It was at this point that the decision was made which set off a chain of events from which the Federals could never recover.

 

That decision was the usage of Thomas’s Wing which had just arrived in Franklin. How this decision was made, why it was made, and what we can learn from it in a strategic sense, is very interesting. 

 

When Rosecrans viewed the battlefield at noon he was flush with the victory of just having driven off the Confederates from Winstead Hill. He could now use the high ground to look to the south and see Polk’s men fleeing before him. He could also see Crittenden driving along the Lewisburg Pike against just limited enemy resistance. But what really caught his eye was the area around Carter’s Crossing. Having had cavalry forces viewing the area all morning, he knew that only a few Confederate brigades had thus far been encountered in the area. Thomas had Zahm’s Cavalry Brigade south of the river and was closely scouting the extreme Confederate left (shown on the map above with a purple circle). They reported nothing but stationary and quiet Confederate forces on their front.

 

From his position atop Winstead Hill, Rosecrans knew it was another four miles of hard fighting to reach the Columbia Crossing over the West Harpeth River. Rosecrans also knew that he had already encountered at least one enemy corps and that others were likely coming in that direction to try and halt the successful Union attack. Looking to the east, it also stood to reason that the Confederates wouldn’t leave the Lewisburg Pike wholly undefended. While Crittenden seemed to be making good time thus far, he still had six more miles to advance through enemy territory to reach the river. Who knew what the Confederates had waiting along the pike? Rosecrans thought about these two offensive options and found both to be problematic and risky at best. 

 

But Carter’s Creek Pike seemed a much more secure avenue of approach to breech the Confederate lines along West Harpeth River. And the more Rosecrans thought about it, the more it seemed the Confederate inactivity at Carter's Crossing was a sign of weakness. The Confederates were now assumed to be building up forces on the Columbia Pike and the Lewisburg Pike. The Confederates at Carter's Crossing were far away from both these areas and would likely be fighting without any close support. With no good east-west roads to utilize, the Confederates would have an extremely hard time shifting men to the west to resist a concentrated Federal push on Carter’s Creek Pike. When faced with a choice between a continued attack in the center or in the east, both of which must cover numerous miles of ground against unknown enemy numbers, or an attack in the west where the distance was minimal and the area already scouted, Rosecrans saw it as a simple decision.

 

Rosecrans ordered that, “Thomas will move in force to take the Carter’s Crossing site. I believe if a full enemy Corps was in the vicinity of the Carter Creek Pike that the Reb forces would not be assuming the defensive posture they have taken.” By this statement, Rosecrans reveals that he believed that the lack of any offensive actions by the Rebels on this front, either against Zahm’s troopers or the weak Federal cavalry scouts then picketing north of the river, was a sign of timidity on the Rebels part bred from their overall weakness in numbers. Afterall, if they were in greater numbers, then why were they allowing Zahm’s men to remain unopposed south of the river, and why would they not drive back the Federal scouts north of their position, and why were they not utilizing the undefended Carter’s Creek Pike for their own offensive purposes? Rosecrans concluded that the answer was that they were too weak to act offensively and were committed to a strict defensive. He would move to exploit this perceived weakness in the Confederate lines and take Carter’s Crossing. He already had a brigade of cavalry on the enemy flank south of the river and a full corps to move against their front. Caught between the two forces, the weaker Confederate defenders would be forced back and the river crossing would be in Union hands.

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Given what Rosecrans knew at the time - this decision makes perfect sense.

 

At noon, Rosecrans had every reason to believe the Confederates were weak along Carter’s Creek Pike. His intel on that road had been accumulated since first contact and he had numerous eyes on every move the Confederates made around Carter’s Crossing. Every intelligence report that he had reinforced the belief that the Confederates in this area were timid and cautious as a result of being too weak to risk any action other than a static defense. The distance to travel to reach Carter’s Crossing was short and the pathway clear all the way to the river. Among the three main pikes leading to the river, this was the only one in which the Federals were assured of a clear path and an enemy whose numbers they believed were already clearly visible. 

 

But not all was as it seemed at noon. Totally unknown to the Federals was that the Confederate forces at Carter’s Crossing were defending, not because they were too weak to attack, but because they were ordered to remain defensive until breastworks and trenches could be built. These men were from Cleburne’s Division and the best infantrymen in the Confederate army. The approach of Zahm’s troopers did not shock them into inactivity, instead, it prodded them to action. Thousands of men were detached from building defenses and sent (out of sight) to slowly isolate and capture the Union cavalrymen. And while there were few overall Confederates seen around the crossing, this was only because Hardee had kept his other division in a reserve position over a mile to the south and out of the view of the Union scouts across the river (seen on the map above outlined in a black rectangle). Far from being weak, Hardee’s Corps numbered nearly 13,000 men and was only slightly smaller than Thomas’s Wing being sent against them. The Confederates were actually hoping to be attacked at Carter’s Crossing as they strongly believed that any attack there by the Federals would be bloodily repulsed. Ironically, keeping McCown’s Division in hiding was not meant to show weakness and entice the Federals in that direction. Instead, McCown’s force was to act as an extreme flank guard should any enemy force have crossed the river via the unguarded western fords. The fact that their absence contributed to the appearance of a weaker crossing point and so greatly influenced Rosecrans's decision was merely a coincidence. A coincidence which would prove deadly for thousands of Federal soldiers.

