Part Four: Fire at Dawn
The Banks of Spring Creek
As the dawn broke in the east, so to did the beginning of fighting on October 6. The Tennessee gunners along Spring Creek, left without any support after the rout of the two Confederate infantry regiments assigned to them just before nightfall, determined to maintain their position despite their lack of support. Firing into the Hoosiers who had struck them the night before, the gunners managed to kill a few Federals in their opening volleys. Riding quickly back to the north to support them was the second battalion of the 7th Tennessee Cavalry led by Col. William Jackson himself. Jackson’s men rode in amongst the guns to stave off any immediate enemy charge but did not have the time to dismount before the Federals moved up in greater numbers along the creek's bank. Fresh Federal volleys poured into the cavalrymen and unhorsed dozens of them as they struggled to maintain their forward position. But the Confederates cavalrymen held and dismounted and soon were supported by the reformed 37th Alabama.
The two sides then traded shots over the creek as the sun came up in the east. The Federals brought up a three-gun section of artillery to the creek’s edge and unlimbered in the face of the Confederates. Behind the Federal front line was a prominence a half-mile to the north. On this hill were placed six more artillery pieces which could lay a fire down upon the road heading to the crossing on the Confederate side of the river. Should the Rebels seek to use this road in the morning they would find it an unhealthy one to march along.
The fighting along Spring Creek began at sunup and remained a close-quarter fight as the sides struggled to command the crossing.
McArthur's Morning
On the opposite flank of the Union army, McArthur spent the dawn completing the crossing of his Cavalry Division to the north side of Beasley Creek. Leaving just a small force south of the creek as a distraction, McArthur would move the bulk of his force north and then east to eventually land on McPherson’s right flank along the LaGrange Road. “My first priority,” he wrote Grant, “will be to secure the LaGrange Road to secure McPherson's right as he passes through the intersection. By that point my command should be more-or-less consolidated. We will shield his right as he moves toward Grand Junction.” He continued on to say that, “My goal is to tie up as many Rebs as I can in this vicinity. If I'm up against an entire Rebel wing, so much the better. I can fight defensively, falling back as necessary. Every Reb unit I can keep engaged is one less Reb unit standing in the way of McPherson, Ord, and Sherman at Grand Junction.” By the time the sun was fully up at 6 AM the leading troopers of Minzer’s brigade were riding down the LaGrange Road and towards the line of Confederates of Hebert’s Brigade.
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Hickory Pike
The two sides were in close proximity throughout the night along the Hickory Pike in the center of the armies. But at dawn the men of Little’s Confederate Division, pursuant to orders, began to fall back to the south along the pike. This was to protect their left flank from any Union forces heading towards them from "the intersection" to the west. At Grand Junction, Johnson’s Division began to abandon their previous lines facing east to start marching northward to reinforce Little’s left flank.
Across the fields to the north the men of Sherman’s Wing started to advance at the break of dawn as Little's men fell back. Trading fire with the Confederates, the Federals moved steadily southward to apply pressure on the retreating Rebels. Their immediate objective was to bring Sherman’s men onto Stanley’s left flank to present a more solid front before moving against Grand Junction.
Little’s men fought stubbornly but the Union pressure on Brig. Gen. Martin Green’s brigade soon became too great and four regiments broke to the rear at 5:40 AM. This hole in the Confederate center would necessitate a quicker retreat along the Hickory Pike to close the gaps and attempt to restabilize the line. Beauregard ordered Price to immediately fall back and to come into line on the left of Maury’s Division nearer to North Hill.
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Little's Division being forced back by Sherman's aggressive morning attack.
The "Intersection"
At the southern end of the Middle Road was "the intersection" which both sides had skirmished over the evening before. By dawn the Federals were firmly in control of the position though the Confederates were just half a mile away moving into line to contest any Federal attempts to move on LaGrange. Their secondary objective was to frustrate any attempts by the Yanks to turn towards Hickory Pike and join in the attack on Price's Corps.
With the limited visibility in the early morning, McPherson was unaware of the close proximity of the Confederates to the southwest as he planned his moves for the day. McPherson's first priority was to assist Sherman in driving back the Confederates along Hickory Pike to the east. He met with Grant and proposed to move to the southeast with Davies's division to outflank the Confederates in front of Sherman and push towards Grand Junction. As one division moved to the southeast, the other division would defend the crossroads and wait for McArthur’s Cavalrymen to eventually come up on their right flank. Grant approved of the movement and McPherson began to advance Davies's division to the southeast.
