Part One: The Start of Something
Advance towards North Hill
Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans’s Wing led the advance of the army towards Grand Junction. His orders were to move down the pike and then towards the high ground north of the town. If any enemy units were encountered he was to attack them in order to secure the vantage points which the hill offered of the surrounding area. Brig. Gen. David Stanley’s 2nd Division was in the lead as the wing moved southward. Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest viewed this from Grand Junction and, upon receiving orders from Beauregard to delay the Union advance, began to move his old brigade northward towards the enemy. Forrest rode out with 2,740 troopers and six cannons to take up a position blocking the road south. Grant, watching the Confederates ride towards his lead column, was not concerned, “sending cavalry to stop our infantry? We will win that fight every time.” Grant urged Rosecrans forward as Sherman’s Wing moved in his wake.
Rosecrans, wishing not to be slowed along the pike fighting enemy cavalry, swerved his column to the east to begin moving along an open ridge which ran to the south towards his objective. A courier arrived from Grant asking for an explanation from the deviation of the plans. Rosecrans responded that, “the high ground we are moving towards dominates the area. By moving to the east I can approach it from more level terrain and in the open where the enemy cavalry cannot easily get to me. I realize the high plateau route is a longer route, but I believe it to be a safer alternative than being delayed on the pike battling cavalry.” Grant accepted this but reiterated the need to take the high ground.
Watching the Federals turn off the pike and begin moving for the ridge to the east caused Forrest some relief as he realized it would take them longer to reach the high ground and minimize the exposure of his own cavalrymen. Price rode up at this moment and, looking out across the fields, observed, “Looks like they mean to go around us and attack the high ground. Don’t they know leaving the road will slow them down?" The two officers looked at one another and shrugged as Forrest’s Brigade dispersed defensively along either side of the pike. He ordered his horse artillery to North Hill where they unlimbered and began to fire long-distance shells at the Federal infantry. Moving through Grand Junction the leading division of Price’s Corps, under Brig. Gen. Lewis H. Little, was angling up the pike to reinforce Forrest’s cavalrymen before the main body of enemy infantry arrived.
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Meeting with Beauregard, Price was ordered to dispatch one division to North Hill and use the other to defend the pike into Grand Junction until Buckner’s Corps could arrive in a few hours to reinforce him. He was cautioned to “not bring on a general engagement as the army is not yet in support of your command.”
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The map above shows the area north of Grand Junction. Rosecrans has shifted to the east while Sherman has continued directly along the pike. Price's Corps is dividing with a division heading to block the pike and another towards North Hill.
Rosecrans’s men soon spotted the Confederate infantry moving north from Grand Junction and alerted Grant to the development on the army’s front. Grant met with his generals to discuss the development before finalizing their plans. Grant began by stating that, “The Rebel army is coming out of Grand Junction and heading North. I believe that they are trying to do our plan on us, that is, they may be trying to take West Hill and North Hill and create a killing field for us in between them. Those two hills are the key to this battlefield!” McPherson spoke next to say that he concurred with Grant’s viewpoint. He then stated that, “I am still a number of miles away from West Hill and cannot reach it before the Rebels do. I shall, of course, continue with my orders but we shall have to fight for that hill. This may not be a bad thing as realistically he cannot be covering all three depots while attacking our advancing forces with any expectation of success.” Grant reminded McPherson that McArthur’s cavalrymen would soon be arriving and would likely ride to come in on his right flank to assist him. “Right now they still don't know where McArthur’s cavalry is and that will complicate everything that they do,” Grant stated.
But it was now McArthur who spoke up to interject his opinion which differed from Grant’s. “I respectfully disagree that they are trying to take those two hills initially. Rather, it appears they are coming directly down the pike towards our line. They know their cavalry hasn't a chance on God's green earth of stopping our infantry or even of slowing us down very much, so they're coming as far forward as they can with their infantry with the aim of slowing our own infantry down and making us pay for every inch of ground.” McArthur continued as Grant listened. “Put yourself in their shoes. Even if they have another brigade or two in the vicinity of Grand Junction, what would you do? It would look like at least three Federal wings - basically, the entire Union army - converging against your one cavalry and one infantry wing. The battle depends on them holding Grand Junction. They must keep us as far away as possible from that town.”
