For the Confederates their objective was to, at first, use Jackson’s entire corps north of the river to drive back the Federals and eventually cross to the south side of the river somewhere far to the east. This was never going to happen. By early morning it was already obvious that the miles and miles of unoccupied ground between Longstreet’s left and the Chickahominy River simply couldn’t be left as they were. Early’s Division, and then Taliaferro’s, were recalled to the capital and sent into the embankments facing eastward. This was the proper move for Lee to make after he identified the corps of Franklin was unopposed to the east. Leaving AP Hill by himself north of the river should have been a risky move on paper. AP Hill was outnumbered by Sumner and the Federals had a full brigade of cavalry while AP Hill had only a regiment of horsemen. So how was he able to so successfully capture Walnut Grove Church and inflict such heavy losses on the Yankees?

 

This came down to the concentration of firepower and manpower at key points. At the very start the Yankees dispatched a few brigades rearwards to the Chickahominy (as planned) and also continued to guard the old embankments in front of Beaver Dam Creek. But the division of AP Hill was a solid moving mass of men and guns. Hancock could do very little against such a powerful force. Each successive point he took up was simply overwhelmed by the continuing wall of butternut which swarmed around him. Concentrated Confederate artillery mercilessly blasted away while the scattered Federal guns were ineffective at best. The issues began almost at the very start as four Federal pieces were captured within the first hour of combat on Hancock’s front. AP Hill fought the entire battle without any real challenge to his offensive and never considered the possibility of defeat or failure on his front. He successfully outflanked the enemy line, drove into their rear, routed their best units, and captured his objective, all within five hours of combat. His limited losses further ensured that his force would remain a dangerous one for the rest of the battle while Sumner’s corps was broken apart and scattered.  

 

The advance of the VI Corps was the first real lost opportunity of the battle for the Yankees. Once freed by McClellan the VI Corps was a compact force of nearly 19,000 men with numerous roads to utilize all leading towards Richmond. Franklin should have concentrated his efforts on one road while lightly picketing and pressing on the others. Instead, he dispersed his corps in five different directions! First, he sent one brigade of Howe’s division to picket a river crossing to the north. Second, he sent a brigade of Smith’s division to the east to guard bridges and build breastworks in the rear areas. Then he sent his remaining six brigades down three separate and dispersed roads towards Richmond. By the time Franklin advanced he had just barley more men available than did the Confederates under Early and Fitzhugh Lee.

 

Franklin was caught trying to both defend the numerous river crossings and attack simultaneously. This was a major error. Ideally in any attack you need to commit your entire force to ensure success and hold nothing back except a strategic reserve within supporting distance. Franklin should have advanced along the Williamsburg Road where the open fields would have favored the heavier Union artillery pieces. Further, the route would have brought the VI Corps into position directly on the right flank of the I, III, and V Corps, and created a united front against the already hard-pressed corps of Longstreet. Franklin could have either abandoned his whole line of embankments and dared the Confederates to advance so far to the east and away from Richmond. Or, he could have left Smith’s two-brigade division in the Federal entrenchments and tried to occupy the attention of as many Confederates as he could while waiting for Sumner to cross the river to join him later in the day. Had Hood’s Division been struck by at least two divisions of the VI Corps earlier in the morning he would not have been able to hold out for long. Hood’s overly aggressive sortie from his embankments against Sykes would have been disastrous if Franklin struck him at this moment and they may have driven over Hood and into Longstreet’s rear. Even if Hood stayed in his embankments his division would have had to have stretched an extra mile at least to avoid being easily outflanked. It was probably the best opportunity for the Federals to dislodge Longstreet’s men.

 

Instead, Franklin was caught in a destructive firefight which he continued to get the worst of through the day. Franklin was mainly engaged with the divisions of Early and Taliaferro and briefly with Anderson’s Brigade of Hood’s Division. Further, he fought against the three cavalry brigades of W.H.F. Lee, Fitzhugh Lee and Wade Hampton. If you add up the losses of those Confederate units they had lost a total of 3,192 men during the day. Franklin’s losses amounted to 4,740 men. Franklin had accomplished very little during the day and had really only pinned Early’s Division in place along the Nine Mile Road. Early seems to have had little real trouble dealing with Franklin’s men as a matter of fact. Taliaferro had lost just 176 men and was even able to dispatch half his division to other areas of the battlefield as reinforcements. What should have been a real opportunity in the center of the battlefield for the Federals turned into a stalemated shooting match by late afternoon.

