Analysis
There is a quote attributed to George Pickett that, when asked why the Confederate army lost at Gettysburg, replied, “I think the Yankee army had something to do with it.” All of the focus of historians since the Battle of Gettysburg has been on Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and seldom do we remember the dramatic and well fought battle from the Union perspective. The Confederate army simply had a much more dramatic and compelling story than did the Union army at Gettysburg. Because of that we continue to be fascinated more by the question of “why Lee lost,” rather than, “why Meade won.”
The Confederates at the Battle for the Railroad will suffer the same fate as Meade’s army at Gettysburg in my final review of the battle – they will be largely overlooked.
But let's give them there due really quick. The Confederate army in this battle conducted a solid, blue-collar, hard-nosed defensive battle. Their plans, from start to finish, were wholly by-the-book and well-planned. They sought the high ground, built defensive lines, kept back a strategic reserve, and launched limited counterattacks to disrupt the Union army’s plans. They were unable to ever build much in the way of breastworks because the Federals attacked them before they could entrench. But Beauregard led his army ably and each subordinate officer stuck to the plan formulated at the start of the battle. Only on the left flank around LaGrange were the Federals unable to hold their original lines and forced to fall back. This minor setback though was unimportant in the end and was only accomplished after the Federals had been almost bled dry from the heavy fighting. Overall, the Confederates played to perfection. Their artillery was always at the right places, their lines were spaced just enough apart to prevent mass routs or enemy penetrations, their reserves were almost always on hand, and they were able to shift east or west to present a stronger front wherever the Federals were attacking heaviest. A textbook performance by the Confederate army!
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Much like Meade and the Army of the Potomac though, they have been overshadowed by a much more interesting story on the opposite side of the battlefield. They will always have the victory, but the historians will concentrate elsewhere when studying this battle.
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So now... let's hear it for the Union Army! Considering that the actual players in this game had never played in a MP game together before, and that they were asked to go up against the storied MP group of Gator Alley, they played extraordinarily well!
How did such a group ever get to within a half-mile of victory, and push the veteran MP group of Gator Alley to their limits, only to come up just short? It's a heck of a story. Had only a few things gone differently – could they actually have won the battle? There are lots of wonderful “what-ifs” from this battle. Let's dive in.
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Final Losses in the Battle for the Railroad
The Federal army began the battle with the plan of attacking straight up the middle with their entire army and capturing Grand Junction. That's straightforward enough. Rosecrans’s Wing led the advance with Sherman in close support. McPherson was an hour behind Rosecrans and Sherman while Ord was about an hour behind McPherson. But because of the distance each needed to travel it was unlikely either would arrive to support Rosecrans and Sherman until the next morning (remember the game started at 3 PM with dusk at 6 PM). This meant that all of the action during the first evening of battle would fall exclusively to Rosecrans and Sherman.
Right from the start we had controversy. Rosecrans immediately deviated from Grant’s plan by taking a longer route than prescribed to attack his assigned objective of North Hill. Rosecrans argued that he would arrive there faster by bypassing the Confederate cavalry blocking the pike and moving along the more open and level ground to the east to approach North Hill. This decision alone is worth a full discussion as the pros and cons on either side are strong.
In the end, it probably didn’t matter which route Rosecrans took as the Confederates were going to defend both the pike and North Hill from the start. By sticking to the pike he would have ended up striking Little’s Division with Sherman in close support. But this would have created an extremely narrow front in which the Union's greater numbers could not have been fully brought to bear. Also, given that Rosecrans's objective was not to push up the pike, but rather to take North Hill, fighting a prolonged battle with Little did not help him capture his objective of North Hill. By taking the path he took he ended up bypassing Little’s Division and striking hard against Maury’s Division which had arrived on North Hill ahead of Rosecrans. Therefore, whichever path he took would have ended in a battle so the debate over which route he should have taken is likely a moot point. But one that will still be debated endlessly.
The end result of his decision though would be felt throughout the battle. One consequence was that Rosecrans himself would be one of the first on the battlefield to fall when a shot struck and killed him when he was reconnoitering the front lines. Command fell to Stanley who continued the push for North Hill. The long-term tactical consequence of Rosecrans's move was that the battlelines were spread out for well over a mile from the Hickory Pike to North Hill. This actually worked in the Union’s favor as it forced the Confederates to defend a longer line with fewer men than the Federals could bring against them. The question would then be – could the Federals exploit this advantage?