At 5:20 AM, the 12th Iowa, scouted to the southwest towards LaGrange and discovered the Confederate position just a few hundred yards from "the intersection." The Confederates opened fire and were ordered to advance against the Iowans to drive them back and inflict heavy losses on the lone unit. Bowen advanced three regiments, 1,300 men, against the Federals and opened fire. Bowen's other objective would be to distract the Federals from their suspected drive against Grand Junction and to force them to react to their movements from the direction on LaGrange. The Iowans stood their ground despite the onslaught of the Rebel regiments against them. Grant encouraged McPherson to look to his right flank and prepare for anything. Meanwhile, his left was to keep up the advance south to support Sherman’s attack on Hickory Pike.
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Action around the intersection quickly escalated once the sun came up.
The Salient
Sunrise brought the situation at Stanley’s Salient to the full attention of both sides. The Union position remained too far forward and without proper support on either flank. Stanley’s Wing numbered just over 12,000 men supported by 30 cannons. But his left flank and rear remained in the air and unprotected. The main Confederate line to their front remained under cover just a few hundred yards away. Because of this, Stanley could not safely turn, fall back, or attack, without potential consequences. He was flat-footed and in a trap waiting to be sprung.
Grant began to realize the predicament was more serious than originally thought. The silence from the left and rear were ominous and there was a sense that something was “about to happen.” Grant ordered Stanley to end any offensive preparations he was making and to look to his own defense immediately. McArthur seconded Grant’s view and recommended that Stanley, “send a brigade to keep an eye on the left, which is currently 'in the air'.”
Stanley took their warnings seriously and began to fall back on his left to shorten the salient and guard his rear. By 5:20 AM he had begun to reorganize his position even as the Rebels watched from just a few hundred yards away in his front. Despite these corrections to the line, the Federals supposedly remained committed to the offensive on Stanley’s front that morning. Grant wrote Stanley that, “I still want you to take North Hill. Sherman will stay on your right flank as you attack the hill from the north. I am confident that you can hold with your left flank regardless of what they might have there."
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Stanley begins to fall back on his left flank.
Unbeknownst to either Stanley, Grant, or McArthur, there were 5,000 Confederates a mere quarter mile away from Stanley’s flank and rear as their repositioning occurred. Tilghman’s Division had spent the better part of the evening, and then dawn, positioning themselves to fall upon Stanley’s unprotected flank. As they inched forward and moved into line, they had every reason to expect that the Federals would maintain their exposed salient near North Hill. But they soon began to notice the woods becoming vacant and the Federals disappearing to the north. “They have wisely, from their point of view, pulled in their left flank,” Tilghman wrote to Beauregard.
This greatly changed things as Beauregard had planned to attack this salient with Tilghman’s and Cleburne’s divisions within the hour. With the Federal salient disappearing, Beauregard ordered Cleburne to fall back to Grand Junction with his division and act as a general support for the fighting around Grand Junction. Tilghman’s Division would still seek to find and attack the Federal left flank in order to take pressure off of the forces fighting along the Hickory Pike to the west. Tilghman moved his men into line at the edge of the woods at 5:40 AM. He remained just out of sight of the Federals a short distance away. Tilghman reported that his men were “looking forward to taking the fight to the enemy.”
Even as Tilghman moved closer to Stanley’s left flank under cover, the battle on Stanley’s front and right was growing. With Sherman advancing south along the Hickory Pike it became necessary for Stanley to support him by advancing with his right flank against the Rebels. Thus the threat to Stanley’s left flank remained ignored and largely unknown. Stanley hinted to Grant that he suspected something was up but had no solid evidence to back up the feeling. Even as Stanley attacked with his right flank, he held back with his left and had over 2,000 men facing eastwards refusing his flank against any enemy threats.
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Stanley refuses his left flank.
Fire at Dawn:
Commentary
The most interesting event from the hour of dawn before the sun fully illuminated the field was the repositioning of Stanley's left and the delay of Tilghman's attack by Van Dorn. At earliest dawn the left flank of Stanley was completely in the air and vulnerable. Had the Confederates moved quicker the evening before to be in a position to attack just at dawn, they might have completely rolled up the Union flank. But Tilghman's men moved cautiously as they approached the known Union flank in order to remain under cover as long as possible to maximize their impact when they struck. Despite the effort they put into remaining under cover, they were still "sniffed out" by the Federal generals. ​
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Stanley's reading of the situation, realizing the almost "eerie silence" on his left for what it was, was correct. The Confederate line ended too abruptly and their just seemed to be an unnatural feel to what was going on around Stanley's flank. Stanley made the decision to pull back his left flank just in time as the Rebels were even then preparing to advance. Had Stanley failed to draw back with his flank, the consequences would have been disastrous. More than any other movement during the early hours of the second day of battle - this movement was the critical one. But would it be enough to save the Union flank?
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