Introduction: Setting up the Battle
I. Campaign Background
II. Union Backstory
III. Confederate Backstory
IV. Victory Conditions
Campaign Background
​
The Battle of Antietam had saved the reputation and legacy of George B. McClellan – temporarily. The northern victory had lifted Union spirits when most needed and had prompted Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation freeing the slaves in the rebellious states. Lincoln could now hope that Little Mac, with a victory under his belt, would become bolder and follow up the defeated Confederate Army and finally take Richmond. Predictably, nothing happened. McClellan’s Army slowly meandered in pursuit of Lee’s army until the moment had passed and Lee’s men were safely behind their Rappahannock Line once more. Lincoln and Halleck could do nothing except plead with the general to launch a new offensive while Lee’s army was still weakened. But McClellan had no desire to attack Lee around Fredericksburg or in the Wilderness of northern Virginia where the land was poor for maneuvering and he could not bring his heavier artillery to bear on the Confederates. Instead, McClellan’s mind turned back to the Peninsula where his grand Napoleonic plans had been thwarted six months earlier by the meddling of politicians in Washington who refused to support him. Now, with a renewed sense of importance and destiny, he told Lincoln his plans to capture Richmond. He would repeat his earlier movements. He would land at Eltham’s Landing and Harrison’s Landing and move rapidly towards Richmond to outflank Lee and take the Confederate capital. This time he would bring all the men and guns he would need and would resign if he were not allowed to end this rebellion once and for all on his own terms. With the midterm elections coming up there was little Lincoln could do. McClellan had won a great victory and the support of pro-war Democrats was essential to the war effort. Lincoln granted his permission and asked which troops McClellan would leave in northern Virginia to protect Washington. McClellan, magnanimous in victory, would leave the IX and XII Corps, along with parts of the II and V Corps, behind to distract Lee while he maneuvered to transport ships for a quick drive on the Peninsula. Burnside, who had bungled so badly at Antietam, was relieved of command before McClellan departed. The failures at Antietam not his own fault, McClellan wrote in the official report of the action, but those of Burnside who failed to carry out the orders of his commanding officer on the field of battle. As the other corps commanders read these words they began to wonder if they would be used as the next scapegoat if McClellan did not achieve all he believed he was entitled to.
The Battlefield Map as shown from above. The map is the large HPS Peninsula Seven Days map.
Across the Rappahannock Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was regaining its strength after Antietam. The recovered wounded from six months of continual fighting began to return in larger numbers and conscripts and volunteers helped swell the ranks. With winter coming though Lee had already ordered his men to build winter quarters and expected McClellan’s army to spend the winter reorganizing as McClellan plotted and planned. But by mid-November rumors began to reach the Confederate lines of large-scale enemy movements. Northern newspapers told of a fresh campaign along the old “On to Richmond” lines before the onset of winter halted operations. Lee, still confused by McClellan’s sudden initiative at South Mountain in September (not yet learning of the infamous ‘Lost Orders’) believed this to be a ploy to lure part of his army back to Richmond and then strike at Fredericksburg. It wasn’t until November 22 that Lee received confirmation that McClelland had, indeed, began to land on the Peninsula once more. Leaving behind McLaws’, Pickett’s, and Ransom’s divisions to hold the northern flank Lee pointed his army back southward to once more defend Richmond. Poor weather slowed Lee’s army and it wasn’t until November 26 that Stuart’s Division arrived in Richmond and began to scout the roads east of the capital. Confederate artillery emplacements were manned along the old lines and Fort Darling at Drewry’s Bluff was reinforced by the CSS Patrick Henry. As the sun rose on November 27 the infantry columns began to snake out of Richmond for a new campaign against an old enemy on familiar ground.
To the east the Union army had made surprising good progress. McClellan seemed to be in good spirits as he read Confederate newspapers still pinpointing him in northern Virginia. But, almost inevitably, this began to change when rumors of heavy Confederate troops movements began to reach his ears. McClellan had hoped for a triumphant march into Richmond with limited enemy opposition but those aspirations were starting to seem unrealistic. Federal cavalry reported that Stuart’s men were now in Richmond and blocking the main roads towards the city. Lee could not be far behind. Slocum, left behind in command north of Fredericksburg, reported the enemy works there still filled with enemy soldiers and suggested Lee had divided his force. McClellan though saw only that the Confederates were so numerous that they did not fear to divide their forces in the face of his grand movement and estimated Lee’s army to be a full 125,000 men around Richmond. Surely, he believed, he must cautiously approach the city and resume the siege operations which were disrupted in the summer by the failure of some of his generals and interference from Washington politicians. This time he would move methodically and with precision to crush the Confederates with overwhelming firepower. As McClellan explained these plans to his generals he could detect an air of dissatisfaction and disbelief on the part of some of his corps commanders – notably Hooker and Reynolds. While McClellan ordered a cautious approach, these officers urged an immediate attack before Lee could snatch the initiative away from them as he had done in June. McClellan denied all requests for even the most limited of probes towards Richmond. His men would build new approaches, construct artillery emplacements, and begin long-term siege operations at once. McClellan was here to stay and would not be driven off this time by another attack from an overwhelmingly superior enemy army. The disgruntled generals returned to their commands sure that Lee would find a way to unravel McClellan and drive them back down the peninsula in an unnerving replication of past events.
