Chapter Seven: North of the Chickahominy
I. The Two Forces
II. Confederate Attack
III. Hancock and Hill
The Two Forces
General Sumner’s morning had been stressful. Strong enemy columns were seen heading for his right flank where Averell’s Cavalry Brigade guarded the Shady Grove Church Road. McClellan’s orders that he was “to stall the enemy as long as possible, bluffing the Rebs into thinking you are really planning to make a stand, then move southward to link with the VI Corps,” were clear enough. Sumner’s corps began the day with Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard’s division in the embankments near Mechanicsville while Maj. Gen. Winfield Hancock’s division was massed in reserve behind the lines. “Our job is to simply hold them up,” Sumner told Hancock. “You will move Zook’s brigade south to the Chickahominy to repair the Upper Trestle Bridge and take your other two brigades north to reinforce Averell’s troopers.” Hancock complied and ordered Zook’s brigade southward and turned north with Brig. Gen. John Caldwell’s and Brig. Gen. Francis Meagher’s brigades to reinforce Averell. Together these brigades numbered 3,307 men – mostly veterans. Brig. Gen. William Averell’s 1,440 troopers gave Hancock a force of 4,747 men in total to defend the right flank of the army. But Hancock had to be wondering why he was moving with the bulk of his division away from the Chickahominy when their orders were to recross the river once pressed.
Moving towards this flank from the opposite direction were the 11,903 men of Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill’s famed Light Division. Composed of six brigades the largest Confederate division moved south from Atlee’s Station before turning east on the Shady Grove Church Road about 8 AM. Hill’s orders were to “outflank the enemy defenses east of Mechanicsville” and drive the enemy back. Jackson planned on reinforcing Hill with Taliaferro’s and Early’s divisions by mid-morning and driving hard against the Union right in order to get in behind their lines at Fair Oaks. He then hoped to recross the Chickahominy farther downriver and turn the entire Union army out of their positions.
As we have already read that the division of Early was quickly rerouted to the east once the Federal VI Corps began its advance east of Richmond. Taliaferro’s Division would, likewise, largely be sent back south of the Chickahominy during the day. A.P. Hill would be on his own in the north with little support from the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Confederate Attack
Averell’s cavalrymen picketed either side of the Shady Grove Church Road. This was the main east-west road north of Mechanicsville and Beaver Dam Creek. It was Averell who had alerted Sumner of the approaching Confederate troops earlier in the morning. It was just shortly after 8 AM that the Confederate infantry began to move directly towards his lines from the west. Averell was assured that reinforcements were coming but he knew they would be too late. Rather than getting caught in a battle with massed enemy infantry he decided to mount up his brigade and fall back fighting to the east. Hancock’s two brigades were still a half-mile or more away at this point and unable to reach Averell’s lines before they were abandoned. This was an advantage for the Confederates as Averell had constructed breastworks which would have been formidable had they been manned with Union infantrymen.
Hill’s men quickly moved forward and over the empty defensive works as they pressed eastward. With Lane’s and Pender’s brigades in the lead the Rebels passed the Taby House and towards the crossroads of the Shady Grove Church Road and the Telegraph Road. The Telegraph Road ran directly south behind Beaver Dam Creek and the main Confederate defenses established there by Sumner’s men. Hancock’s brigades were just then taking up positions along the Telegraph Road facing north and northwest in anticipation of a continued enemy advance. Hancock knew his men would be hard-pressed by the quickly escalating enemy numbers moving against them. Nonetheless, Hancock moved his men into line and prepared to conduct a delaying action as the rest of the II Corps moved south of the Chickahominy as Sumner had said they would. But when Hancock looked to the south he saw that Sumner had dispatched Col. Joshua Owen and three of his Pennsylvanians regiments to reinforce him. The additional 1,037 men now gave Hancock about 5,800 men to contest the Confederate advance. This was simply too many men to turn away from a fight with but also not enough to expect to defeat a large enemy. Hancock must have been perplexed by the situation he now found himself in.
By 9 AM the Confederates had brushed Averell’s men back and were now upon the Telegraph Road where they moved southward to get in behind the Union embankments. Hancock steadied his two brigades and placed Owen’s regiments on his left flank. Hill concentrated his own forces and began to drive on Hancock’s position about 10 AM. To the south Taliaferro’s Division had just begun to move into position when word came from Jackson to retrace their steps over the river and move to Early’s aid. Taliaferro did leave behind four regiments, two each from the Louisiana Tigers and the Stonewall Brigade, to keep up a veneer of pressure against the Federal embankments east of Mechanicsville as Hill advanced on their flank.
