Part Three: The First Day Ends
Confederate Staff Meeting
As the generals met at Beauregard’s headquarters for their command conference there was a feeling of success in the air. Beauregard began by announcing, “I am very pleased with everyone's decisions and movements. We could have done a few things better but overall; we are on it! Well done all!” The officers spent no little time discussing the novice maneuverings of the Yankees and celebrating the reported killing of Rosecrans who had ventured too far forward into the fighting. Beauregard then wondered aloud, “whether there is more enemy cavalry lurking out there somewhere that we don't know about. They have shown a willingness to be deceptive.”
Overall, the evening meeting was about the offensive possibilities the morning offered. Tilghman’s Division was firmly on the Union flank to the east of North Hill. His force remained unseen and two of Forrest’s cavalry units had advanced even further around the Union flank to be sure that the Federal line ended where it was estimated that it did. Beauregard stated that, “I believe that the whole Yankee flank is hanging in the air, just ripe for Tilghman's Division to slam into it sometime right after dawn.” Van Dorn was quick to support the proposal and responded that, “I'm feeling pretty good about Tilghman's flanking move - ideally I want to get in their rear, isolate as many Yank regiments as possible, and then destroy whole regiments. Their advance is playing right into our hands.” The other generals agreed that Tilghman’s Division was ideally placed to attack at dawn.
It was at this moment that an out-of-breath courier arrived to announce that the defenders had fled away from Spring Creek without firing a shot. The generals sat thunderstruck as the information was wholly unexpected. Price was the first to speak, “Well, I feel cheated.” Beauregard could only manage one word in reply, “Sucks.” Price nodded in agreement and threw up his arms. Van Dorn tried to remain positive and promised to turn Jackson’s nearby cavalry regiments around at once and attempt to rush back and defend the ford. The infantry would reform sooner or later and would assist them. “I look forward to seeing what the dawn brings,” was his final comment on the subject.
Beauregard shook his head and cleared his thoughts from the setback along the creek to begin issuing orders for the morrow. To begin with, Breckinridge’s Corps would continue to see to the defense of LaGrange. Lovell’s Division would be the key to much of this as they had advanced to within a half-mile of the intersection of the Middle Road. From this intersection the Federals might advance unimpeded to the east and get in behind Price’s line. Lovell’s orders were to prevent this from happening by any means – even by counterattacking the Federals to keep them from threatening the center. Breckinridge’s other division under Lee would continue to both block the main roads into LaGrange from the north and the northwest.
Price’s left, under Little, would fall back at dawn to avoid any possible catastrophe should the Federals manage to move to the intersection and to the southeast. Little would take a new line closer to Grand Junction where he would eventually be reinforced with elements from Buckner’s Corps. Price’s other division, Maury’s, would continue to hold the area around North Hill ahead of Rosecrans’s Wing which had spent the evening angling around the hill. “I fully expect,” Beauregard stated, “the enemy to use his artillery to bang away in the morning but Maury needs to hold if at all possible. Sometime later in the morning Tilghman's Division will launch his flanking attack. I would think this might produce a pull back of the units directly in Maury's front. If this happens, Maury will need to keep up the pressure and hinder the enemy from sending troops to aid in the fight against Tilghman.”
Turning next to Buckner, Beauregard ordered him to redeploy Johnson’s Division out of Grand Junction (where they had been building breastworks) and move them northward to support Little’s Division. Johnson would move up the Hickory Pike for about a mile before angling to the west and moving to support Little’s left flank should the Federals advance from the intersection to the southeast. Cleburne’s Division would swing to the east and then north to get into position south of Rosecrans’s position. Once Tilghman’s attack began they would join in and help crush the Federals between them.
To Van Dorn went the most complex orders of the day. Tilghman’s Division would move to strike the flank and rear of Rosecrans as much as possible. The attack would need to be closely watched as they could run into a hornet’s next of Yankees if Rosecrans was more heavily supported than they supposed. On Van Dorn’s other flank, where the Spring Creek line had just given way, the situation was more unstable than anticipated. Jackson’s two cavalry regiments would be ordered to rush back to the north as quickly as possible to attempt to keep the ford in Confederate hands. If the Yankees pushed hard enough they might be able to force their way across before the routed units could reform and return to their previous lines. They would have to wait and see what the outcome of all this was at dawn before they overreacted one way or the other.
The generals nodded their understanding of the orders and were in agreement as to their responsibilities the next day. With that the meeting came to a close and the generals departed to return to their commands. Beauregard returned to his tent to get a little rest before the real battle began at sunup.
The Confederate plan for the second day of battle is to defend along most of the front while concentrating an attack on the salient near North Hill.
Union Staff Meeting
As the Union generals gathered at Grant’s headquarters the mood was a somber one as Rosecrans’s body was then being loaded onto a wagon for transport back north. Brig. Gen. David Stanley would take his place at the meeting and attempt to lead his wing to victory tomorrow.
