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Part Eight: Carter's Crossing

The Western Fords
 

With the capture of Zahm’s cavalrymen, Wheeler’s Brigade turned to the west and began riding to scout the crossing points from which they came. Bragg and Hardee continued to worry that a larger Union force would make the crossing and come in behind their position at Carter’s Crossing. Wheeler’s five regiments, about 900 men, arrived at the two fords to find only 10-man Union cavalry detachments picketing the river. Wheeler was ordered to entrench and guard the crossings.

 

But Rosecrans could not have known this. When word arrived from the pickets that enemy cavalry was moving in force to the west he called for additional cavalrymen to reinforce that flank. But with Zahm's brigade captured, and Minty's brigade scattered with Thomas's Wing, the majority of the mounted forces remaining were then fighting as part of Crittenden’s force on the army’s far opposite flank. It would take time for them to disengage and ride to the other side of the battlefield. Within the town of Franklin the Pioneer Brigade (detached earlier from Crittenden) were still entrenching and preparing to defend the town against any Confederate raiding parties crossing the river to get into the Union rear.

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Carter's Crossing
 

After their methodical advance southwest along Carter's Creek Pike, Thomas's Wing was finally ready to launch their assault on Carter's Crossing. Thomas might have preferred to bring up his artillery and weaken the enemy position more before attacking, but the sun was setting too quickly for that. It was also believed that the Confederates would use the long night to fortify their position further and make any attack the next morning an even bloodier affair.

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Thomas’ men moved into densely packed battle lines and advanced against the Confederate position. Artillery batteries were first unlimbered on the low ground beneath the Confederate guns but in close support of the infantry. Heavy Confederate fire dropped Union soldiers at every step as they approached the crossing over the West Harpeth. Breckinridge wrote to Bragg that, “I can't believe he's moving around in the open like that. He is either getting ready to move up next to the river and start firing at everything or he is getting into position to dig in for when night falls.” Hardee was equally perplexed and stated, “The more I look at the Yankee movements in front of Carter’s Crossing the more I'm baffled. Their casualties are really mounting up there.”

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Map #8A.jpg

The advance of Thomas towards Carter's Crossing.

Thomas’s men continued their concentrated advance on the crossing despite the increasing losses. Moving directly along the pike Thomas’s men poured a heavy fire into the artillerymen on the higher ground above them, but with no appreciable effect at first. “This is going to get bloody,” Thomas wrote to Rosecrans as his men attacked. Over 200 Federal casualties were taken as they moved right up to the river’s edge to engage the Confederate artillery above them. Union infantrymen eventually uncrewed the four-gun Arkansas battery at the crossing which was devastating their ranks with canister fire. But other Confederate batteries would be more difficult to silence from their positions further back from the river.

 

Thomas then began to spread his line out to occupy the higher ground directly east of the crossing. From this ground his men would be firing down on the Confederates who were a few hundred yards away at a lower elevation. Union artillery also began to limber up and move to the hill from where they could dominate the crossing points over the West Harpeth. But this would take time. Watching the Union guns beginning to unlimber, Hardee wrote to Bragg that, “I think we should be grateful the Yankees didn't try this a couple of hours ago… I think the 6th/7th Arkansas guarding the crossing are just going to have to stand up and take it until nightfall. I do think their losses will be worse than ours if they attack.”

 

Breckinridge was not as confident of the defenses at Carter’s Crossing, “Oh my! They plan on rushing the crossing! Soon all of the Yanks can move up to start firing. If they are lucky they could uncrew some more batteries while their artillery opens fire on us. They should be able to start crossing soon and I don't think we have enough there to stop them. We need our reserve troops to move up to the crossing area at once. Wow, I would never have considered attacking like that because of the losses. If he does get the crossing we can fall back into the woods and rough areas to the west and pound him while he is in the open. We just have to not get too beat up while he crosses. Well......this should be interesting.”

 

To the west, the infantrymen from Johnson’s and Polk’s brigades were then trekking back through the forests from their earlier action with Zahm’s brigade. Their absence had left Cleburne with a reduced division and his ability to build breastworks and trenches was halved without the assistance of two of his best brigades. It would take over an hour for the infantrymen to reach the main Confederate defenses and just 2,000 men stood in Thomas’s way until then. Bragg wrote Hardee that, “you are going to get hammered once the Federal guns open up. In case of the worst outcome, you should consider moving some of Liddell's or McNair's boys closer to the crossing as they may be needed for a counterattack should the enemy attack and get across. I don't know what to tell you about re-positioning any artillery, no matter where you move to you are going to get pounded and we have to accept that.”

 

At 3:40 PM the Federal guns opened fire on the Confederates guarding the crossing over the river. The 5th Confederate and 6th/7th Arkansas received the brunt of the fire and lost nearly 70 men in a manner of minutes. Just as Bragg had predicted the losses were quickly piling up in front of the Union’s massed guns. Confederate counterbattery fire was less effective and the Union guns erupted again into the massed ranks of the 6th/7th Arkansas. After losing an additional 40 men the Arkansans routed rearwards leaving Carter’s Crossing temporarily unprotected. Bragg wrote to Hardee that, “We have to move up reserves now, get men forward to prevent a crossing, and continue to pound away with our artillery. We should be able to put a real hurt on all that infantry in the forward positions opposite us. I don't see how realistically the Yanks can manage a crossing in front of our guns.” Confederate reserve units were marched forward to block the crossings while Federal guns and infantry ripped fresh holes in their ranks. But Confederate counterfire was equally as severe as Thomas wrote to Rosecrans that the river ran “red with blood.”

