Part Seven: Command Meetings in the Chaos
Beauregard's Command Tent
As the battle raged along the entire front Beauregard called a meeting of his generals at his headquarters to reevaluate the situation. Beauregard began immediately by stating the following:
If anyone doesn't realize it, this fight is all about Grand Junction - everything the Yanks are doing points to their desire to take that place. The forces fighting Breckinridge around LaGrange are meant to hold them in place and prevent Breckinridge's boys from moving to help in the defense of Grand Junction. Further, if their forces fighting can cut the main road from La Grange to Grand Junction, all the better for their plan. We can't let this happen! Up north and east, enemy forces that could have worked to force a crossing of the West Fork Spring Creek, are all heading towards Grand Junction, leaving only a token force to guard the crossing there. From my standpoint, our right flank at Saulsbury is secure. La Grange also seems to be secure at this point. It is Grand Junction which is being threatened when you look at the forces the enemy has arrayed against it. The matter then becomes boiled down to this, how best to utilize our forces to thwart the enemy drive on Grand Junction? What are we willing to risk? I want to also point out that in this fight we have inflicted a good deal more hurt on the enemy than we have received, but in so doing we have had to trade space for time. Trading space is now a luxury that we can no longer afford. At this moment the enemy is now just one mile away from Grand Junction.
Beauregard then commended Price for his stubborn defense along Hickory Pike in the center of the Confederate lines. Price’s men had been heavily engaged and were greatly relieved by the timely arrival of Buckner’s Corps. Buckner’s men would now form the rock upon which it was hoped the enemy would break themselves as they attacked towards Grand Junction. “You have to hold sir!” Beauregard told Buckner. “I think within a couple of hours we are going to see a fresh Union infantry corps heading straight for your lines in an attempt to break you.” On the right flank the corps of Van Dorn was to keep Tilghman’s men deployed on the right flank of Price where they would keep an equal number of enemy troops pinned in place and unable to assist in the main attack on the Hickory Pike.
Beauregard then opened the floor to the generals. Price spoke up first to reiterate his thankfulness that Buckner’s men arrived when they did. “I can't tell you how great it was to see Buckner moving up to relieve Gates’s Missouri brigade. Buckner is now in a good position and can bend and flex as the battle calls for it. The bad thing is that most of the ground he is on is open. But there ain't a thing we can do about that. Just got to be ready.” Price also agreed that the pressure on Breckinridge’s Corps was growing and that it appeared the Yankees hoped to cut the main road between LaGrange and Grand Junction.
Buckner then responded with a calculated suggestion which likely made Breckinridge shift uncomfortably in his seat. “If the Yanks make a move to cut LaGrange from Grand Junction, do they have the troops and time to defeat Breckenridge in detail before nightfall? Maybe we make them fight for LaGrange and that wears them down and continues to keep their forces divided. We might also turn our cavalry loose against any force that tries to cut the road or maybe into their rear areas.”
Breckinridge then replied that his men could hold LaGrange and that he did not see how the enemy could continue their violent attacks for an indefinite period of time without wearing themselves down. Looking at the larger picture he opined that, “I believe that the forces covering Saulsbury can be pared down to a minimum and that with the rest of our forces converging towards Grand Junction, and with our cavalry covering our flanks, we should be able to control the flow of the battle.”
Beauregard then went on to suggest that Breckinridge pull back from his fight with the enemy cavalry along the LaGrange Road. A sudden crash of musketry and the sounds of battle then escalated near the “intersection” and panicked soldiers soon carried the news that Lovell’s Division was being broken apart. Beauregard was forced to admit that the sudden “near collapse of Lovell’s Division is the most serious and pressing of concerns. The situation is now very precarious.” Beauregard ordered Breckinridge to prepare to move his Orphan Brigade, then unengaged watching the roads west of LaGrange, to reinforce Lovell’s Division to avert a disaster. Beauregard was willing to give up LaGrange in order to save Lovell’s Division and to shore up the lines north of Grand Junction.
Price then spoke up to lighten the mood and to remind the generals that they had been in tougher spots than this! “If our units are fatigued than theirs must be as well.”
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Grant's Field Headquarters
Even as Beauregard was meeting with his generals, so Grant was meeting with his. Having called them together he asked them each for their viewpoints and what their plans were moving forward.
McArthur spoke first. He stated that he was going to continue putting pressure on the Rebels west of LaGrange but would not attack them with his limited cavalry forces he had left south of the creek there. He hoped that by demonstrating they could keep a large number of Rebels tied down and unable to move to the assistance of the other Rebel forces being pressured elsewhere. He also advised the others that he felt the artillery should be brought right up to the front lines to maximize their effectiveness against the Confederate lines.