 

The fighting in front of Battery #17 bears the greatest examination. It was here that the Federals repeatedly launched piecemeal attacks throughout the morning and into the afternoon. Early in the morning the Union forces enjoyed their greatest success when they encountered and captured the bulk of Mahone’s Brigade south of the Confederate embankments. Emboldened by this success they then attempted to follow up the attack before they had all their pieces in position. This was their greatest mistake.

 

The Union gunboats were steaming as quickly as they could towards the battlefield. Confederate heavy artillery at Drewry’s Bluff had managed only one hit on the gunboats and they steamed right past the narrow obstructions under the Confederate guns. Had the Confederates utilized the CSS Patrick Henry to block the narrow pass they might have delayed the Federal gunboats under the heavy guns for a much longer period and neutralized a few more guns or repulsed them completely. Instead, the Confederates stood aside with their lone gunboat and fired ineffectually as the Union navy bypassed their position and headed to shell the Confederate embankments. To quote Lee, “Thank God he didn't bombard our troops before he launched his attack on the western ramparts.” The heavy naval guns would have easily pried open the Confederate flank anchored on the James River and allowed thousands of Federal troops to get over the embankments along with river with very few losses. This was the lost opportunity of the battle. Once in place by late afternoon the Federal gunboats did terrific damage to Confederate units near the river and were causing considerable frustration for the defenders near the river. But there was no longer any Union infantry left to compound the confusion and drive forward.

 

Porter and Hooker had been impatient and decided to attack before the arrival of the gunboats. The early success against Mahone may have contributed to the idea that they would be able to keep the Confederates on their heels and drive over the main line of embankments. Once the Union attack was launched it was done so in stages. Sykes attacked first and then, as if they were doing so en echelon, Sickles attacked on his left, then Griffin, and lastly Birney. At no time were the attacks ever coordinated and the Confederates were able to shift men about to meet each threat as it materialized. Wright’s Brigade, for example, fought on the southern wall of embankments, supported Wilcox to the east, then turned west to help capture Berry’s brigade, and then returned to the southern embankments to defeat the final Union attack by Birney. Had all of the Union attacks occurred at once, with the naval support, the Confederates could not have withstood the pressure for long.

 

The embankments were simply too strong to assault without at least a three to one superiority in numbers. The large size of many Confederate units made this impossible. Therefore, the best outcome the Federals could usually hope for was a Confederate rout away from the embankments. This rarely happened. Had the Federals stayed just out of rifle range and pinned the Confederates in place all along the front they might have stretched their lines to find the enemy flank open at some point to Hood’s left. Or, they might have allowed the flank resting on the James River to be opened by the gunboats. But attacking frontally was never going to work. Even in the most dire of moments the Confederates held on easily to their positions and their leaders were close by to steady them if they were disrupted. Longstreet’s loss was regrettable but DH Hill was so highly rated (A for Command and B for Leadership) that there was little trickle down effect to his subordinate commanders. It was a superbly conducted defense by DH Hill from start to finish. Only the half-hearted advance of Hood’s Division ruined a perfect morning for Longstreet’s Corps.

 

The Federals continued, even after being repulsed repeatedly in their frontal assaults, to throw more men into the meat grinder south of Battery #17. DH Hill commented on this repeatedly to Lee. The most telling comment was, “My goodness, they are attacking the southern ramparts again! They are slow learners.” At numerous points during the morning the Federals should have halted their attacks and reassessed the situation. They became consumed with the idea that just one more good push would punch a hole in the enemy lines and allow them to pour through. The interesting part is that through a minor miracle they accomplished that exact goal when Robinson’s brigade charged ahead at 1 PM. But by this point there were simply not enough men on hand to exploit the breakthrough and the Federals were hurled back with heavy losses. Had Reynolds’s men been in place to support the attack by Robinson, or even just a division of the I Corps, they might have expanded their breakthrough and finally dislodged the entire Confederate line. But having the right men at the right place at the right time rarely occurs in warfare.

