Part Two: Evening Skirmishing
North of Grand Junction - North Hill
When Rosecrans shifted his wing to the east of the Hickory Pike, he did so to follow a ridgeline to get around the Confederate forces coming up the Hickory Pike. It was a longer march but it was largely on even ground with the Rebel guns as well as partially concealed from enemy view by the terrain. To support his column, and Sherman's trailing him, Rosecrans unlimbered eighteen cannons on the nearby ridges and began firing on the Confederates then moving into position in the open fields blocking the Hickory Pike ahead of Sherman’s advance.
As Rosecrans shifted it forced the Confederates to spread out their own defenses to counter the move. Maury’s Division was Price's trailing unit and it was diverted towards North Hill in response to Rosecrans's actions. With the support of Forrest’s Brigade the Confederates stayed in-between the Federals and North Hill the entire time. Also, rapidly coming up through Grand Junction was the support corps of Maj. Gen. Simon Buckner. His leading division, under Brig. Gen. Patrick Cleburne, was then just a half-mile south of North Hill in support Maury’s efforts. Buckner wrote to Beauregard that he was moving Cleburne “as fast as possible to relieve Forrest and reinforce Price’s right. If we want to create a defensive line around Grand Junction than North Hill should be the center of that line.” Beauregard agreed with Buckner’s statement and actions and even encouraged him to be prepared for offensive action should an opportunity present itself.
As dusk began to cover the battlefield the fighting around North Hill flared up. Infantry units clashed sporadically with neither side committing strongly to their efforts just yet. Moving through the Union lines was Rosecrans who took up a position on high ground with the 43rd Ohio overlooking North Hill just a half-mile away. Through the darkness a stray shot fired from the Confederate lines found William Rosecrans and killed him instantly. The loss of Rosecrans was a rough but the Federals maintained their positions and kept up the pressure on North Hill and the right flank of Price’s Corps. Brig. Gen. David Stanley took over the command of the wing while Col. Joseph Mower took over the command of Stanley’s old division.
The advance of Rosecrans's Wing shifted to the east to try and approach North Hill from a more vulnerable direction. But the delay in arriving allowed Maury and then Buckner to block the move. Rosecrans was killed just before sundown.
North of Grand Junction - Hickory Pike
Little’s Division was soon deployed for battle perpendicular to the pike facing the advance of Sherman. The Federals moved into battleline and began a slow advance against the Confederates on the pike. Both sides brought up their artillery support and began to duel one another across the open fields bordering the pike. Neither side was able to gain any advantage over the other and it soon dissolved into a standup shooting match between Sherman's leading brigade under Colonel Samuel Holmes and Colonel Elijah Gates's Missourians under Little.
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The fighting along Hickory Pike.
To the west of Hickory Pike, the Middle Road ran south to an intersection behind Price’s left flank. From there an open road ran directly to intersect the Hickory Pike behind the Confederate lines. It was along this road that McPherson’s Wing was then marching down as the day turned to dusk. The Confederates had been able to rush cavalrymen to picket the Middle Road and were extremely concerned that the Federals would be able to gain the crossroads and begin coming in behind the Confederate positions on Hickory Pike. Beauregard wrote Price that, “I believe the Yanks are going to cause our cavalry to withdraw and the Yanks will arrive at the intersection before any of our infantry can. This means the road leading to our rear and left flank is open to them, this is not good.” Van Dorn concurred and guessed that the Federals were even then rushing down the Middle Road with a view to get in behind their center. Both Van Dorn and Breckinridge favored pulling back Little’s Division of Price’s Corps to avoid them being attacked from behind by any Federals coming down the Middle Road. Price agreed with this assessment, stating that, “the Union advance down the Middle Road has caused my plans to go up in smoke.” Beauregard agreed that the position of Little’s Division was now untenable and ordered them to fall back and refuse their left flank to “be prepared for what appears to be an aggressive enemy commander leading an infantry corps coming down the road to our rear left.”
The advance of McPherson's Wing has caused a shift in the Confederate positions on Hickory Pike. The left flank of Price is now exposed and must fall back further south.
At the intersection along the Middle Road, 1,100 cavalrymen from Armstrong’s Brigade and two artillery pieces prepared to delay and engage the oncoming Federal column. The Federals unlimbered their artillery and moved into battle lines in the open fields north of the Confederates. By 6:20 PM the sides opened on one another at close range and a Confederate gun was quickly destroyed in the fighting. McPherson's leading brigade under Oglesby brigade heavily outnumbered the Confederates and rushed forward to engage the cavalry before night fell completely. The Confederate cavalry fell back ahead of the attack and by 7 PM the Federals had secured the crossroads just as night fell.
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The LaGrange Area
With the arrival of McArthur’s cavalrymen at 4 PM the area around LaGrange became much more active than it had been. Armstrong’s Cavalry Brigade was suddenly outnumbered and outflanked to the west while Breckinridge’s Corps was only then arriving in the town itself. McArthur’s goal was to reach and cross Beasley Creek to the north rather than to threaten the town itself to the southeast. McArthur feared attacking the town without infantry support as he might be counterattacked and driven back against the creek.
Breckinridge announced his intention to hold the town by using Lee’s Division to block the LaGrange Road into town a mile north of LaGrange. Lovell’s Division would then divide with a brigade heading to the northeast to attempt to intersect and defend the approach to LaGrange along the Middle Road. This was necessitated by the observed approach of Union infantry (McPherson’s) coming from the north. Meanwhile the other brigade of Lovell’s Division would move to the northwest of LaGrange and guard against any approach to the town from that direction by McArthur's cavalry last spotted moving through the woods to the west. Beauregard suggested that Breckinridge also reposition Armstrong’s Cavalry Brigade to support the infantry west of the town.