The gloomy mood was suddenl broken when cheering erupted from near Spring Creek at 7 PM. Word arrived that the Confederates defending the ford there had broken to the rear after a surprise attack by the 25th Indiana. Grant jumped up and clapped his hands together and announced, “Gentlemen, this is a game changer in my opinion! I say we attack over that ford in the morning. This will force the Rebs to reinforce the Saulsbury area and weaken themselves in the center where our main attack is heading.” McPherson agreed fully and stated the age-old adage that you must reinforce success where you find it. McArthur congratulated Ord’s men on their fine performance as well.
McArthur then, as was his wont, began to play devil’s advocate in the discussion to assault across Spring Creek. McArthur pointed out that any forces thrown over the creek would likely be too weak to actually take Saulsbury and might themselves become trapped south of the creek. McArthur suggested a simple feint be made over the creek with a single brigade rather than a full division or more. “The key will be to make the Rebs think we're pouring men across the creek. The Rebs will rush reinforcements to the area, thus accomplishing our goal of stripping reinforcements from Grand Junction. By the time the Rebs realize we have no one there, the rest of Ord's Wing will have arrived in the center, providing the reinforcements to be used in the final push.”
Ord spoke up next. “I've not been in favor of dividing my command up so, having said that, I think that I need to be used either as Sherman's left flank or as a diversion towards Saulsbury to try and draw forces away from Grand Junction. If I demonstrate in force in front of Saulsbury, I can keep some of their force there and slowly withdraw towards Grand Junction. Crossing the ford that had been graciously vacated.... well... that’s a narrow fighting front in front of me. They could anchor both of their flanks on the rivers and make me beat myself silly attacking their center. Let’s face it: if their units routed, they will be sending additional forces to take their place soon.”
Stanley now spoke up for the first time and favored attacking both Confederate flanks to relieve pressure in the center. Attacking their flanks would “keep their defense honest in the center and force them to reinforce certain areas away from our main attack.” McPherson spoke up again in support of advancing over Spring Creek. “My undoubted belief is that the Rebs expect us to attack en masse at some, yet to be determined, objective. I further believe that he is sitting there ensconced within tactically beneficial terrain and breastworks just waiting to shoot the 'poop' outta us! Whoever shoots first, is stationary and suitably dug in and protected, will in all likelihood inflict substantial casualties on the attacker. We should seek to draw men from their planned defenses by doing what they do not expect on the flanks.”
McArthur spoke up again to point out he vulnerability of Stanley’s Wing now well in advance of Sherman’s left flank. He urged that Stanley either attack to the west to aid Sherman in driving south along the Hickory Pike, or switch to the defensive on his current ground to avoid becoming even further exposed in front of the main army. He also noted that his cavalry north of LaGrange had linked with McPherson’s men and opened the direct road between them over Beasley Creek. This would allow him to turn his main force north to begin assisting McPherson’s advance by securing his right flank. He would keep a smaller force south of Beasley Creek to threaten LaGrange and distract the Confederates away from the center.
Stanley then spoke up to agree with McArthur that he could advance no further southward without further support. His position had already become a salient protruding towards the Confederate lines. He reiterated that Sherman must attack to link up with his right and begin the drive on Grand Junction. Part of Ord’s Wing would be up soon enough to offer support to them both. He also surmised that the Rebels in Sherman’s front were fighting a mere delaying action before falling back to the south. At this, McArthur spoke up in agreement, “The Rebels to Sherman’s front probably have no intention of counterattacking or trying to stop Sherman. I expect their sole intention is to slow him up.”
The conversation and the discussion continued for a number of hours as the generals contemplated a number of different strategies and moves for the morrow. Finally, after hearing enough, Grant was ready to issue his orders for the next day’s battle.
McPherson’s Wing would drive towards West Hill directly south between LaGrange and Grand Junction. He would work to support both Sherman on his left and (eventually) McArthur on his right.
Stanley’s Wing would continue their attack on North Hill. He was to watch his left flank in case the enemy struck him in his forward position.
Ord would continue to the center with four of his five brigades to reinforce the drive on Grand Junction. Veatch’s brigades would cover the Spring Creek crossing rather than attempt an advance across it.
McArthur would move to the north of Beasley Creek and come in on the right flank of McPherson as he drove south for West Hill.
Sherman’s Wing would attack directly south along the Hickory Pike.
With that the conference came to a close and the generals retired for a few hours of sleep before the dawn.
The Union plan is to advance and attack the Confederates to press them back on, and out of, Grand Junction.
The End of the Day:
Commentary
The battle on October 6 never quite became the bloody affair that the generals had anticipated as they moved towards one another that evening. The two sides maneuvered more than they fought and tried to outmarch one another to the most advantageous ground on the field. The most interesting move came early on when Rosecrans moved off the Hickory Pike to bypass attacking the enemy cavalry and attempt to reach the high ground by a more circuitous route. This is the "Daniel Sickles" move of the Battle of the Railroad and could be debated for generations.