Union Backstory
With each scenario I create I like to give the players a backstory specific to their army. This is done to increase the realism of the scenario and to avoid it feeling like just another battle where your men are dropped onto a map and expected to fight to the death. The following backstory was given ONLY to the Federal players at the start:
​
McClellan ordered his commanders to slowly reoccupy their former lines and to begin building fortifications and gun emplacements. At the center of McClellan’s plans was Savage Station where his railroad supply depot was established. From here he would launch his grand strategy to grind down Lee’s army. As such he moved with his favorite corps, Franklin’s large VI Corps, to protect and entrench around this depot. From here, McClellan declared, would come the needed guns, men, and supplies to wear down the Confederates. He would personally oversee the operations on this line. The massive reserve artillery pieces, the heaviest in the army, would be safely shielded by Franklin’s large divisions. North of the Chickahominy River he ordered his least worrisome general, for he had little initiative, Edwin Sumner and his II Corps, to entrench around Beaver Dam Creek and Mechanicsville. Even if the enemy were found to be wholly south of the Chickahominy, he was to maintain his position to protect the army’s right and rear from enemy attacks. There must be no repetition of Jackson’s flanking marches this time.
The overused railroad line to Savage Station was slowing the buildup of McClellan’s large army. McClellan could not transport his men fast enough to the front and with Stuart already in Richmond – how far behind was Lee? McClellan now ordered his final three corps be moved rapidly forward by both forced marches and transport ships. Porter’s V Corps, another of McClellan’s “pets” from the old army, was the next in line to arrive. It was the closest to Savage Station and so had a shorter march than the other two trailing corps under Hooker and Reynolds. Porter was ordered to march along the Charles City Road and entrench around White’s Tavern on Franklin’s left flank. Hooker's and Reynolds' men would be transported aboard ships to Varina’s Landing on the James River from where they could march north and link with Franklin and Porter to protect Fair Oaks and Savage Station. The move held some risk but McClellan wanted his artillery up as quickly. Besides, he thought, Porter will be there to oversee things. Porter was under great scrutiny for his actions at Second Manassas and only his close relationship with the commanding general had kept him from being relieved by Halleck. McClellan felt Porter would keep the left flank protected and prevent any glory-hunting by his two junior corps commanders. Little Mac went to bed on the night of the 26th expecting to see Porter’s men on Franklin’s left on the morrow and the columns of Reynolds and Hooker arriving from the south by afternoon. Even better than that – his heavy artillery pieces would begin to arrive in the morning.
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
​
But while McClellan slept events conspired to thwart these comfortable plans. Porter’s march had gone well until he reached Glendale. The day’s march had been a leisurely one, too leisurely, and the column had not yet reached White’s Tavern. Porter, knowing he was under great pressure to redeem his reputation after the events at Second Manassas, worried that McClellan might use the pretext to relieve him of his command should he fail to come up as ordered at dawn. He ordered the columns to keep moving after dark while he bedded down in Glendale for the night. His leading division, under Charles Griffin, kept marching as ordered. But someone failed to explain which road they were to take and the column moved directly west along the Long Bridge Road for New Market rather than northwest on the Charles City Road. It was not until the Federal cavalry unit of David Gregg was bumped into in the darkness did Griffin realize his mistake. The column halted as a courier rode to inform Porter of the error. What should be done? The men bedded down along either side of the road as they waited. Porter received the courier about 2 AM and immediately rode to meet with Griffin. The division commander suggested the column backtrack and regain the Charles City Road before morning. But Porter knew this would be impossible. The men were exhausted and by the time they started to move again it would be daylight. “Let the men sleep”, he advised Griffin, he alone would have to answer for the error to McClellan.