 

The decision having been made – the first of many dominos fell which eventually led to the Union defeat. With Rosecrans having made the decision to launch his main effort to cross the West Harpeth River via the Carter’s Creek Pike, he felt that a continued attack on the Columbia Pike would be too risky. If the Confederates were rushing, potentially, tens of thousands of men to the center, then leaving the strong, naturally defensible, ground around Winstead Hill would be unjustifiable. Afterall, Rosecrans thought, once Carter’s Crossing fell into Union hands, the Confederates were likely to attempt a desperate counterattack on Winstead Hill to regain the high ground and the momentum in the battle. He believed the Federals should halt on the high ground, entrench, and be reinforced with Gorman’s Wing. Doing so would maul any Confederate counterattacks once Carter’s Crossing was captured and shatter any hope the Confederates had to drive back the Federals and win the battle. Rosecrans then gave the formal order which halted McCook's attack and unknowingly allowed Bragg’s army the time they desperately needed to regroup.

 

The domino effect of the decision to send Thomas’s Wing against Carter’s Crossing would continue until the very end of the battle. For Crittenden, it meant that his advance along the Lewisburg Pike had become a mere sideshow. While Gorman reinforced McCook’s inactive force on Winstead Hill, Crittenden’s men became heavily engaged with Price’s Corps in the east. Crittenden would seek to tie down as many Confederates as possible along the pike. But without reinforcements to continue his drive southward Crittenden was stalled. He would spend the remainder of the battle simply trying to hold on to what he had taken in the first few hours of the battle.

 

Along Columbia Pike, the decision to move Thomas to Carter’s Crossing meant that the offensive by McCook came to a sudden stop. This gave the Confederates a respite from the fighting and an opportunity to regroup. More importantly, it justified their controversial and risky decision to send the closest support for Polk’s weary men to the Lewisburg Pike rather than to Winstead Hill. Had McCook’s attack continued it might have forced the recall, even partially, of Price’s Corps away from the Lewisburg Pike. Crittenden’s action on that road might have followed a far different course had he encountered only part of Price’s Corps instead of the whole. The halt of McCook also gave Breckinridge’s Corps the hours they needed to complete their march to the battlefield. They would arrive by mid-afternoon and be in place to assist both Price on the Lewisburg Pike, and Polk on the Columbia Pike, when needed.

 

Most consequentially, the decision to attack Carter’s Crossing effected Thomas’s Wing more directly, and disastrously, than the others. Before Thomas had even completed his march to the crossing it was clear that the earlier intel was incorrect. The Confederates were soon swarming around Zahm’s men and would capture the entire brigade. There would be no pressure on the Confederates south of the river as Rosecrans and Thomas had hoped. Then thousands of McCown’s men were spotted moving towards Carter’s Crossing even as Thomas’s men were deploying in line to begin their attack. Rather than tangling with just a division – it now appeared a full corps was in the area. At this moment the attack could have been called off and another plan followed. Thomas could have disengaged and headed directly to the east to get in behind the Rebel center and force their defense of the Columbia Pike to crumble apart. But it was not to be. Thomas was ordered to attack – and he did.

 

By the end of the battle Thomas’s men had been engaged with Hardee’s men from start to finish. The losses in the two forces summarize the disaster that the attack on Carter’s Crossing had been. Thomas had lost 6,124 men of 14,857 in his corps (41%). Hardee had only lost 1,059 of 12,892 men (8%) and only three of those men were from McCown’s largely unengaged division. This nearly six-to-one ratio of losses at Carter’s Crossing was the result of the superior defensive ground the Confederates were able to utilize and the repeated stubborn and fruitless attacks of the Federals against an unmovable foe. Even after it was clear that there was nothing to be gained at Carter’s Crossing – the attacks continued.

 

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It is fascinating to see an entire battle be so incredibly influenced by just a single decision made so very near the beginning of the battle. But I believe that the Federal defeat at the Battle of Williamson County fully stemmed from the decision to send Thomas’s Wing to attack Carter’s Crossing. The faulty intel when that order was given led to a series of events that were felt for the rest of the battle by both sides. The “what might have been” discussion of this battle is intense as a result. Had Thomas reinforced Crittenden and the Union forces driven southward in strength along both the Columbia and Lewisburg pikes – what might have been? Or, had McCook’s Wing continued their attack southward with Gorman’s Wing and driven the Confederates towards Columbia Crossing – what might have been? What if Price's Corps moved to reinforce Polk and had abandoned the defense of the Lewisburg Pike - what might have been?

 

But to quote the abolitionist poet John Greenleaf Whittier: “It is said for all the sad words of tongue or pen. The saddest are these, 'What might have been.’”