Part Six: Fighting North of Grand Junction
The Federal Left
The area of the most pressing concern was on the Federal left. Stanley, having been ordered to hold the left as best he could, assigned Hamilton’s division to the task. Mower’s division (Stanley’s old division) would continue to hold the right flank in support of Sherman’s attack. Hamilton’s men on the left held their ground and fired into the oncoming Rebel lines. The stronger than expected Union resistance sent the 39th Mississippi running for cover. Tilghman kept moving forward and were reinforced on his left flank by 1,600 troopers from Forrest’s Brigade. These dismounted men would fill the hole between Tilghman’s left and Maury’s right east of North Hill. On the heights ahead there were four Federal guns unlimbering which would soon be able to dominate the ground Tilghman’s men were moving across.
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Stanley's position is attacked.
Tilghman continued his attack despite the stubborn Union resistance. His men moved to within 125 to 250 yards of the Union lines and opened a heavy fire into them. The Union guns barked back in reply and the Federal infantry returned their fire steadily. The veteran Iowa Brigade of Ord’s Wing was then seen moving to reinforce Stanley’s left flank which would close any window to outflank the Union line that had existed. Tilghman could now clearly see that his surprise attack had not achieved the collapse of the enemy which he had been hoping for. With enemy forces now aligned firmly against him, and with the additional forces seen coming towards the flank, he decided to call off the attack. The Rebel forces fell back into the woods from which they sprang just an hour earlier to the east. All along the Union lines the Federals cheered as the Confederates retreated back. Van Dorn sent a message back to Beauregard that there “too many Yankees” on the flank to continue the attack as planned. “But at least we have tied up a considerable numbers of Yankees facing east & the numbers they have committed to attack elsewhere are being whittled down.”
Stanley then turned his attention to North Hill where over a dozen Confederate guns continued to blast away at his position just a half-mile away. Bringing up as many men and guns as he could, Stanley attempted to put pressure on the Confederates defending North Hill in an effort to either take the position or to at least support Sherman’s attack to the west. The Confederates were well-positioned though and soon the fighting at the base of North Hill became a bloody slugging match at close range.
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The Hickory Pike
Sherman’s Wing continued its attack southward against Little’s Division as it fell back east of the pike. Little’s right flank brigade of Missourians, under Col. Elijah Gates, halted to contest a ridgeline on the left flank of Maury’s Division. His crack infantrymen hardly had a chance to regroup before the Federals were attacking once more. Brig. Gen. M.L. Smith led his brigade forward in a charge to push the Missourians back. Leading the 55th Illinois and the 57th Ohio, Smith led the charge himself up the ridge and against the 3rd Missouri and six supporting artillery pieces from Wade’s Missouri battery. After a fierce hand-to-hand struggle the Confederates were forced back from the ridge in the center. The Rebel guns fell into Union hands and were quickly destroyed. Cheers rose across the Union front as the American flag topped the ridge and waved over the destroyed enemy artillery pieces. Grant, viewing from a nearby hilltop, turned to Sherman and exclaimed happily, “The tide is turning!” McArthur, threw in his opinion that the Rebels were likely to fall back from the ridge completely soon enough.
The effect of the attack on the Confederates side was immediate. Five regiments in the middle of the Confederate lines from Little’s Division routed rearwards. These included some of the veteran Missouri units which were now extremely fatigued after being heavily engaged since dawn. With the center of the Confederate line crumbling it became a dire situation. Cleburne’s Division of Buckner’s Corps were the last uncommitted reserves around Grand Junction. Cleburne, not waiting for orders, began deploying his men a half-mile behind Little’s Division. Buckner’s other division, under Johnson, tied into Little’s left flank and spread out to defend the Hickory Pike and the open field to the west. Rushing up on Johnson’s left were the cavalrymen of Armstrong’s Brigade which had been relieved of guarding LaGrange the day before. The men and guns were stretched out in a line over three miles in length from North Hill to West Hill, but the line was ready.
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The action along the Hickory Pike has been fierce.
Sherman’s men were not intimidated in the least. Continuing their attack against Gates’s Missourians the Federals drove back the supporting regiments of Johnson’s Brigade which had just come up on their left flank and routed them in a hurry. This allowed Sherman’s men to wrap around the flanks of nearly 900 Rebel Missourians and isolate them, along with Col. Gates, from the rest of their army. The Federals then charged forward into the Missourians and easily threw them back with heavy losses. The 5th Missouri fled the field while the other units managed to fall back in some order.
Cleburne now sent forward the leading elements of Liddell’s Brigade which had just come up from Grand Junction. Moving forward the Arkansans counterattacked past Gates’s Missourians and into the oncoming Federals in the forests east of Hickory Pike. The sudden arrival of fresh Confederate forces thwarted the Union attackers and routed the 45th Illinois of Dennis’s brigade from the woods. With the Confederate line now supported by additional units the situation east of the pike stabilized for Price’s Corps after having been pushed back over a half-mile by Sherman’s attack.
To the west of the pike the men of McPherson’s Wing were coming into the fighting slowly. Only two brigades of McPherson’s Wing were available to support the drive on Hickory Pike. McPherson’s men faced open fields and an unprepared Confederate flank as their advance began. But reinforcements were quickly arriving from Buckner’s Corps in the form of Johnson’s Division. Johnson’s men deployed quickly to come in on the left of Little’s Division and defend the western side of Hickory Pike. Despite Federal artillery quickly routing two of Johnson’s regiments their position was soon solidified. The opportunity to exploit the weakness to the west of the pike was squandered as the Federals were not yet up in sufficient strength to charge ahead. Ord’s Wing was still moving south and was another hour away. Johnson’s men would be prepared for them when they arrived. Van Dorn, watching the arrival of Buckner’s men from a hill near Grand Junction, remarked to Beauregard that, “Buckner’s men arrived just in time!”
