Part Eleven: Nighttime Actions
A Busy Night
With darkness now fallen on the battlefield the two sides began to rapidly reposition themselves for the coming day. The Federals continued their movement forward with McCook’s and Gorman’s wings directly south on the Columbia Pike. Hovey’s division worked to clear the West Woods as Stevenson’s Division fell back in front of his force and out of the contested woods. On the far-left flank of the Union army, Palmer’s division spread out in a thin defensive line across the Lewisburg Pike while the other divisions of Crittenden’s Wing moved to the west and center of the battlefield. They would attempt to come in on McCook's left flank at dawn in order to join the expected attack down the Columbia Pike. Thomas’s Wing, likewise, began to partly disengage and reposition a division to join in the attack on the center.
For the Confederates the night revolved around trying to determine in which direction the Federals were moving. Price’s Corps held along their line blocking the Lewisburg Pike. They would send out skirmishers to make sure Crittenden did not vanish during the night. Another major concern was that the Federals might reposition against the weakly defended river crossings between Carter’s Crossing and the Columbia Pike. These were only held by part of McCown’s Division, and the area, according to Hardee, contained “barely any troops & has no natural or man-made defenses.” Bragg agreed that the position there was a concern and wrote that he, “would like to see if we can shed another brigade or two for our West Harpeth River defenses.” Meanwhile, Polk’s and Breckinridge’s corps continued to fall back to the south ahead of the Federal advance along the Columbia Pike.
By far the most active part of the Union maneuvering was in the center where McCook and Gorman moved forward as rapidly as possible in the darkness. Despite running into the Confederate rear guard on occasions, they continued to push forward on the heels of the Confederates as they moved southward towards the river. Bragg complained to his generals that, “the Yanks continue to maintain very close contact with our forces withdrawing south and are pressing the rear guard. This effort by the Yanks to maintain close contact is making it difficult for some of our boys to reposition.” Even as this discussion was occurring five Confederate units routed rearwards as Union pressure on the rearguard on Columbia Road increased. Seeing the fleeing soldiers, Bragg turned and complained to his generals, “This has turned into a huge ugly night action!” He began to worry that the aggressive Union actions would cause his line to have to contract more than even originally planned, “if the Yanks keep pressing then I see no other choice.” Breckinridge responded with equal consternation and stated that, "I would never have thought they would do a night attack.” Hardee opined that Thomas may have abandoned his front near Carter’s Crossing and related his intention to shift part of his corps further east to reinforce the weaker crossing points between Carter’s Creek Pike and Columbia Pike.
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The advance of the Federals and the Retreat of the Confederate center.
As the Federals advanced Rosecrans ordered Crittenden’s supporting force, two divisions under Wood and Van Cleve, to aim towards the Chaffin House for their dawn attack. Meanwhile, McCook and Gorman continued to move south on either side of the Columbia Pike to apply pressure on the retreating Confederates. Although the Confederates continued to fall back, they were able to inflict losses on the leading Union regiments who ventured too far forward. Artillery and small arms exploded in the darkness as the lines came together and fought at close ranges. But Bragg continued to edge his men backwards in the face of the Union advance. The Federals paid for their aggressive movements as seven regiments were routed at midnight due to the stubborn Confederate defenders still holding on. Rosecrans was then forced to fall back some in order to keep his forces together and organized. Bragg’s generals immediately reported the development to Bragg. He responded, “I’m thankful for the respite, if it continues then we can start withdrawing towards our planned positions for tomorrow."
It was at this moment that the first units moving east from Thomas’s Wing struck the extreme left of Polk’s Corps just north of the West Harpeth River. Hearing the firing from beyond their left, Bragg exclaimed, “We are flanked!” It was ascertained by those on the front line that the battle flags indicated the enemy was from Thomas’s Wing which had last been spotted at sundown near Carter’s Crossing. Realigning his army north of the river was now a dire necessity for Bragg. He ordered Polk and Breckinridge to fall back at once to their pre-arranged lines for a final battle to hold their extended positions north of the river. If this line were to fall they would be forced back over the river. At 3 AM the Confederates, no longer being pressed in their front, fell back a up to an additional half-mile to form a more compact line in anticipation of dawn.
