Part Nine: Reverses East and West
Fighting in the East Woods
As ordered earlier, Brig. Gen. Frederick Steele’s division of Gorman’s Wing moved southeast of Winstead Hill and into the East Woods. This large area of woods, to the east of Columbia Pike, stretched for nearly two miles to the south and a mile to the east. Moving through the thick woods Steele was aware of the general Confederate line then a few hundred yards to his front and at a lower elevation. But the movements of Withers’s Division, to his left and out of sight, were completely unknown to him. Steele maneuvered his men to attack southward even as his left was overlapped by the oncoming enemy division.
Bragg, watching the situation unfold, could only marvel at how fortuitous the return of Withers's men was from their aborted movement to attack Crittenden. Now Withers was in a position to surprise and strike Steele’s unprotected left flank just as he attacked. Bragg asked his commanders whether they should attack at once or allow Steele to move even further south before striking. “I would wait a little longer before attacking,” Hardee replied. “I think we stand a much better chance of damaging them badly if we open the jaws of the trap a little wider.” Bragg concurred and ordered Withers to hold off on his attack for the moment.
Twenty minutes later the forward skirmishers from Withers were in contact with enemy units moving directly south towards Cheatham’s right flank. The woods concealed the strength of the Union advance but Withers’s two brigades were poised for a direct assault upon the flank and rear of the Federals. At 3 PM Withers ordered his brigades forward and quickly encountered Brig. Gen. John Thayer’s entire brigade in column as they moved through the woods. Excitement swept the Confederate ranks as they poured a heavy fire into the unprepared Union columns. Bragg and his general congratulated one another on a job well done as Withers sent back glowing reports of the enemy being cut up in the woods.
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Withers's Division strikes the flank and rear of Steele's division.
The Confederate attack routed the 30th Iowa which disrupted Steele’s nearby units. Rosecrans gave little comment on the attack aside from mentioning to McCook and Gorman that there was unexpected trouble on their left flank. Steele refused his left flank and McCook moved up Baldwin’s brigade to extend the Union left in the woods to try and halt the Confederates. Baldwin’s brigade extended beyond the Confederate right flank and soon struck the flank and rear of Anderson’s Brigade attacking Steele. But the continued Confederate attacks soon caused mass routing and disruptions crippling Steele’s attack before it had even begun. Rosecrans sent word to Gorman that, there is “nothing to do at this point but try and extricate Steele’s division before they are encircled.”
Despite the Union attack on Anderson’s right flank, it was decided to continue the attack on Steele as long as possible to try and capture and defeat as much of the Union force caught in the trap as possible. Withers continued his attack and Chalmers’s Brigade meleed the men of Osterhaus’s Union brigade from behind. Over 650 men were killed, wounded, or captured in the attack. Elsewhere, the 30th Indiana was driven back by assaults from Anderson’s Brigade.
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Withers's Division causing mass routs and casualties on Steele's division.
Steele retreated from the East Woods and fell back on Winstead Hill. Baldwin's brigade provided cover for the retreating Federal division as they regrouped on McCook's left flank. Withers continued to attack the fleeing Federals as best he could. But the 45th Alabama, under fire from Baldwin’s men, broke to the rear on the right flank which weakened Withers’s assault. Bragg consulted with his generals over whether to continue the attack or not on Steele’s division. Hardee advised a cautious course and stated, “the geography is against Withers & the enemy has successfully pulled out the Steele's division & relieved them with Johnson's division of McCook's Wing.” Bragg agreed that to continue the attack would be too risky and halted Withers's Division before leaving the cover of the East Woods. But general skirmishing continued as the two sides remained in close contact within the woods though neither attacked.