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Grant lit another cigar as the booming cannons echoed in the valley north of Grand Junction.
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Saulsbury
Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn rode into Saulsbury about 4 PM to meet with Col. William Jackson, commander of one of Forrest’s brigades guarding the depot. Jackson had already sent out his regiments to picket the approaches north of the depot and had yet to make any contact with enemy forces. Van Dorn took over control of the town and was ordered by Beauregard to garrison the town with a division while potentially using the other to move to the west. Doing so would keep the line of communications open between Grand Junction and Saulsbury and allow either place to be reinforced by the other if needed.
Moving southward came Maj. Gen. Edward Ord’s Federal wing at 4 PM. Arriving from Bolivar and moving through Van Buren, Ord’s orders were to move south and then divide his force in half upon reaching the West Fork of Spring Creek. One division would move to join the main attack on Grand Junction while the other guarded the crossing over Spring Creek. At Grant’s headquarters the conversation, after settling the manner of the advance on Grand Junction, turned to Ord’s marching orders. Ord himself was confident that he could hold the crossing of Spring Creek with a division while the other moved away to join the main army. Grant was satisfied that the crossing could be held by a single division and was about to give the orders when McArthur, once again, spoke up; “Sir, I believe the Rebels rumored to be at Spring Creek are there just to make sure we don't cross there. I'm confident General Ord can hold that crossing with a single brigade. Assuming that Ord does not discover any enemy infantry around the ford we can safely assume that the enemy is not attempting to flank us. I don’t believe they will attempt such a thing. Any units the Rebs send north, on either of our flanks, is that many fewer men they will have to block our way to Grand Junction - and it will be a longer march for them to get back to the center than it will be for us to reach ours. Essentially, they can't afford to attempt a flanking movement at this point, especially after seeing the massive number of men we're sending straight toward Grand Junction.”
Grant pondered McArthur’s advice but decided to follow his own instinct and divide Ord’s Wing in half. Ross’s division would proceed to reinforce the main army in the center while Hurlbut’s division was detailed to guard the Spring Creek crossing. Ord confidently led his wing southward towards Spring Creek as the late afternoon wore on.
At 4 PM the first of McArthur’s scouts arrived from the east just a mile from Saulsbury. These 400 men were tasked with harassing the enemy flank and distracting the Rebels around Saulsbury. Their unexpected appearance of the Federals quickly threw the defenders around the town into a panic. Brig. Gen. Martin L. Smith’s 3,150-man brigade was tasked with defending the town and he quickly dispatched six artillery pieces and 1,200 men to cover the Saulsbury Creek crossings to the east. Smith then made his brigade as prepared as possible for whatever might be moving up behind the cavalrymen from the east.
The map above shows the dispersement of Van Dorn's Corps around Saulsbury and the approach of Ord's Wing from the north. The 400 Federal cavalrymen approached Saulsbury from the east.
LaGrange
Brig. Gen. Frank Armstrong’s cavalry brigade had been in LaGrange for most of the morning when word came of the Union infantry moving on Grand Junction. Armstrong was ordered to protect the depot at LaGrange in anticipation of the arrival of Breckinridge’s Corps in a few hours. Armstrong scattered his regiments across the numerous roads to the north and east to provide plenty of warning and to delay any enemy force which moved towards the army’s left flank. Breckinridge was ordered to hold the town upon his arrival while keeping the direct line of communications open to Grand Junction to the east.
At 4 PM, the first of McArthur’s cavalry brigades began to approach LaGrange unseen from the northwest. McArthur hoped to pass silently through the woods to reach the crossing over Beasley Creek to his east. From there he might cross to the northern side of the creek and move to come into line with McPherson’s Wing then moving southward.
But at 4:40 PM the Confederates caught a glimpse of McArthur’s cavalrymen in the woods and became aware of his presence on their left flank. There was little that Armstrong could do though as his brigade was dispersed covering numerous roads across a large area. Armstrong held his units in their current positions until Breckinridge arrived in LaGrange at 5 PM. With infantry support now at hand the defense of the town would have to be altered in response to the unexpected appearance of Union cavalry. The woods concealed the strength of the enemy forces somewhere to the northwest but neither Breckinridge, nor Beauregard, were comfortable with the situation.