In response to the Union threat along the river on Polk's left, Bragg ordered Hardee to detach Ector’s Brigade from McCown’s Division to cross the river and come in on the left of Cheatham’s Division. The addition of Ector’s Brigade allowed Polk to stretch his left and anchor it on the river. Further, opposite the river at this point was an elevated ridge on which numerous Confederate artillery batteries were unlimbered from which they could dominate the open fields in front of the Confederate lines.
Despite being on the run since nightfall and being pushed back for over a mile and a half, the Confederate line had managed to reconsolidate in the darkness. By dawn the Confederates were aligned with Ector’s Brigade on the left just north of the West Harpeth. To Ector’s right flank was Cheatham’s Division which turned from north to southeast towards the Columbia Pike. Withers’s Division was on Cheatham’s right flank and rested his own right flank on the pike itself. To the east of the pike came Breckinridge’s Corps with Stevenson’s Division on the left and Preston’s Division on the right. Preston’s right flank remained in the air but it was hoped the enemy would be unable to exploit or discover this weakness. Bragg was satisfied with the performance of Polk’s and Breckinridge’s corps during the night and sent them both his compliments as the night came to an end along the pike.
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The two lines as they were at dawn
The Lewisburg Pike
With so much activity on either side of the Columbia Pike it was only natural that the Confederates began to question where the added forces were coming from. The nearest known assistance for the Union center would be those Federals last seen on the Lewisburg Pike – Crittenden’s Wing. Price moved units forward along the pike to ascertain the strength and whereabouts of those Federals he had been confronted by all day. His skirmishers found fewer Union encampments than expected and a reconnaissance in force was ordered directly north on the Lewisburg Pike. Little’s Division moved forward and soon struck the Federal cavalry units blocking the pike on the Union left. Encountering just cavalry along the pike, and finding few Union units anywhere nearby, has encouraged Bragg to state that, “I believe there is only one division and a portion of another facing Price's entire corps.” This was a correct interpretation as only Palmer’s overextended division, along with 900 cavalrymen, were now in position on the Union left.
The Federal cavalry fell back in the darkness ahead of the Confederate advance. This unexpected weakness on the Union left emboldened the Confederates even more. Bragg prodded the advance further, stating, “Armstrong's cavalry and a good portion of Little's Division should continue to press forward up the pike towards the enemy.” Moving further north on the pike the Confederates continued to meet scant resistance as Little’s Division gained over a half-mile of ground. Infantry from Palmer’s division rushed to get ahead of the Confederates and take up positions in wooded areas along the pike. Bragg ordered that Price’s men should be moved into battle line and advance against the Yankees in the darkness to keep up the pressure. In the ensuing skirmishing Brig. Gen. David Stanley, commanding the cavalry on Crittenden’s flank, was killed in action.
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The advance of Little's Division along the pike.
After driving the Yankees back a few hundred yards it was felt that the salient being created by the push down the pike might be too exposed once the sun came up at dawn. Bragg ordered Price to fall back and reform. He was to create a solid line with both of his divisions facing north in anticipation of any action on that front at dawn. To Price’s left the men of Breckinridge’s Corps had broken off contact during the night to move nearer the Columbia Pike. This left Price’s Corps alone along the Lewisburg Pike with his left flank exposed to a possible flanking attack. But Bragg and Price were confident that Crittenden’s force had also been stretched thin during the night and would be unlikely to renew any attacks at dawn.