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Map #8B.jpg

Thomas's charge against Carter's Crossing.

Cleburne rushed forward Liddell’s Brigade to hold the crossings over the river ahead of Thomas’s men. As Hardee viewed the carnage being inflicted on the Union ranks he remarked to Cleburne that, “surely their morale will begin to crack with such losses.” Hundreds of Federal soldiers were now falling with each salvo of Confederate musketry and artillery. There was little Thomas’s infantry could do from their positions opposite the higher Confederate ground over the river. But the Federal artillery remained dominant and continued to knock out Rebel guns. But could they inflict enough losses on the Confederate infantry to help punch a hole through the Rebel lines? “George, the eyes of the Union are on you, sir!” Rosecrans wrote to Thomas as his men continued to force their way up to the river. Union infantry managed to catch a Mississippi battery in the open and uncrewed it near Carter’s Creek Pike which lessened the volume of fire then pouring into them.

 

Two regiments of Arkansas troops were routed away from the crossing as the Union artillery devastated their ranks. Bragg addressed this with Hardee right away, “The artillery and infantry offensive fire from the Yanks is tremendous, causing the routing of two units, and killing another battery crew. This in not unexpected but complicates the defense of Carter's Crossing and hampers our ability to inflict massive damage on the enemy in return.” Still, the guns and infantry that Cleburne was able to bring to bear were having a devastating effect on the thick Union lines around the crossing.

 

As the sun began to set the Federals continued their attack on the crossings. Heavy losses were incurred by all of Thomas’s infantry units as they maintained their positions at the river's edge and tried to force their way across. Confederate infantry firing from behind breastworks on the high ground were especially devastating to the Federals below. Only one melee across the river was attempted but it was bloodily repulsed. As dusk turned to darkness the killing around Carter's Crossing finally came to a conclusion. Thomas's men had been unable to violently storm across the river and drive back the Confederate defenders. Backing away from the river the Federals began to regroup and assess their situation once again.

Thomas's Attack
Commentary

 

The attack on Carter's Crossing ended in a bloody repulse for the Federal army. Numerous decisions were made which led directly to the bloodletting along the river; from the decision to first bring Thomas to Franklin before sending him to the southwest along the pike, to the decision to attack regardless of the strength of the enemy position. Thomas had not wished to attack and objected to it before it was ordered. He originally proposed withdrawing his men to use them elsewhere rather than against a strongly held enemy bastion. But strong arguments by Crittenden soon swayed him and he dropped his objections. Regardless, Rosecrans felt that the die had already been cast and that to recall Thomas to join the rest of the army would mean squandering all of the remaining daylight. It would have also meant that Thomas's entire day would have been spent marching without any action being taken by his Wing. Lastly, with McCook, Gordon, and Crittenden all engaged with enemy forces to their front, it was always possible the Rebel left might be too weak to hold if pushed hard enough.

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The truth is that Carter's Crossing could have been successfully held by just half the number of defenders as were currently there. The position's strength was natural, and the Confederates had fortified it further with breastworks and a few trenches. Confederate artillery, although late to set up in some instances, dominated the other side of the river as the Federals approached. With only three hours of daylight remaining, the crossing could have been held against any number of Federals.

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But the position was far from impregnable. There were actually five river crossings within a mile and a half of Carter's Crossing; but the Federals only focused on Carter's which happened to also be the strongest. Each of the other crossing points was on a level elevation with the ground on the opposite side of it - at Carter's there was a 60-foot elevation for the defenders to use. The easternmost crossing points near Carter's Crossing were lightly defended and without any proper artillery support. At Carter's the bulk of Cleburne's Division and the corps artillery were firmly established. Also, the highest ground in the area was actually on the Union side of the river. Just 375 yards from Carter's Crossing the land rose up on the Union side of the river 60 feet above the Confederate position. Properly placing massed Union guns here would have pulverized the Confederate position and greatly hindered any movement on the other side of the river. 

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But time was against the Federals. With the sun going down it was determined to make an all-or-nothing attempt to force their way across the river. The attempt failed. With more hours of daylight it might have been possible to bring up additional guns to soften the enemy positions before attacking. There might also have been time to scout the other crossing points nearby to find a more vulnerable place to attempt the attack. But it was not to be so late in the day and with heavy fighting occurring on all the other fronts. 

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The day began with the 12,892 Confederates of Hardee's Corps moving along the Carter's Creek Pike. After a full day of fighting Minty's and Zahm's cavalrymen, and then being assaulted by Thomas's Wing, the Confederates had lost just 952 men (7%). Their decision to halt at the river, rather than crossing over it to attack the fleeing cavalrymen of Minty's brigade or scout towards Franklin, had been a good one. The Federals had come to them and attacked them on ground of their own choosing with devastating results. 

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Thomas had begun the day with a total of 15,909 men from his wing and from Minty's cavalry brigade. After the loss of Zahm's brigade and the gory repulse along the river, 4,463 men were listed as casualties (28% losses). While Thomas's Wing had taken heavy losses it remained intact and with solid command and control. Their divisions were consolidated and they were still an effective fighting force despite the setback. It only remained to be seen how they would be used during the night and whether they would be called upon to launch another attack over the river in the morning. 

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