Sherman and Stanley were engaged with Price’s and Buckner’s corps by late evening. The two sides were roughly equal in number and it would be unlikely either could gain much of an advantage over the other without reinforcements. The Federals needed to concentrate more force to break through the Confederate lines and reach Grand Junction. This brings us to the arrival of the three Union wings during the evening of October 5: McPherson’s, Ord’s, and McArthur’s.
McPherson’s Wing was the first to arrive. They marched directly south towards the area soon to be known as the “intersection”. As with any intersection, the question of which way to go is paramount. This was a critical decision of the battle. McPherson’s force could go in three different directions: it could go southwest and attack a Confederate force of unknown strength blocking the road towards LaGrange, it could move south through a forest and open fields and march for West Hill, or they could turn southeast and come in on Sherman’s right flank and join in the main attack on Hickory Pike.
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I believe, in hindsight, that the most obvious choice should have been to turn southeast and join in the attack on Hickory Pike. But at the time, Grant was concerned that this would open up his flank and rear to the Confederates. Therefore, he ordered McPherson to make his main effort to the southwest while sending small forces in the other two directions. Splitting one's force is rarely a good idea in a situation like this.
McKean's three-brigade division of McPherson’s Wing struck Lovell’s Division southwest of the intersection. This left just the two brigades of Davies’s division to turn south and southeast. One brigade came in on the right flank of Sherman to support the main attack. The other moved south through the woods towards West Hill. Neither was heavily engaged as both lacked the force to push forward without immediate support. Meanwhile, the fighting on McKean's front exploded.
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McKean had greater success as he had a three-brigade division and was opposed by just the two brigades of Lovell’s Division. Throughout the morning of October 6 the fighting southwest of the intersection was in the Union’s favor and they drove back Lovell with heavy losses after a number of hours. Unfortunately, this victory did not help them at all to gain their objective at Grand Junction. But it did technically keep Grant’s flank and rear secure which was the impetus behind the decision in the first place. But could this not have been done by simply positioning a brigade defensively as opposed to an attack with a full division? Had McPherson detached his strongest brigade to block any actions by Lovell it would have freed up the bulk of his Wing to move in support of Sherman at once. The effects of this could have been decisive early on October 6. Instead, McPherson’s men were tied down all morning fighting in a battle which failed to serve any purpose towards their overall strategic goal of capturing Grand Junction.
Later in the battle, after Lovell’s Division was finally driven back, McPherson’s Wing did concentrate and move to support Sherman. They enjoyed some of the greatest success the Federals had during the battle with their offensive attacks against Buckner’s overextended forces west of the Hickory Pike. But their earlier battle with Lovell had left the wing fatigued and reduced in numbers. The delay in attacking in support of Sherman also caused other consequences such as Sherman’s own forces being used up early in the morning before McPherson’s men arrived to support them. In short, they were both committed piecemeal.
Speaking of piecemeal… Ord’s Wing. Ord’s Wing had the most interesting of battles. Once on the field the wing became a point of great discussion as Grant and his general debated about how these infantrymen could both secure the army’s eastern flank while also contributing to the attack on Hickory Pike. It was decided, at first, that a full division should be committed to defend the ford over Spring Creek in case of any enemy advance to get around the Federal army. Soon the discussion focused on just how many men were really needed to guard a ford in the middle of the woods on the extreme flank of an army. Eventually the answer became – a full brigade. To the south the Confederates faced the same question, how many men do they commit to defend a ford in the middle of the woods on their extreme flank? Their answer was half of a brigade. Neither side knew, of course, that the other had zero offensive plans concerning this ford because both considered it impossible to storm across it.
With Ord dropping 20% of his wing off at the ford to defend against a possible enemy attack, he continued on to towards Hickory Pike with his other four brigades. Circumstances on Stanley’s front (after he took over for Rosecrans) soon dictated that Ord again dispatch a brigade to an isolated part of the battlefield on Stanley's left. Ord sent the very best brigade in the Union army, the Iowa Brigade, to secure Stanley’s flank from being turned. Was it the right move? Boy, we could discuss that all day. It did help convince the Confederates that their own attack was outflanked and it did keep any further Confederate attacks from reaching around that far to the Federal flank. But it also drained another 20% from Ord’s force – and they were the best troops in the Union army. This left Ord with just three brigades with which to reinforce the stalled attack of Sherman, McPherson, and Stanley north of Grand Junction.