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The "Intersection"
As the fighting increased at other places, so to did it at the vital intersection of the Middle Road. With half of his wing moving to support Sherman’s attack, McPherson was left with McKean’s division to protect the intersection against a suddenly aggressive enemy. McKean’s men spread out to the southwest of the intersection and brough up artillery to cover their defenders. Advancing against them were the men of Lovell’s Division of Breckinridge’s Corps. Lovell’s men were instructed to engage and worry the enemy so as to keep them from moving more men and guns against the Hickory Pike. Lovell did this by moving forward and engaging the Union infantry at close range. The ensuing firefight was a draw with neither side gaining any advantage. Lovell’s men fell back rather than continue the close contact fighting and retreated to his former lines.
But the Federals had no intention of letting them catch their breath. McPherson’s men drove forward on the right flank of Lovell and pressed his men from that direction. On Lovell’s left flank the cavalry brigade of Brig. Gen. Isaac Quinby came charging across the fields with some infantry support from McPherson. The mounted troopers launched a gallant charge on the rear of two Mississippi regiments in the center of Lovell’s line but did not manage to break them. But more Federals advanced on Lovell’s front as the pressure increased on his position near the crossroads.
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A large battle has engulfed Lovell's Division northeast of LaGrange.
The Confederate line managed to hold on despite the Union pressure. Heavy firing occurred all along the lines of Lovell’s Division while the Federals stubbornly continued the attacks. Another valiant charge by Quinby’s troopers and the 18th Wisconsin infantry of Allen’s brigade overran the position of the 15th Mississippi and Caruthers’s Mississippi Battalion. The Rebels were routed rearwards and fled the field. Close on their heels were the 4th Alabama Battalion and 4th Louisiana of Rust’s Brigade which collapsed after taking heavy Union fire on their right flank. Two artillery pieces were then overran and the Federals were soon swarming all through and over the Confederate lines. By 8 AM the situation along the road to LaGrange had grown very desperate for the Confederates.
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Lovell's Division being driven back by the Union attacks.
The "Intersection"
At 6 AM the leading elements of McArthur’s Cavalry Division were finally moving south along the LaGrange Road. Their objective was to put pressure on the Confederates on McPherson’s right flank to keep them pinned down and unable to counterattack against the Union right. Leading the column was the 7th Kansas Cavalry of Minzer’s brigade with 349 men. Riding over a slight ridge they were suddenly set upon by nearly 1,500 Confederate infantrymen of Hebert’s Brigade supported by six artillery pieces. Hebert’s orders were simple, to “advance and engage the cavalry along your front and hit them hard.” The cavalrymen lost 142 men but held their ground and allowed the rest of McArthur’s division to adjust to the sudden battle on the LaGrange Road.
Falling back, McArthur’s cavalrymen began to move into line to challenge and distract the Rebels north of LaGrange. Hebert pursued cautiously and soon found himself in a firefight with Col. August Mersy’s brigade of U.S. regulars attached to the cavalry division. Neither side gained any advantage in the standup fight on either side of the LaGrange Road. (see above North of LaGrange Map)
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The Banks of Spring Creek
Returning to the banks of Spring Creek on the eastern side of the battlefield, the two sides continued to slug it out for possession of the crossing north of Saulsbury. The Federals had pushed the Confederates away from the crossing point at dawn, but at 7 AM the Confederates counterattacked up the creek’s edge. Over 1,500 Rebels from Martin’s Brigade advanced against the Federals of Veatch’s brigade which had taken up a position on the opposite side of the creek. The sudden Confederate attack routed the 15th Illinois but the Union artillery had already placed five artillery pieces for close support along the line. These guns boomed back and soon a sharp firefight was ensuing across the ford.
With neither side able to gain any advantage, and with nothing to gain by continuing the fight, the Confederates fell back 125 yards from the ford and set up a new defensive line in case the Federals crossed. But the Federals were as little inclined as the Rebels were to continue fighting along this line. Soon Veatch detached two batteries from his position to be shifted to the fighting along the Hickory Pike. The action along Spring Creek would come to an end with both sides firmly dug in along the creek and unable to cross.
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Fighting North of Grand Junction:
Commentary
With fighting occurring along the entire front from Spring Creek to the LaGrange Road, the morning's action was quickly escalating. Tilghman's attack was the key Confederate movement of the morning but enjoyed almost no success. I believe the attack was well-planned and should have driven back the Union flank in chaos. But two factors caused this not to be the case. To begin with the attack was anticipated by Stanley and others who had begun to turn units to face the flank should the Confederates advance from that direction. Had they ignored the flank the result would have been far different. The other factor was the lack of Confederate drive by Tilghman in his initial assault. Tilghman was unsupported and had no direct artillery support, nor roads to utilize, and was unsure exactly what he was attacking against. These issues likely weighed on his mind and caused him to attack more cautiously than he might have under different circumstances. In the end the attack became a sideshow of the battle rather than a turning point in it.
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The same might be said of the action around Lovell's Division. The fighting here, while successful for the Federals, has not helped them in any material way. Rather than concentrating on driving for Grand Junction, the Federals have siphoned off a reinforced division to attack an enemy division defending a road which leads to nowhere the Federals are aiming to take. While the fighting here has been heavy - it has served no purpose other than to weaken the Union drive on their primary objective of Grand Junction.
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