It was at this moment that Reynolds and Hooker came riding into New Market. The two corps commanders had met privately at Varina’s Landing and conferred about the interpretation of their orders. Hooker, who had been wounded slightly at Antietam but left the battlefield believing a major victory was within reach, blamed McClellan for allowing Lee’s army to escape Sharpsburg. A more able commander would have captured Lee’s whole army he believed. Reynolds, who had missed Antietam but had long since grown weary of McClellan’s caution, agreed with these sentiments. Reynolds also commanded Hooker’s old I Corps after McClellan appointed the recovered Hooker to command the III Corps. Their orders were to land at Varina and march north to link with Porter and Franklin. Only in a single line of the order was there any discretion with their actions, “In the event of a confrontation with the enemy you are to fall back unless an opportunity is presented to fall upon and destroy a smaller enemy force.” This line gave them pause as they discussed whether or not they would be court martialed if they actively went seeking a smaller force of the enemy to fall upon and destroy. If a battle was initiated surely McClellan would support them rather than risk a defeat – right? Maybe the best way to get McClellan to fight was to put him in the role of being obligated to act as he had been after finding the ‘Lost Order’ before Antietam.
As they discussed the situation a courier from David Gregg arrived telling them that Porter’s V Corps was now at New Market and to take care in the morning to avoid using that road which was already occupied. Hooker saw providence in this and asked Reynolds to accompany him to Porter’s headquarters. The fact that Porter’s V Corps had somehow taken the wrong road and was now directly on their flank, within perfect supporting distance, seemed to indicate that the Gods of War were smiling on their plans. The two generals met Porter in New Market at 4 AM as that general was readying his corps to about face and start to double back to Glendale. Hooker explained that he felt McClellan would not fight on the peninsula and that the best chance the army had for a victory was before Lee’s army was fully up and entrenched around the city. McClellan, while not technically ordering an attack, did give them permission to attack a smaller enemy force if practicable. With over 30,000 men almost any force would be smaller than their combined corps. Would Porter move to support them if a battle came?
​
The Federal positions on the field at the beginning of November 27, 1862
The Federal Order of Battle
Porter was stunned at the audacity of the junior major generals. Porter reasoned with the generals that their actions could bring about their own destruction and that only the loosest interpretation of their orders could justify their offensive plans. They wouldn’t be responding to an enemy thrust but actively seeking to engage the enemy – contrary to orders. Hooker and Reynolds knew Porter was correct but had hoped he might support them as the senior major general present. Without the support of his corps and leadership they were resigned to the fact that the campaign would crawl forward and they would spend all winter on the peninsula. But Porter hesitated a moment. Porter knew that McClellan was on his own short leash with Halleck and Lincoln and that if the campaign failed to produce results quickly that he would surely be removed from command. Without Little Mac there he would surely be relieved as well and his career in the army jeopardized. Porter had acted correctly at Second Manassas and he was made a scapegoat by Pope for his own failures. Porter should have been the hero of the day for his correct appraisal of the battlefield situation but instead just barely escaped a court martial. Now he was relying on the support of McClellan, who he had learned to trust about as little as John Pope, to sustain him in command. Any failure on the peninsula and Porter knew where the blame would lay – and he was already behind schedule and on the wrong road.
Porter contemplated what he should do. Should he advise Hooker and Reynolds to attack Lee and move to support and
lead them? Porter did not believe in the phantom legions of enemy numbers as much as McClellan did and thought there was an opportunity for victory here. If victorious he would receive the lion’s share of fame and he might eclipse the cau-
tious McClellan as the leader of the Army of the Potomac. If unsuccessful he could lay the blame on the junior corps commanders who marched without orders to engage Lee’s army. His participation was merely to extricate their men and avoid a major disaster he could say. On the other hand, if he ordered the two junior corps commanders to follow him back north to link with Franklin they would be obliged to do so. Was there anything wrong with being cautious in the face of the aggressive Lee? Might the enemy attack be thwarted again as it was at Malvern Hill and a chance present itself for a counterattack to take Richmond? Risk versus reward he thought.
While he was contemplating these things the sun began to lift up over the horizon to the east. Porter would have to choose now what to do. With Hooker and Reynolds before him he lifted his head and began to speak.
Within an hour Bayard’s brigade and Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, who had spent an anxious night awaiting the arrival of Porter, were aware that something was amiss on the Charles City Road. They sent word to McClellan that Porter was not on Franklin’s flank as ordered. McClellan received word of this by 7 AM and ordered Franklin’s men to be ready for anything should the enemy attack them while they were unprepared for battle. McClellan continued to look southward to see if Porter’s men would still come up on his southern flank as expected. Where could Porter be? Somewhere in the distance cannon began to echo.
Confederate Backstory
With each scenario I create I like to give the players a backstory specific to their army. This is done to increase the realism of the scenario and to avoid it feeling like just another battle where your men are dropped onto a map and expected to fight to the death. The following backstory was given ONLY to the Confederate players at the start:
​
As the sun rose on the 27th Robert E. Lee contemplated his options. McClellan had shown uncharacteristic energy before Antietam but was overly cautious once the battle was initiated and afterwards. Which version of McClellan would show up on the peninsula now? Stuart’s cavalrymen were watching the roads into Richmond for any enemy advance and had, thus far, reported nothing. Should Lee again bring the fight to McClellan as he had in June? The Seven Days had been costly for Lee in terms of losses though successful in driving back the Army of the Potomac. Should he now take up old positions behind fortifications and let McClellan attack him? Or should he gain the initiative right away and think offensively from the start?
