. In the East and West woods, the divisions of Stevenson and Withers were retreating rapidly to try and stay ahead of any Union attack coming down the Columbia Pike.
McCook, following orders, now ordered his entire wing forward. Supported by Steele's reformed division, McCook moved four divisions southward against positions that had been manned by Confederates twenty minutes earlier. The Federals found them abandoned as the Confederates retreated in the darkness ahead of them. On Thomas’s front, the orders went out to begin to disengage from the Confederates and fall back to more secure positions. For Crittenden’s Corps the order to advance and support McCook was followed through with. He moved his units to the southwest and began to disperse skirmishers to feel out enemy locations in the dark. All across the battlefield units were in motion in the dark of night.
Confederate Reactions
Bragg met with his commanders once again after the aggressive actions of the Federals in the center. Bragg began by stating that, “The Yanks have continued their attacks over at Carter's Creek with no let up. I just keep shaking my head at their stubbornness. Along the Columbia Pike, Stevenson's Division will continue to withdraw, and if the Yanks move up in battleline they will be resisted by our rear guard. Polk's boys are in good shape though and I see no major concerns along their front. Price too has things well in hand. Hardee has held the crossing at Carter's Creek. I think this is our biggest victory of the day! But we can't count out stopping Crittenden and keeping McCook in check, all go together as successful parts of the contest, failure in any one of these fronts could have doomed us. And to top it all off, through it all we have put a real hurt on the Yanks. All around, I am very pleased with the results of the day!”
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At Carter’s Crossing were the Confederates fully confident of holding their lines against any additional attacks. Hardee wrote that his men had “gotten good at knocking the Yanks down like ducks in a row” in front of the crossing. “I'm mystified about the enemy actions at Carter's Crossing,” he continued. “Cleburne's boys are all uphill, either behind breastworks or in the woods. Why keep attacking?” Just to make sure that Hardee’s men were sufficiently protected, Bragg ordered four batteries to move to the west during the night to join his forces in defense of the crossing.
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Bragg continued by offering his interpretation of the Union’s coming moves on the second day of battle. “Because of the success they have had versus Stevenson's Division thus far, I think the Yanks will start edging their resources over towards the Columbia Pike. I think the Yanks have given up on trying to march south on the Lewisburg Pike. I believe that Crittenden will join with McCook for a push on the center for the next day, and they might opt to stay in contact with us during the entire night along the Columbia Pike. I am not sure Thomas will still be facing Carter's Creek in the morning. They must know overnight we will only get stronger there. So where could they best use Thomas? Perhaps have a blocking force to hold Hardee from advancing north and send the rest of the corps to aid the push in the center with McCook and Crittenden?”
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Hardee did stated that, “I remain convinced Crittenden will pull back tonight - he obviously didn't think he had the strength to push back Price in today's fight, so why would he get on better tomorrow, after we've dug our breastworks and resited our artillery? He would have to be reinforced & that would mean an even bigger split in the Union army. If this is right, then Price can either advance to threaten Franklin or reinforce Polk and Breckinridge.” Breckinridge agreed with the assessment of Hardee but also stated that with the pullback of Polk’s men and his own, Price’s left flank might be endangered. He suggested a full retreat back to the river lines to fully secure their flanks ahead of any Union attacks at dawn. Price acknowledged that the loss of Preston's Division would create a strain on his small corps, but that he was confident he could continue to hold his line. Price also agreed with the assessment that, “Crittenden is likely moving away from the Lewisburg Pike to support McCook.”
Hardee then spoke up to say that he favored a general repositioning of the army. “All day we have kept the Yankees off balance with a mixture of daring attacks, stubborn defense, and the odd bit of play acting. However, as a result of these successful actions, I believe the Yankees have finally got a half decent picture of where our forces are & are acting accordingly. The way I see it, and for very good reasons, we've ended up with a bit of a salient formed by Polk's Corps & Stevenson's Division. Assuming we don't fall back behind the West Harpeth overnight, I think we want to occupy a line from where Price is currently in the woods north of Cotton Port, heading west up the ridge where the Davis farmstead sits, following the ridge west past the L. Smith farm, crossing both the Columbia & Franklin Pike and the Nashville & Decatur RR, bending slightly southwest to take the benefit of the church at as a defensive strongpoint, and then anchoring the line in the woods immediately west of the church.”
Bragg listened and drew up a new plan as his generals had spoke. Bragg ordered that Hardee’s general outline for a pull back into a better aligned defensive position was the proper course of action. Preston’s Division would form a thin defensive line on Price’s left flank stretching to the west. Stevenson’s Division would continue to fall back and eventually form into a line in support of Preston. Polk’s men would slowly move south on the Columbia Pike to the Stone Church line and form up on Breckinridge’s left flank.
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The Confederate fall back positions.
Losses
As the day of battle came to a close the hospitals on both sides of the West Harpeth River were being inundated with the wounded. It had been a bloody day of battle for both armies. But the Federals had taken a larger percentage of the losses as their offensive attacks against Carter's Crossing were bloodily repulsed. As seen in the chart below, the Confederates have lost just over half the number of men as the Federals in the fighting thus far.