 

On the Confederates side, DH Hill had very few reserves to utilize by late afternoon. As mentioned before the piecemeal nature of the attacks allowed them to continuously shift men from one threatened sector to another – but they were spread thin. Supply wagons were also running on empty and some units were low on ammo already. If Robinson’s breakthrough had been supported properly there is some reason to believe the Confederates might have been forced back as the Federal gunboats arrived at nearly this same hour.

 

But that was not to be. Robinson charged ahead and even though supported by nearby units, their numbers were too few and their men were already fatigued from hours of fighting through the day. Further, heavy losses in the officer corps crippled these efforts as untried commanders were given battlefield promotions but could not lead effectively. The Confederates lost just two general officers all day south of Richmond: Longstreet and Mahone. While Longstreet’s loss might be a headline in a newspaper it altered little in the outcome of the fighting. But for the Federals their officer corps lost eight general officers: Stockton, Hall, Warren, Andrews, Berry, Birney, Ward, and Sweitzer. By late afternoon Porter had to admit, “it is madness to continue to attack in the south.”

 

The I, III, and V Corps, along with the cavalry brigades of Gregg and Farnsworth, were largely engaged against DH Hill’s and Anderson’s divisions south of Richmond. The Confederates were also assisted by the cavalry brigade of Stephen D. Lee and three of Hood’s four brigades. The combined losses of these Confederate units numbers 6,029 men. This simply pales in comparison to the 14,840 Federal casualties in front of the southern embankments.

 

The Federals began the day with a total of 84,000 men on the field of battle. By 6:20 PM their total number had fallen to 59,843 men for a total loss of 24,157 men. The Confederates had lost just 11,082 men of the 64,925 men they began the day with. This better than 2:1 ratio is really astonishing given the fact that the Federals maintained the tactical initiative throughout the day and fought on ground of their own choosing. In the end it was the embankments which caused the defeat of McClellan’s army. Attacking frontally against such strong defenses was never going to succeed.

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Technical Stuff:

The terms of engagement and victory in this scenario are of special note. As mentioned in the Introduction both sides went into the battle with no knowledge of how many men they were up against, where they were coming from, or how they were positioned at the start. This made it extremely difficult on both sides to comfortably move around the battlefield as they would in a normal scenario. Both sides knew that I would not cruelly bring enemy troops onto the map behind their known lines so at least this was some consolation. Both sides also knew that a casualty limit had been set which would force them to attack carefully lest they lose too many men and be forced to retreat from the field. For the Federals this stipulation was a greater issue as they became the attackers by choice. If you recall, neither side had to attack. The objectives both sides agreed to allowed for a Draw if neither side lost one of their objectives. This could have been a two-day staring contest had both sides cautiously stuck to their embankments. But the Federals chose to attack. Had they not done so I believe the aggressive Confederate commanders would have taken the role of attackers as their pre-battle plans included a large attack north of the Chickahominy.

 

By the end of the battle the Federals had lost 27% of their infantrymen and cavalrymen (remember artillery losses do not count in the games casualty rule). This meant the game could have, theoretically, continued as the Federals had not yet reached their maximum loss cap of 29,400 men (35%). But as I have so often said – once an army loses about 25% of their men they are no longer able to effectively fight the battle. That doesn’t always stop some people though. We have all been part of games where the enemy goes down to the last man or keeps fighting hoping their opponent will run out of ammo and then attack once they can no longer defend themselves. Both of these outcomes are so ridiculous (in my opinion) that I use the casualty rule as a way to avoid such things.

 

The Federals lost because 1) they surrendered of course, but also 2) they lost one of their objective flags north of the Chickahominy. With their reduced numbers they were unable to recapture their flag and were not able to ever break the Confederate lines to take one of the enemy objectives. Even if they had not surrendered the battle would have likely ended in a Confederate victory based on the gaining of the objective flag north of the Chickahominy.