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On the one hand the move makes perfect sense. By leaving the main road and veering to the east Rosecrans has forced the Confederates to spread out their defenses along a large front stretching a number of miles. The movement also negated the Confederates from utilizing their earliest infantry and artillery reinforcements to strike at him as he moved across the fields and allowed him to make good progress right up to the foot of North Hill.
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On the other hand, the move was detrimental because it allowed the Confederates to maintain control of a larger part of the Hickory Pike throughout the day. Rather than fighting for control of the pike from the start, the Rebels were given extra time to bring up Little's Division and throw them across the pike further north than originally planned. This has forced Sherman to go into a battle along a line they had expected would be cleared by the time they arrived. The bigger issue is the vulnerability that Rosecrans has placed himself in by creating a salient far ahead of the main Union line. Much like Sickles's move at Gettysburg, the Confederates can see the error and are rushing to exploit it.
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I am reminded of the exchange between Meade and Sickles at Gettysburg which seems very appropriate right now:
General Meade exclaimed, “General Sickles, this is neutral ground, our guns command it, as well as the enemy’s. The very reason you cannot hold it applies to them.” Sickles asked if he should pull his divisions back to their original line. He might try, Meade said, but delivered a warning: “You cannot hold this position, but the enemy will not let you get away without a fight. . . .”
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And so it is here that Rosecrans has found himself in an exposed forward position outside of the supporting range of friendly units. The Confederates are quietly approaching his flank with the intent of falling upon them and causing maximum losses and disruption to the Federal plans. There is little that Rosecrans can do to prevent this and the attack that is about to fall upon him will be devastating in the morning. In the end, at Gettysburg, it all worked out for the Federals. Will it be the same here?
The Rosecrans Salient extends far south of the main Union line and has become exposed to attack from three directions.
Besides the movement of Rosecrans, the other major Federal movement which bears examination is that of McArthur's Cavalry Division.
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McArthur's Cavalry Division is a powerful force which consists of 8,338 men: 6,238 cavalrymen, 500 artillerymen (20 Cannons) and 1,600 infantrymen. McArthur's main arrival was from the west giving him a unique opportunity to attack the enemy's western flank at LaGrange and distract the Confederates away from other points along the railroad line. McArthur's strength should have allowed him to hold his own in any fight against a like numbered enemy force for an extended period of time. Even if outnumbered and pressed he could have utilized his force to withstand numerous attacks and kept a larger part of the enemy occupied for a long time.
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McArthur did not see it this way and was concerned that his arrival location, far from being advantageous, was actually dangerous. His main concern was to reach Beasley Creek and open the road to the north where he might cross and join the main body of Union troops. This he accomplished by dusk and the main road between McPherson's infantry wing and McArthur's division is now open and cleared. McArthur now plans to move to the north and then join in on the flank of McPherson to attack south.
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Was this the right move? Should McArthur have been bolder and sought to make a demonstration in force against LaGrange from the west? Having arrived from the west he was poised to strike right at LaGrange from their weakest flank. Had McArthur waited to leave the cover of the woods until sundown, he might have moved unseen right up to the gates of LaGrange in order to launch a dawn assault. This would be unlikely to succeed by itself without further support from McPherson or other Union forces. But the mere demonstration, with his mixed force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, likely would have served to pull thousands of Confederates away from other areas to reinforce the town of LaGrange.
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This decision may go down as the great "What if..." of the Battle for the Railroad.
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The Confederates have fought the battle, thus far, by the textbook. They have used their cavalry effectively to scout the approaching Union forces and have blocked their progress south where they could. Their infantry recognized the key high ground at North Hill early on and moved to block the Federals from reaching it first. Their defensive lines, while not perfect, are flexible and have been able to adapt to the circumstances around them.
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The fortunate happenstance of Tilghman's Division remaining unseen throughout the evening, though just a half-mile from the Union salient under Rosecrans, has convinced them to take the offensive at dawn. Seeking to reclaim the initiative the Confederates are poised to strike at the Federals and force them to adjust to their actions rather than the other way around.
Will the aggression of the Confederates pay off? It seems that it likely will. But with each step the Confederates take to the north, they move further away from their defensive lines and the road network which the rail depots offered them. Attacks can sometimes draw in additional forces and soon become a vortex of battle which brings in all the units near it. Can the Confederates afford to commit their reserves in an offensive action when the enemy has yet to really commit to any single plan? What will happen if the Federals make a breakthrough in another area?
Day two is shaping up to be an interesting one.
Casualties
With little action taking place on the 6th, the casualties for both sides were relatively low. The Federals lost a combined 642 men while the Confederates lost 288 and an artillery piece.
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The most notable casualty from the first day was Major General William Rosecrans. His loss will be felt throughout his wing as the second day of battle begins.