As McPherson's Wing moved more aggressively on the Middle Road it began to worry Breckinridge that they might be turning towards LaGrange and not to get in behind Price on the Hickory Pike. But Beauregard was not sure yet what the Yankees intended and so changed Breckinridge’s orders so that all of Lovell’s Division would move to the northeast towards the Middle Road to block the direct route into LaGrange. Beauregard wrote him that, “With Lovell on or near that intersection it will be in a good position to make the Yanks think twice about traipsing over to attack General Price.” Breckinridge’s other division would divide with a brigade maintaining their position blocking the LaGrange Road from the north and the other protecting the town from any approach coming from the west.
The fighting around LaGrange has not yet begun but both sides continue to jockey for position around its many roads.
For McArthur, the advance from the west had been a slow and frustrating one. Choosing to utilize the cover of the woods to approach unseen the main crossing of the Beasley Creek, McArthur’s men were spotted almost at once through a gap in the trees which exposed his men briefly to an enemy scout a few miles away. McArthur wrote Grant that, “We should proceed under the assumption that the element of surprise has been lost. However, I will endeavor to keep up the appearances of having a large force in the east as much as possible, so as to keep the enemy tied up in that direction.” McArthur still hoped to reach Beasley Creek and cross to the north side of it as quickly as possible. But he maintained his plan to “leave several scout units in the far west, operating on the road from Somerville and, eventually, on the railroad. I have no delusions that these units can, by themselves, achieve great victory. However, they may be able to serve as a distraction: If the enemy can be made to think we have large bodies of men in that area, they might divert forces that could otherwise be used in the center.”
Around Saulsbury
The relative quiet around Saulsbury contrasted greatly to the more active areas around LaGrange and Grand Junction. This has allowed Van Dorn plenty of time to position his men and begin maneuvering them to other areas of the battlefield if they are needed. With Ruggles’s Division defending the town itself, Tilghman’s Division completed its march to the northwest and reached the intersection of the Memphis Pike. From this position he could move east to Saulsbury, west to Grand Junction, or continue north and then west to come in on the flank of the advancing Federals towards North Hill. [see the Grand Junction map above] Van Dorn wrote Beauregard that, “Tilghman is moving to position himself on the Yankee flank as they push for Grand Junction. His division has moved out of sight of the Yankees so far and has an open route behind the enemy front moving on North Hill.” Beauregard wholeheartedly approved of the movements of Van Dorn and began to visualize a counterattack the next morning utilizing Tilghman’s men.
Beauregard did express some concern that if the Yankees managed to cross Spring Creek that Ruggles’s Division might be too weak to prevent a Federal drive to take Saulsbury. But as of then the Federals had shown no aggression at the Spring Creek crossings and each was guarded by cavalry regiments from Jackson’s Brigade. The most likely crossing point was a number of miles to the north of Saulsbury. But Jackson's men had built breastworks and were support by a two-gun section of artillery at the ford. By dusk two infantry regiments from Martin's Brigade, nearly 900 men, took over the defense of the ford and allowed Jackson's cavalry to be shifted to another area.
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The brief appearance of the enemy cavalry to the east of Saulsbury concerned both Van Dorn and Beauregard, but thus far the Federals had shown little strength and appeared to be scouting only. Ruggles would continue to block the creek crossings east of Saulsbury in case a larger force of Yankees approached from that direction.
Van Dorn wrote to Beauregard that, “I wouldn't be at all surprised if that Yankee Corps we spotted north of Spring Creek is ordered to only screen the crossings & move to support the main Union attack on Grand Junction.” At their 6 PM conference Beauregard issued orders for Van Dorn to prepare Tilghman’s Division for a likely attack on the Federals near North Hill at dawn. By sundown Tilghman had moved his division northward to within just a half-mile of the known Union lines then battling Price’s men northeast of North Hill. Tilghman’s men remained unseen and he awaited further orders from Beauregard before advancing any further against the enemy.
Meanwhile, well to the north, Ord was then approaching the Spring Creek crossing which the Confederates had just reinforced with 900 infantrymen. Ord's scouts had already alerted him that the Rebels held a strong position along the creek and were prepared to resist any attempt to cross to the south. Ord wrote to Grant that he would just hold the main crossing with a brigade to prevent any Rebel raids behind the Union lines, and that the rest of his corps would move to reinforce the center for the attack on Grand Junction. Grant approved of this and ordered Ord to bring in his men as a reserve behind Sherman.
But Ord's curiosity got the better of him and he decided to send Veatch's brigade, covering the Spring Creek crossing, forward to have a first-hand look as the enemy defenses. Just as the sun was setting the men of the 25th Indiana inched forward to the ford over the Spring Creek. After moving up through the heavy woods the Federals found themselves suddenly exposed to nearly 900 Confederates and two unlimbered artillery pieces positioned behind breastworks. The Indianans instinctively fired into the Confederates who were just then caught unawares. With darkness falling and chaos suddenly erupting around them, the Confederates unaccountably fled the field. The 33rd Mississippi and 37th Alabama took to the rear leaving the section of Tennessee horse artillery dangerously exposed along the road. The Indianans were as shocked at their good fortune as the Tennessee gunners were to see their infantry support melt away. The Federals had lost not a man while managing to uncover a key crossing point across Spring Creek just as the sun set.
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Could this be exploited at daybreak?
The brief skirmish along Spring Creek has caused the unexpected rout of the 900 Confederate infantrymen picketing the ford across the creek. Two of Jackson's cavalry units are still in the area and are now the only organized force which might be able to slow or stop the Federals at the creek.