In fact, a few hundred yards away, Crittenden was penning a note to Rosecrans that “I’m stretched pretty thin but I suppose the Rebs are also.” Crittenden now had just Palmer’s division across the Lewisburg Pike while both Wood and Van Cleve were stretched to his right for a distance of nearly two miles. As the sun rose at dawn the two sides were still in close proximity along the Lewisburg Pike.
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The Lewisburg Pike at dawn.
Union Cavalry Raid
Despite predictions to the contrary by the Union generals, no Confederate cavalry advance across the westernmost fords materialized after they captured the crossings the day before. Forgetting the disastrous loss of Zahm's brigade just a few hours before, it was decided by Rosecrans to attempt another raid across the river with his last available cavalry forces. At midnight, 1,800 cavalrymen rode west from Franklin towards the unguarded fords west of Carter’s Crossing. Led by Col. John Minzer and Col. Robert Minty, the force would move to scout the enemy side of the river and ascertain whether the Confederates were building a force to cross to the north of the river and attack Franklin. Unfortunately, for the Federals, the men of Wheeler’s Cavalry Brigade had spent the night building trenches across from the ford and were in position to contest any crossing of the river in the morning. Manning the trenches were 694 Tennesseans led by Wheeler himself. Although one of the two units was short on ammunition, a reserve unit of 173 men was nearby and could rush to support the defenses if necessary. Ironically, the other crossing a mile to the west remained unguarded. Rather than investigating this point as well, the Union cavalry halted and awaited the dawn.
At 4 AM the Confederates at the crossing deployed skirmishers across the river and ran into the Union forces laying in the dark across the creek. Bragg was concerned at the unexpected appearance of enemy forces near the weakly defended Confederate left flank. He wondered aloud to Hardee if, “Thomas is preparing to attack up there at that crossing at dawn and then come streaming down behind Carter’s Crossing. We've stripped our left partially to aid Polk in the center.” Hardee brushed the concerns aside and felt confident that Thomas has not moved far from where he was last seen at twilight. Further, part of Thomas’s force had already been identified on Polk’s left flank during the night fighting. Hardee saw no reason for concern.
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As dawn came the cavalrymen from both armies were lined up just 250 yards apart at the crossing.
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The western river crossing at dawn.
Darkness around Carter's Crossing
Even as fighting flared up during the night at other places - there was only silence around Carter’s Crossing. The Confederates were unsure if Thomas meant to continue his attack at dawn or if he meant to maneuver to some other crossing point. Hardee stated that, “maybe the dawn will reveal Thomas's Wing all lined up ready for another try at Carter's Creek but in my gut I'm pretty sure they'll be gone and leaving just a blocking force. But just in case, I've moved around the guns to better protect the crossing.” Bragg agreed, stating, “I am with you, my gut tells me that they have a blocking force at Carter’s Crossing, and Thomas will have moved to threaten the lower crossings or aid McCook.” As the increased Union pressure was felt against the center it became increasingly likely that Thomas would not try his luck at Carter’s Crossing in the morning. McCown’s Division was sidled to the east to better protect the crossings between Carter’s Creek Pike and the Columbia Pike. Cleburne’s Division would maintain its position near Carter’s Crossing and hold the line.
Little else occurred around Carter’s Crossing after darkness fell. Thomas spent the night moving Negley’s division towards the center while Rousseau’s division remained behind at Carter’s Crossing to block any Confederate counterattack across the river. While Rousseau did construct breastworks, he failed to build any trenches or to reposition his artillery to gain better firing positions before dawn.
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Carter's Crossing at dawn.
A Long Night:
Commentary
As the night began the Confederates were confident that they had already demoralized and defeated the larger Federal army. Bragg wrote that, “I think the Yankees have one last big push in them. If we can limit our losses now & get set defensively for tomorrow, I think they’ll be forced to retreat.” Hardee concurred and stated that, “The Yankees defeated us in a few phases - they chucked us off Winstead Hill, they got a bit of a twist on our cavalry on the Lewisburg Pike, and they beat Stevenson's Division to the punch in the West Woods. The difference is we've been able to minimize our losses in losing situations & they haven't.”