The area around LaGrange is pictured above. Armstrong's men are spread out covering multiple approaches into the town. Breckinridge's men are just arriving in the town and moving northward through it. To the northwest the men of McArthur's Cavalry Division are moving through the woods largely unseen to reach the ford over Beasley Creek.
The End of the Beginning:
Commentary
The Confederates had a relatively simple plan as the day began – they would move north and occupy the towns to protect the depots. This they easily accomplished with a corps on either flank and two in the center. This allowed them to use their cavalry to scout all of the surrounding roads to give them advance warning of any Union advances. The initiative was with the Union side and the Confederates were going to allow them to make the first moves – then react. This was a solid plan and made the most sense. With nothing to gain by attacking, the Confederates sat back and let the Federals come to them.
For the Federals, the decisions had been more complex. The Federals could either attempt to outflank the Confederates on either side of Grand Junction to force them to retreat, or, take Grand Junction itself. Grant opted to attempt to take Grand Junction. Assuming that one decision is as good as the other, then it comes down to execution of the plan. The plan has had some faults which the Federals will need to overcome in order to win the battle.
To begin with, the advance of Rosecrans has veered too far to the east and the Union attack will have very little depth or maneuverability once it strikes the Confederate lines. Without a second line of reserves to push forward to exploit successes, the attack will be unlikely to succeed and will sputter out rapidly once the initial push has lost momentum. Sherman’s Wing is moving to Rosecrans’s right flank but, even with the support of Sherman, the two wings are still little stronger than the Confederates opposing them. There are just over 24,000 Confederates in the area of Grand Junction as evening commences. This includes the two corps of Price and Buckner along with Forrest’s Brigade. The Federals are bringing just 25,000 men into the fight here and will not have the strength to gain any ground.
But the biggest problem for the Federals is their failure to keep up as much pressure as possible on as many points as possible. This will allow the Confederates to concentrate in key areas with an equal force to the Yankees and leave a smaller force to guard other quieter areas.
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The real wildcard in the battle was the unexpected arrival of McArthur on the Confederate flanks as a way to distract and force the Confederates to commit more men to either flank in order to isolate and weaken the center. But McArthur was not inclined to attempt a daring move against LaGrange and so opted to play it safe and seek to join the main body of the army north of LaGrange. But without McArthur's 8,300 men threatening LaGrange from the east, what is to prevent Breckinridge from simply turning to the north and joining the fight against McPherson as he moves southward? Failing to keep up the pressure on LaGrange could be a major error in the long run as the fighting intensifies around Grand Junction.
But the biggest issue might be on the Union left where Ord’s Wing has been ordered to divide itself and send one division to the center while the other pickets the creek crossings on the flank. This will tie down 6,000 men to watch a single creek crossing (currently picketed by just a few hundred enemy cavalrymen) in the Union rear. This exorbitant number of men will serve little purpose as they will not be a threat to Saulsbury nor force the enemy to commit more men at any point. By removing these 6,000 men from the battle, the Federals have neutralized their manpower advantage. The fear that the Confederates might cross the creek there has inexplicably taken over quite a bit of their strategic thinking and caused them to make this blunder. It would be better to at least attempt to force the crossing over the creek, causing the Rebels to reinforce the creek line, or to just send the entire corps to reinforce the center, than it would be to split the corps.
There are plenty of moving parts right now for both sides. Thus far the Confederates have made the wiser moves and have been able to react to each Union move that they have observed. The appearance of Union cavalry on their two flanks has not shaken them and the general plan is unchanged. They will fight the Yankees north of Grand Junction and also hold the two flanks simultaneously. But while this will eventually give the Federals the advantage in the center, it is unlikely the Confederates will maintain full strength on their flanks unless they are pressured to do so. Right now, there are no plans for the Yankees to pressure the Rebel flanks at all.
Therefore, this battle appears to be one that is headed for a giant brawl in the center of the battlefield. At that point you can throw strategy out the window and it will all come down to a slugging match between the two foes. Which is exactly what Grant's plan was all along anyways.
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