Longstreet’s Corps, reinforced by DH Hill’s Division, was poised to begin their morning march just south of Richmond. To the north two divisions of Jackson’s Corps were arriving in the northern part of the capital. Still further to the north, above the Chickahominy, the largest division in the army, AP Hill’s Light Division, was arriving behind schedule and on foot. Lee knew from local scouts that part of McClellan’s army was north of the river but he did not know how much of it was there. Lee pondered whether to attempt to hold the fortifications of Richmond with a reduced force while a larger portion of his army attempted to attack and drive back McClellan at some point. Would McClellan remain defensive and allow an offensive attack to succeed or would he counterattack and overwhelm a reduced line around the city?
As Lee thought this over a courier arrived from Col. Stephen D. Lee south of Richmond. Reports of enemy transports landing at Varina had come in during the night. If this was true then what was the enemy strength north of the Chickahominy? How spread out, or strong, was McClellan that he could spare at least a reputable force to land at Varina while also occupying ground on either side of the Chickahominy? Did the enemy mean to attack both his flanks or merely to demonstrate?
As the first streaks of dawn filled the sky Lee met with his generals and gave them their orders.
​
The Confederate Order of Battle
Victory Conditions
In the scenarios I create I do not use the traditional victory conditions. Instead, I use objectives and casualty limits to determine the victor in the scenario.
​
Below you see the general setup of the field of battle as designed. Neither side had access to any information going into the game about the enemy’s locations or arrivals other than what was laid out in their individual backstories.
I designed the scenario this way to give both sides numerous options of how to fight the battle. South of the Chickahominy River there are roughly 52,000 Confederates versus 72,000 Federals. North of the Chickahominy the two sides are even in number with AP Hill’s large division equal in size to the whole Union II Corps. The bridges across the Chickahominy were "damaged" at the start of the scenario limiting any rapid movement across it by either side. This would force both to alter any plans they might have to shift troops quickly over the river one way or the other. Crossing the Chickahominy would take time and bridge repair work for both sides.
South of the Chickahominy the tactical situation favors the Federal. With three corps massed south of Richmond they are poised to overrun any unprepared Confederate forces lounging around the city. The Confederate player must take the information related to them above, about enemy landings at Varina, and react accordingly. The Confederates have extremely strong interior lines with embankments, abatis, and mounted artillery pieces all along their front. These embankments have a 70% modifier which makes any offensive attack against them extremely costly. If they are built up with breastworks they can become almost impenetrable. If they strongly occupy these works they can be nearly impossible to take. The Federals could also play defensively by not attacking and allowing the aggressiveness of Lee to take hold. The Federals have equally strong embankments and abatis but poorer interior lines.
I feel like this is a good Chess match of a game with both sides having numerous options of how to play it. At the start I will admit I believe Sumner to be in a bad location and vulnerable to destruction if not handled well. On the flip side I feel the same way about any unprepared Confederate forces south of Richmond.
I expect a good game!
​
Winning with Objectives
There are a total of ten objective hexes on the map. There are five within the Union sphere of control and five within the Confederate sphere of control. Whichever side has more than five objective hexes at the end of two days of battle is victorious. If the objective hexes remain at five apiece the game ends in a Draw.
​
Below is the battlefield map with all of the forces shown in their starting positions and the objective hexes marked with stars. The light blue stars are the objectives held by the Federals and the red stars are those held by the Confederates.
​
Winning with Casualties
The reality is that many of the games we play are borderline unrealistic bloodbaths in which commanders have no need to rationalize their losses because there is "no tomorrow". Actual Civil War generals were constantly reminded about the importance of keeping their army intact and of minimizing losses for both political and military reasons. Even the most bloodiest of battles rarely saw casualties exceed 35% of the available men engaged for either side.* Therefore I have set casualty limits for both sides which will automatically result in a defeat should they lose too many men in the battle.
​
The Confederates have 64,000 men on the battlefield in total (NOT including the 925 men of the Inner Defenses forces which man the heavy artillery). They could take up to 40% losses in the battle. This came out to 25,600 men. Artillery losses do NOT count towards this total – only infantrymen and cavalrymen. I set the number at 40% given the absolute critical nature of holding Richmond.
​
​The Federals have 84,000 men on the battlefield in total. They could take 35% losses in the battle before being forced to abandon the field – this amounts to 29,400 men. Artillery losses do NOT count towards this total – only infantrymen and cavalrymen.