The Federals made their greatest gains only after the sun went down. Having spent nearly the entire day procrastinating on Winstead Hill, they finally advanced under the cover of night. This was largely prompted by the unexpected success in turning Polk’s left flank in the West Woods and driving back Stevenson’s Division. Once the Confederate line began to retreat it was forced to give up over two miles of ground in some areas before they could halt and regroup. The Federals kept up the pressure through the night and advanced on their heels. But this came at a heavy cost as they were frequently at a disadvantage in the nighttime firefights which broke out as a result of their close pursuit. Between 10 PM and 6 AM the Confederates lost 300 men while the Federals suffered 1,404 casualties. With the sun now coming up the Federals had lost just over twice as many men in the battle as had the Confederates – 12,662 vs. 6,151.
The Federals made good use of the night from beginning to end. They advanced rapidly and managed to finally drive the Confederates back along the Columbia Pike. They maintained enough pressure on the Rebels to rob them of any opportunity to build breastworks or trenches to bolster their defenses before the coming attack at dawn along Columbia Pike. They also managed to spread out Crittenden’s Wing and detach a division to reinforce McCook and Gorman in the center while still holding a line stretching all the way to the Lewisburg Pike. Thomas also managed to divert a full division to the coming assault along the Columbia Pike from his position near Carter’s Crossing.
But despite accomplishing so much along the Columbia Pike and Lewisburg Pike, the situation along the Carter’s Creek Pike was totally neglected. For the Federals this area of the battlefield had become kryptonite to them. Despite having wooded ridges, higher ground, and plenty of possible areas to build an effective defensive line to contest and dissuade the Rebels from advancing north of the river – Thomas did very little. Rousseau’s division remained on the lowest ground in the area and directly under the Confederate artillery and infantry across the river. A few breastworks were built but they would help little once the sun illuminated their position and the Confederate artillery laid a plunging fire at down upon them. The Federal artillery, likewise, remained inactive through the night and continued to sit unprotected on an open ridge less than a half-mile from the well-protected Confederate artillery.
This differed greatly from the activity on the Confederate side of the river. Hardee had Cleburne’s men digging throughout the night to protect the artillery with trenches and breastworks wherever possible. Cleburne’s men were spread out on the best ground and would be able to contest any Union attack over the river from numerous directions. The Confederates would dominate the crossing at dawn even more than they had at dusk the day before. For Rousseau’s men, they would be needlessly exposed and would likely suffer plenty of casualties as a result of their poor placement.
Why have they been left in such an open and deadly area when better defensive terrain sits just a few hundred yards away? Honestly, I don’t know. Thomas is under orders to block any Confederate counterattacks across Carter's Crossing. Thomas has determined that the best way to do this is to remain as close to the crossing as possible despite the geographic disadvantages of the positioning. Cleburne’s men across the river are under the same exact orders from their commanding general - to block the crossing. The main difference is that Thomas’s men are on very poorly chosen ground while Cleburne’s men are on the best-chosen ground possible. Cleburne's men do not hold all of the ground adjacent to the river because they do not need to. They hold selected areas which have been chosen to maximize their defensive positioning and cover the crossing at the same time. As dawn eventually turns to day, and the Confederates at Carter's Crossing begin to open up with their artillery, I believe Rousseau's men will regret not using the night to secure better positions further from the crossing.
The Confederates, like the Federals, made good use of the night despite being pressured throughout most of it. They managed to reorganize their forces blocking Columbia Pike and to form a continuous line in anticipation of a Federal attack at dawn. While the line is continuous, and is ready, it lacks any solidly defensive advantages and should lead to bloody close quarter combat once the assaults begin. On all of the Confederate fronts the Army of Tennessee is positioned as they wish to be and are as ready as they can be for the renewal of the battle.