For Sumner the situation was less stressful near Walnut Grove Church. “The II Corps has begun its withdrawal,” he wrote McClellan. “I hope the Rebs will think we are only consolidating around Walnut Grove Church and will be slow to follow.” With Zook’s brigade already near the Chickahominy there remained five more Union brigades to be withdrawn. Howard’s division began its withdrawal at 10 AM by moving Sully’s brigade east towards the church. Owen’s other two regiments, those not with the colonel on Hancock’s front, were likewise withdrawn and put on the road eastward. Hall’s brigade would continue to hold the trenches around Beaver Dam Creek and fall back slowly.
Hancock and Hill
Over the next few hours Hancock’s brigades contested the Confederate advance stubbornly. Overwhelming Confederate numbers though continued to pressure Hancock and he fell back fighting the entire way south along the road. Hill kept up heavy artillery pressure and managed to capture a few of Hancock’s cannons whose crews were decimated by the heavy infantry fire. Using all of his available brigades Hill drove relentlessly against Hancock but could not outflank him or create a large enough break in his lines to cause a full rout. Hancock “the Superb” was on full display this morning.
At 10:20 AM Sumner began to order the rest of his corps to fall back south of the Chickahominy using Duane’s Bridge just north of the VI Corps position. Zook’s brigade, having been countermanded in their earlier orders to rebuild a bridge farther upstream, were the first to be ordered to cross the river. Trailing them were Sully’s brigade of Howard’s division. But most of the rest of the II Corps was engaged by this point with Hill and could only conduct a slow retreat towards the south. But this did not bother Sumner who reported to McClellan that, “The Rebs are pressing my II Corps hard. That's wonderful - they apparently have no idea I'm purposefully drawing them farther in as I withdraw. They're moving units into the forest, to watch for an ambush and to attempt to outflank me. I'm confident I can get most, if not all, of II Corps safely away.”
Hill was not as oblivious to all these movements as Sumner may have hoped. As early as 9:40 AM Hill had written Jackson that, “It appears like the defenses east of Mechanicsville are being stripped of troops to confront our advance from the north.” This did concern Hill as he was unsure just how many men were in those defenses. “These troops,” he wrote Jackson 40 minutes later, “may have enough strength to hit our flank and perhaps might even outnumber us north of the river.” But as the fighting continued Hill grew more convinced that the Federals were taking no offensive action north of the river and were fighting a mere delaying action. He wrote that, “It looks like the Union is completely abandoning the area around Beaver Dam Creek and the emplacements there. The strange thing is that the bulk of the units that departed their lines do not seem to be crossing over to the south of the river quickly enough.”
Jackson largely concurred with Hill’s opinion that the Federals were “abandoning the area north of the river and keeping a minimal force to fight a rearguard action against you.” He continued in his reply to Hill that, “It seems almost certain now that they are heading to bolster an attack on our lines south of the Chickahominy.” The Confederate conclusions were correct. By 11:20 AM Hall’s brigade had abandoned their old lines along Beaver Dam Creek and were heading towards Walnut Grove Church in the wake of the rest of Howard’s division.
As Hill watched the Federals retreat towards the Chickahominy the continued stiff resistance by Hancock grew even more peculiar. “The Yankee units to my front seem content to sit in the open and be shot-up by our men,” he wrote to Jackson in a 11:40 AM dispatch. Hancock’s fighting withdrawal stubbornly contested each yard of ground north of Walnut Grove Church. As they did so they took increasing losses against superior enemy numbers each step of the way. One bright spot for the Yankees was the fall of Brig. Gen. James Lane, leading Hill’s largest brigade, killed while encouraging his men north of the church.
To the west the old Beaver Dam Creek embankments were vacated and occupied, about 12:20 PM, by the four regiments left behind by Taliaferro when he moved back south of the river. These units would march rapidly eastward and threaten to get in behind Hancock’s position and cut his line of retreat back to the Chickahominy. Hill wrote once more to Jackson that, “The Yanks north of river seem to be headed to cross the river to reinforce their troops south of it. We are advancing against the careful retreat of the Yanks and captured some of their artillery. It looks like they are abandoning the area north of the river.” The running retreat and fighting continued all the way towards the banks of the Chickahominy.
By 2:20 PM Hancock’s lines could no longer hold their integrity and broke apart. Hours of fighting a stiff defense across two and a half miles of ground wore them down to the point of exhaustion as casualties mounted. Hill noticed the collapse at once and wrote to Jackson that, “They are pretty much broken up here and fleeing with the rest of their forces for the river crossings.”
For Sumner the challenge was now whether his remaining men could still be an effective force once they regrouped south of the river.