Once in the battle, Ord’s men achieved some initial success in driving back Buckner’s men along the pike. But, in the end, they did not have the strength needed at the critical moment to achieve the success Grant needed to finally breakthrough the Confederate defenses. What could have happened had Ord had the Iowa Brigade and at least half of the brigade then sitting to the far northeast guarding a useless ford? I don’t know, but it is interesting to consider.
This brings us to the arrival of the last great Union force – McArthur’s Wing. McArthur’s arrival, and the great questions surrounding its usage, were discussed at the conclusion of the first day of battle [Review of Day One]. McArthur’s actions on day two were excellent and he managed to both support McPherson’s attack on Lovell’s Division while also keeping the rest of Breckinridge’s Corps pinned down in place around LaGrange. Should McArthur have saved time by approaching and threatening LaGrange from the west rather than moving around to the north and coming in on McPherson’s flank? Maybe if McArthur’s infantrymen are seen approaching LaGrange from the west, where no infantrymen were thought to be, instead of from the north, where they most certainly were, the Confederates would have reacted by strongly reinforcing LaGrange. Any action the Federals could take to draw off reserves from the fighting around Hickory Pike were beneficial to them. Would it have made any difference in the end? It’s possible. But McArthur did manage to effectively keep the Rebels in place around LaGrange in large numbers throughout much of the battle before eventually capturing it after they fled.
By late morning on October 6, the Federals were as concentrated as they were going to get. McPherson’s men had broken off from their fighting with Lovell’s Division, Ord’s three brigades had arrived from the north and McArthur’s mixed force was occupying the Confederates around LaGrange.
It was about this time that I began to notice both sides really getting into it and stressing over each turn. From the Federal side came some frustration that the Confederates would not break, “The Rebels are holding the line well thus far and as it stands we're not getting to Grand Junction. Our Commands jointly over the past turns have hammered the Rebels to our front and they don't even have the decency to Rout! They just stand there and fight to the last.” While on the Confederate side it looked more and more like they would simply be overwhelmed by massed Union numbers, “Going to be a tall order keeping the Yanks out of Grand Junction for the next 30 turns or so, I've had doubts since about turn five.”
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The final hour of the battle was intense. The Confederates were pushed to their limits and many of their units could no longer hold their positions in the center. Units were suffering from severe fatigue, heavy losses, leadership losses, and an enemy that just wouldn't stop. When the Confederate center began to crumble the Confederate artillery limbered up and rolled south to the tree line north of Grand Junction. It was during this brief respite from the Confederate artillery that the Union push came closest to breaking the Rebel center. Massive routs on the Confederate side threatened to undo their defensive alignments and there were no fresh infantry units anywhere to be found. Units recovering from routs were rapidly plugged back into the line only to rout again soon after. Only the Confederate artillery seemed to be holding the line and acting as a rallying point for nearby units to converge upon.
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Once the retreating Confederate infantry cleared the open fields and reached the tree line the Confederate artillery could open fire once more into the faces of the oncoming Federals. The Federal infantry, just as worn out as their Confederate brothers, were unable to stand up to this final onslaught of shot and shell. Heavy losses caused massive routing and the Union attack faltered and was broken - a half-mile from their ultimate objective. Had the Confederate artillery not been aligned as they were at that moment - the ending might have been different. Could the panicked Confederate infantry have stopped them alone? Probably not.
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Had the Federals only done this or that… then maybe… who knows? So many great tactical debates were created during this battle which can be discussed and dissected all day.
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All of that brings me back around to where I began when listing the causes of the Union defeat. The Rebel army might also have had something to do with it.
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Final Note
As always, I want to thank the participants for volunteering to play in this game. I believe these double-blind games are especially hard but also a lot of fun. I hope everyone involved in the game had a good time. Remember, watching from above is super easy and I hope people don’t think I’d have avoided any mistakes the participants made. I’d have just made a whole batch of other mistakes in their place. But since the AAR’s are meant to be fun and enlightening I tend to fill them with my two cent opinions rather than a strictly dull play-by-play approach. I hope you have enjoyed the read! There will be more of these to come in the future.