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Day One:
Commentary
What happened to the Union army on day one? The Federals early success seemed to fade away and then be obliterated at Carter's Creek just before sundown. Only the unexpected success of Hovey's attack managed to salvage something of the day and finally broke the stalemate on the Columbia Pike.
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The battle began abruptly on Winstead Hill and within just an hour the Federals had taken the heights and driven back the Confederate advance. Within two hours they were atop the high ground and viewing the retreating mass of Confederates as they fled south on the Columbia Pike.
From that point on, nothing went right.
The Union high command made three strategic decisions with major consequences within the first few hours of the game. It is hard to say any of them were right or wrong as you never know how one decision will affect others after it. But these decisions were critically important and affected the battle in major ways.
The first major decision was to move Thomas to Franklin rather than to send him over the West Harpeth River in force from the start. Thomas had access to two known unguarded fords over the creek and could have been over the creek within a few hours with his whole wing. Instead, he was ordered to march to Franklin to "concentrate the army" before then moving along Carter’s Creek Pike towards the main crossing point over the West Harpeth there. Had Rosecrans ordered Thomas to cross with his whole corps using the unopposed crossings it would have placed his 15,000 men south of the river and on the flank of Hardee’s 13,000 men then near Carter’s Crossing. This alone would not have meant an easy victory for Thomas, but it would have opened up numerous options for maneuver behind enemy lines. It would also have forced Bragg to send additional forces to the west to confront Thomas and to block the numerous crossing points over the river east of Carter's Crossing. Such movements would have changed the dynamics of the battle in major ways. The battle developed, instead, with Thomas making a direct assault against the fortified heights across from Carter’s Crossing. This resulted in extremely heavy losses with no discernible benefits for the Union army.
The second major strategic decision was to halt the advance of McCook’s Wing once it took Winstead Hill. The decision to halt McCook and defend were complex and are covered at the conclusion of this history. But McCook had driven back Polk’s men almost effortlessly and could see them fleeing the field to the south from atop Winstead Hill. Yet the Union high command feared a counterattack and so halted McCook to begin to entrench on the high ground. Had McCook continued his advance he would have found Polk completely unprepared to defend against his overwhelming numbers. The Confederates had no way to know how many Federals were coming through those hills and the ease with which they took them had rattled their confidence. Had McCook driven them another mile to the south he would have forced them onto the low ground where there were no ridges or trees to utilize in their defense. This likely would have caused them to fall all the way back another mile to escape the Union guns which would then be dominating them from their elevated positions. The momentum and initiative would have stayed with the Federals as the Confederates rushed to try and stabilize their lines after their early defeat. It also would likely have prevented Price’s Corps from moving to the east so quickly to defend the Lewisburg Pike. Price would have been drawn into the battle at Polk’s side, leaving the fighting then occurring on the Lewisburg Pike to the cavalrymen for a number of more hours until the trailing corps of Breckinridge could reach them belatedly.
But with McCook halted the Confederates had time to strategize and made the very bold decision to not immediately reinforce Polk. Instead, they sent the first available reinforcements to the Lewisburg Pike where they arrived just in time to stop the Union advance on that line. Soon Polk’s men were building breastworks and being reinforced by Breckinridge’s Corps which came up only after a number of hours on the march. Failing to follow up the successful attack by McCook’s men was likely the most controversial decision on the first day of battle for the Union army.
Lastly, the usage of Gorman’s Wing was ill-conceived. With McCook committed to a defensive posture it would simply stand to reason that he should only be reinforced if he was actually being pressed and forced back. But all was quiet on Winstead Hill. Nonetheless, Gorman’s men were sent to reinforce the quietest part of the battlefield. Once there they began to build breastworks even as fighting raged to the east and west of them. This move simply didn’t make any sense. Had they been sent to the unguarded fords to the west they might have gotten over the river and behind the Confederate positions they now knew guarded Carter’s Crossing. Or, had Thomas crossed earlier in the day, they might have moved on Carter’s Creek Pike to pin down thousands of additional Confederates as Thomas fought them on their flank south of the river. Still another option was to reinforce Crittenden’s stalled offensive along the Lewisburg Pike. The only option which made no sense was the one that was chosen – to reinforce McCook.
But, to be honest, it almost paid dividends. The Confederates had a very poorly thought out plan to counterattack Winstead Hill by moving through thick woods both east and west of the Columbia Pike. Had they been able to somehow move unseen through the woods they might have fallen on Winstead Hill from both flanks and threatened to break McCook’s hold on the heights. Realistically, I don’t believe the proposed Confederate attack had any probability of success. The infantry-only attack would have been up against numerically superior entrenched defenders on high ground with artillery support. The Confederates didn’t even have any supply wagons to draw from had they even been able to attack. As it turned out, events elsewhere thwarted all Confederate plans to attack Winstead Hill.