McPherson now spoke up in reply to McArthur to state a few of his own views. While McArthur had secured the army’s right flank, he felt that the situation on Stanley’s left flank was still dangerous. “It remains my steadfast belief that the Rebs are conducting a flanking maneuver and, in all likelihood, on our Eastern Flank. The Rebs have virtually free reign in the area East of Stanley and South of West Fork Spring Creek. He could be maneuvering an entire Army, never mind a Division in that vast expense of terrain. Hence my belief of the flank maneuver. We have no general army reserve to counter such an attack. The Rebels demonstrated through the forests on Stanley's left flank and promptly withdrew upon meeting his opposition. They may just have been 'testing the waters' in that area as opposed to exploring the Gap where General Ord's Iowa Brigade is presently guarding.”
Ord was quick to agree with McPherson that it was likely the failed Confederate attack on Stanley’s left flank was only the precursor to a greater effort further to the left. As evidence of this, Ord pointed to the fact that there were so many Rebel cavalry units playing the role of infantrymen in the battle. “The Rebs are either very short on infantry or they are filling the gaps with cavalry to allow the infantry to do something else, somewhere else.” McArthur somewhat disagreed, stating that, “I have no idea why the Rebs have posted another cavalry brigade, dismounted, in front of McPherson. My expectation is that they are short-handed in that area, but I could be wrong.”
McPherson then pointed out that any flank attack would likely not extend far beyond where Ord had placed his Iowa Brigade. The brigade of Iowans numbered nearly 2,200 men and was the best unit in the army. The 15th Iowa was armed with breechloading rifles which would quickly cut down any attackers on their front.
Grant was not sold on the idea of another major flank attack on Stanley’s left flank. He believed that any Rebs still unseen were more than likely entrenching around Grand Junction rather than attempting any offensive maneuvers. “I may be wrong,” Grant stated, “but I don't feel that they are doing a flank attack. I believe that their intention is to build breastworks around Grand Junction and use the rest of their force to grind us down as we come. It seems to me that they too are playing the long game just as we are. We need to either carry on and try to inflict more casualties than we receive or do something totally radical. The way the battle looks right now I can't see a totally radical route, so as much as I dislike doing it, we seem to be committed to going toe to toe and inflicting more casualties than we receive. Our one advantage over the Rebs is our superior artillery. At this point I think we just have to stay the course, attacking down the Pike and bringing our artillery to bear.”
McArthur agreed fully with Grant about the action on Stanley’s left flank. “I tend to think the Rebels to our east are a feint,” he began. “They probed and discovered Stanley was there in force and they left. They have continued sending units northward in that direction, but I fully believe they are sending nothing more than a light recon force, if even that much. They know they will lose this battle if we take Grand Junction. They may send a small force around our flank in an attempt to distract us - and to prevent us from sending a flank attack against them - but they can't afford to weaken their main line to severely threaten our flank.” Grand nodded in agreement as he puffed on his cigar.
“The way I look at the situation,” Grant told them, “is that our ability to maneuver is over, we have to push on and try to beat them head on.”
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With that the meeting broke up. Grant bade his generals to be aggressive and to pitch into the Rebels. Taking aside Ord, Grant explained that the key moment of the battle was at hand. He must violently attack when his wing arrived and drive back the Rebels to Grand Junction. Ord vowed to do so.
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The battlefield at 8 AM with the two sides grappling along a wide front.
Command Meetings:
Commentary
The Confederate are in some trouble. They are stretched out in a long thin line from LaGrange to Saulsbury and have committed their last reserves into the battle along Hickory Pike. But they are moving quickly to rectify the situation. Up until now the Rebels have had the 2,850 men of the Orphan Brigade sitting out the battle and holding the western road into LaGrange. With no enemies threatening the town they are now being ordered to prepare to move back to reinforce Lovell. From the east the men of Price’s Corps are also being asked to strip their lines and prepare a force to move west if there is a breakthrough which must be countered.
McArthur’s cavalrymen have done an acceptable job until this point in keeping the enemies forces tied down in large numbers on their flanks. But now the lack of strength or aggression by McArthur around the enemy flanks has convinced them that the Union cavalry has no intention or support to press forward against either flank. Unbeknownst to them, McArthur is preparing a feint on LaGrange. But will it be enough to hold the Orphan Brigade in place?
For the Federals the most important area of the battlefield has become narrowed to a half-mile front along the Hickory Pike. To the east the men of Stanley’s Wing are locked in a struggle with Price’s Corps which neither side has any advantage. To the west the men of McPherson’s Wing have been able to defeat Lovell’s Division and drive them back. But in doing so they have had to commit more men and guns than they could spare. The victory over Lovell is a pyrrhic one at best as the real objective is to the southeast and not the southwest where Lovell’s men are fighting.
Along Hickory Pike is the most fluid part of the battlefield and the only section in which the Federals continue to successfully drive the Confederates back. If Ord’s men can successfully attack Buckner’s Corps then they will have a clear path all the way to Grand Junction. To help Ord are parts of both Sherman’s and McPherson’s wings. But will it be enough?
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