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Fighting in the West Woods
As the fighting progressed in the East Woods, on the far side of the Columbia Pike, the West Woods were also active. Gorman’s other division, under Brig. Gen. Alvin Hovey, moved around McCook’s right flank to enter the West Woods largely unseen. His goal was to move south under the cover of the woods to strike the Confederate left flank somewhere to the south and force back the Confederate center. Accompanying Hovey would be Brig. Gen. Joshua Sill’s brigade of Sheridan’s division. The first contact with Confederate forces was made at 3:20 PM as the Federal skirmishers stumbled into the unseen Confederate units hidden in the woods ahead.
The Confederate forces in the woods were composed of two brigades of Maj. Gen. Carter Stevenson’s division. These 4,000 men were unprepared for the attack and were not in a defensive alignment when Hovey's men appeared in their front. Breckinridge was concerned despite not being able to see the full strength of the enemies coming towards him. “I'm starting to think the Yanks have sent a large portion of their troops to both our flanks trying to do the same thing we wanted to do to them. I'm thinking it might be better if I try to build some breastworks and let them move to us. I believe I'll put out more skirmishers and try to see how many are coming.”
The skirmishers on both sides quickly began to spot one another through the woods though neither side had yet committed to the attack. Bragg favored moving his two brigades a bit more to the west to allow the Yankees to move further south before attempting to attack them in their right flank as they passed. Stevenson agreed to the plan and spread out his two brigades to the west. But Hovey’s division was larger than Stevenson's force and their right flank extended beyond Stevenson's left despite the maneuver. Bragg was concerned enough with this realization to write to Stevenson that, “I am concerned that your ten regiments might have a tough time with the force the Yanks may have assembled in your front. A collapse of your forces here would be a disaster, fortunately night is approaching.” Stevenson was not very confident with his men’s ability to attack or to even hold against a heavy Union attack; Bragg ordered Stevenson to attack anyways. Stevenson moved his men forward. The Federals were encountered on higher ground and were discovered to be in greater force than anticipated.
The Federals unleashed heavy volleys into the oncoming Confederates from their vantage points on the higher ground. Stevenson’s concerns about his poorly trained men proved well-founded as three regiments quickly routed rearwards within minutes. Brig. Gen. Edward Tracy’s right flank brigade was now in pieces and the weak Confederate center fully exposed to a flank attack by Hovey’s division.
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The rout of Tracy's brigade in the West Woods by Hovey's division.
Bragg wrote to Stevenson that, “It looks like your concern over the low quality of your troops was well founded. Three of your regiments routed and have stripped away any protection for our line of artillery. Currently, after the routing, we have zero units that can immediately block the Union advance should they strike eastwards. We are in trouble here!”
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The Center Retreats
With the collapse of the Confederate flank in the West Woods it became necessary to adjust the disposition of forces in the center immediately. Bragg wrote that he favored withdrawing Withers’s Division, who had halted their attack on Steele, back south to rejoin Cheatham’s Division. Then he suggested a full retreat of all forces along the pike to the south. They would move under the cover of darkness to take up positions blocking the main crossings over the West Harpeth River. Breckinridge was in full agreement. He wrote Bragg that, “I would start withdrawing back to the crossings at once. If we don't start moving back to the crossing now then they could get between us and the crossing." Breckinridge continued to write that, "We had a good plan, but my green troops could not hold them back. I would like to get my full corps reunited. We did some great damage to the Yanks today but the position we find ourselves in can get bad quick.” Hardee agreed with pulling back and wrote that, “it's time to redeploy ASAP.” Price agreed as well with the plan to make it unanimous. Preston's Division would be withdrawn from Price's left flank and move to rejoin Stevenson's Division in the center. Price would have to spread out his own line to make up for the withdrawal of Preston's forces.