One additional tactical error bears mentioning. The movement of Zahm’s cavalry brigade south of the river over the unguarded fords was actually the right move to make. Unfortunately, once across, they dismounted and entered thick woods to try and discover and observe the Confederate flank. Once dismounted and in woods the Union cavalry lost sight of their flanks and rear and were soon sitting ducks for the Confederate cavalry to capture. Had Zahm’s men continued south once across the river they would have led thousands of Confederate cavalry on a wild goose chase across the battlefield and caused a maximum amount of disruption on the Confederate rear for the numbers involved in the raid. Instead, Zahm’s men were easily pinpointed, hunted, and then bagged, without a real fight.
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On the other side of the battlefield the Confederates fought a very good battle. They moved Price's Corps to the right place at the right time and stopped the Union advance down Lewisburg Pike. They bluffed a stronger defense than they had on Columbia Pike and managed to halt McCook's drive on their center. On the left they utilized Hardee's Corps to block the Carter's Creek Pike crossings and repulsed Thomas with heavy losses. They launched limited counterattacks which were largely successful in halting Union advances and creating confusion in the enemy ranks. Lastly, they knew when to fall back and regroup at the end of the day.
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That being said, mistakes were still made. Holding back McCown's divisional artillery left Cleburne's artillery alone to face the oncoming Union wing led by Thomas. Cleburne's smaller artillery pieces were no match for the Federal guns and would have been overwhelmed had they not been supported at the very last moment by McCown's artillery. McCown's guns, even after they unlimbered, were poorly placed as they did not have proper time to be moved to the best locations before engaging the enemy. Only the naturally strong terrain south of Carter's Crossing saved the Confederate flank which had been slow to build defenses and position their artillery during the day. Yet, despite all the fighting around Carter's Crossing, McCown's Division did not lose a single man during the day. The position was strong enough to be held by just Cleburne's Division alone.
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In the center the decision to weaken Stevenson's Division by detaching one of his brigades to Preston's Division was a poor one. In the lull of midday it was decided that one-third of Stevenson's force should be sent to the east with Preston's men to guard Price's left flank. This left Stevenson with only two green brigades with which to defend the West Woods. This decision would come back to haunt the Confederates as Stevenson's failure to hold the woods force the entire center to fall back at nightfall. Meanwhile, the brigade they had dispatched had spent a quiet day resting behind Preston's lines, suffering no losses.
By nightfall on the first day of battle the Federal army has shrunk from 65,000 men to 53,742. This includes the loss of 9,678 infantrymen and 1,455 cavalrymen. Five artillery pieces were also lost during the fighting. The 11,258 casualties are 17.3% of the Union army which began the day of battle. The Union’s loss limit is 22,750 men before they are forced to concede the game. This means they are about half of the way to that limit after the first day of battle. For the Confederates, they have lost 5,851 total men during the battle. This equates to just 10.6% of their army. Their casualty limit is set at 20,900 men. They are only 28% of the way to that total at this point. As things are shaping up, it will be a much more difficult day for the Federals tomorrow.
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But there are still reasons to hope if you are the Federals.
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The decision of Rosecrans to move along three different axes was a good one to begin the battle with. He has discovered the strength of the Confederate forces along each main line and now knows where each Confederate corps is located. The decision to concentrate the attack on day two in the center was the best decision he could make given the circumstances. The Confederates have committed Hardee’s Corps to defending Carter’s Creek Crossing. This means that Hardee’s men will be out of the action in the center on day two unless they become an offensive force and attack north of the river to join the fight. If Rosecrans can use part of Thomas’s Wing to hold the northern side of Carter’s Crossing then he can utilize his men elsewhere to bring pressure on the Confederates in the center. McCook’s and Gorman’s men are relatively unscathed and will be fully rested come morning. Their numbers will be great enough to apply heavy pressure on any Confederate force on level ground. Having gained valuable ground before nightfall they have forced the Confederates back along Columbia Pike and will cause them to miss hours of sleep during the night as they reposition themselves for the battle tomorrow.
Crittenden’s Wing has suffered some losses and will be unlikely to contribute much on the second day. But his attacks just before nightfall on the Confederate right have caused great alarm to the Confederate commanders. Price remains in place along the Lewisburg Pike and Preston’s Division has been left to support his flank. This means that about 14,400 Confederates are defending against 14,000 Federals opposite them. This equates to 26% of the Union force holding 29% of the Confederate force in place. Not a bad trade.
If Thomas can move 8,000 of his men to support McCook and Gorman then there will be a total of about 39,000 Federals attacking the 18,000 Confederates of Polk’s Corps and Stevenson’s Division in the center. There are 3,500 Confederates in reserve along the West Harpeth River that Bragg can call upon to reinforce the center but the odds remain in the Union’s favor. If the Federals can manage to attack the Confederate center successfully, they might just drive them back to the river and cause mass confusion and losses on the Rebel army. If Hardee remains inactive or checked in his current position, and Price and Preston remain checked by Crittenden in their position, then the Federals will enjoy a large numerical advantage in the center which might just redeem the battle for them.
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And so we continue...
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