Bragg sent out orders as the sun set in the west and dusk enveloped the battlefield. Polk would fall back, first with Cheatham to support Stevenson, and then with Withers who would bring up the rear and cover the retreat down the pike. Price was sent orders to “disengage from the enemy corps in your front and start the process of stretching your frontage westward to cover ground previously occupied by units of Preston's Division. You will be aided in that most of your movements will be shrouded in the woods and under the cover of darkness. Use the utmost care, do not present an opportunity to the enemy while in transition.” Breckinridge was ordered to withdraw Preston’s Division from the left flank of Price’s Corps to support the center and reunite with Stevenson. Only Hardee’s orders remained unchanged, “Hold at all costs!”
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An overview of the Confederate plans to fall back at dusk.
Darkness Comes
Even as the Confederates fell back the Union troops continued their advance in the West Woods. Sill’s brigade, of Sheridan’s division, struck Barton’s brigade on the Confederate left. Sill was wounded in the fighting, but his men managed to rout two of Barton’s Georgia regiments from the front. Bragg viewed the growing chaos in the West Woods with trepidation. He turned to Breckinridge and exclaimed, “We are in trouble here! It may be difficult to extricate Stevenson's remaining units from the clutches of the advancing Federals.” Breckinridge, also growing increasingly concerned, chimed in that, “I would bet the house that everything the Yanks have on Winstead Hill our heading our way. He's gonna give one last big push before nightfall.” Bragg, turning to a courier, repeated his earlier orders to Stevenson, “Tell General Stevenson to get the hell out of there!”
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Despite the fears of the Confederate high command, the Yankee center was not barreling forward along the Columbia Pike to support Hovey's attack. Skirmishing continued in the West Woods as Hovey continued to push Stevenson from the woods until night fell. As the visibility fell to nothing in the dark the firing slackened and then stopped completed. Soon only the sounds of moving infantry, wagons, and artillery could be heard in the blackness.
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Whirlwind in the Center:
Commentary
The action along the Columbia Pike remained the most intriguing from the day's beginning to its end. The events of the later afternoon were shockingly symmetrical as both sides attacked the other's flank successfully. In the East Woods the Rebels were extremely lucky that Withers's recalled division arrived at the right place at the right time to surprise Steele's division just as their attack began. Withers's crushing assault on Steele's division completely routed them and put an end to any Union offensive plans in the East Woods. Had Withers's Division not returned to the center it is plausible that Steele's attack manages to outflank the Rebels and drive them back.
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In the West Woods the situation was reversed. The Federals moved a larger force into the woods and advanced stealthily against the Confederate left. Although neither force was completely prepared to meet the other in the woods, the Union right extended beyond the Confederate left and had them at a disadvantage. The problem was compounded for the Confederates when the poorly trained troops of Tracy's Brigade routed after the initial collision and left a gaping hole in the Rebel lines. At that point there was nothing to do but order a general retreat back south along the Columbia Pike to avoid being cut off from the West Harpeth River.
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Having already missed one opportunity earlier in the day to launch McCook's Wing southward against a panicked enemy - it would seem unlikely that a second opportunity would present itself, or that if it did it would be missed a second time. Yet, that is exactly what happened. McCook's Wing sat idly on Winstead Hill even as Polk's Corps scrambled southward to regain the pike and close the gap exposed by Hovey's attack. The limited visibility of dusk covered much of these moves. But it should have been obvious that the Confederates were reeling and that a concentrated push in the center needed to begin at once to gain as much ground as possible before night fell completely. Another grand opportunity was missed, and the Confederates got a head start in their retreat south.
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The fighting in the center had lasted all day. It began north of Winstead Hill and rolled southward. It encompassed both the East and West woods and brought in tens of thousands of men into the fighting. The Confederate fighting in the center was done by Polk's Corps and two of three brigades of Stevenson's Division of Breckinridge's Corps. Together these 17,384 men opposed the 30,649 men of McCook's Wing and Gorman's Department of Eastern Arkansas forces. The Confederate forces lost about 2,403 men in the fighting along Columbia Pike (14%) and the Federals lost 3,802 men in the fighting (12%).
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As night fell the center remained the most active place on the battlefield. It was likely to remain so for the rest of the battle.