That game was great. Flat out.

 

Let’s talk about why the battle worked out the way it did. The Confederate plan was, in my view, too conservative. By committing to a strictly defensive plan at the start they handed over the initiative to the Federals from turn one. With a great natural barrier like a river to utilize I understand the temptation to do this but, as we have seen, it didn’t work. By giving your opponent all of the time they need to position themselves at their leisure, which the Federals had, you allow them to fight the battle on their terms. The first Federal corps to arrive was the III Corps late on the first day of battle. They arrived piecemeal and over a number of hours. The Yankees were extremely vulnerable at this time. Had a Confederate plan emerged to probe east of the river with a combined infantry, cavalry, and artillery force, they would have created a major problem for the III Corps. When the sun went down on day one the Yankees were still trying to get their bearings. Having a known enemy force east of the river would have prompted most of their cavalry to head in that direction and altered their future plans for the entire battle. Those Union plans were basically, “get to the river!” But with thousands of Confederates putting up a fight at dusk east of the river I have to believe that the Yankees would have made their top priority clearing out the Rebels before they started considering crossing points.

 

The next Union corps to arrive was Hancock’s II Corps. He arrived overnight and early on day two. With no Rebel activity to be concerned with east of the river he headed directly to the river crossing which offered the best opportunity to cross at – Toll Gate Bridge. Mallory’s use of the II Corps was textbook. He had a superior position east of the river from which he could dominate everything west of it for a space of about 10 hexes. Mallory was reinforced by the Union’s Reserve Artillery and soon had nearly every Union gun on the field tearing holes in the Rebel lines west of the river. For the Confederates, again, they paid the price for being too static in their positioning and plan. Swanson held on for too long under the enemy guns and saw heavy losses in numerous units while never inflicting any appreciable losses at all on the enemy.

 

How bad was it? If we take just the II Corps and then Ewell’s Corps and compare their losses before any crossing of the Monocacy was attempted you will get an idea. The Federals lost 513 men in the II Corps before attempting their crossing. These were lost wholly in the 1st Division which spent a number of hours building breastworks to protect Federal guns and taking long-range enemy artillery fire from Reich Ridge. These losses were divided between numerous regiments and caused little overall disruption. For the Confederates of Ewell’s Corps they lost 2,580 men in the early fighting over Toll Gate Bridge. These losses were particularly heavy in the Texas Brigade and Law’s Brigade. Fitz Lee’s Cavalry Brigade lost another 300 men in the fighting around the Toll Gate. For an army on the defensive to take nearly 6 to 1 losses is unsustainable.

 

It was at this point the battle plan for the Confederates needed to change and Swanson did adjust his defenses. He fell back to Reich Ridge and then over it to the safety of the far side which shielded him from Union guns. The subsequent advance over the bridge by the II Corps was done well but I believe Mallory erred by not moving north instead of south once across. Hughes Ford, north of Toll Gate Bridge, was unprepared for any attack from the flank or rear. The ground there was open and the Federals could have easily supported any movement in that direction from their higher ground east of the river. By uncovering Hughes Ford the Federals would have bypassed Reich Ridge and forced the Confederates to fight them in the open fields and spread out their already thin line much farther. With two crossing points secured I believe Swanson would have had to fall back and either defend Frederick City or Monocacy Junction with his force. The move to uncover Hughes Ford would also have allowed the VI Corps division of Maj. Gen. John Newton to arrive unopposed on day three to quickly add 6,000 more Federals to the fighting on that flank. Hively commented on this situation when he wrote that, “If I were the Yanks, I would try to send strong forces to drive us away from Hughes Ford, and try to expand their bridgehead that way.”

 

Instead, Mallory attacked southward in an effort to help uncover and distract the enemy attention away from Crums Ford before the I Corps attacked. Mallory’s movements south from Toll Gate Bridge were not successful in the early stages. The Confederates likely could have held indefinitely against these attacks were circumstances to have stayed status quo. But the repulsed attacks of the II Corps emboldened Swanson to make the pivotal decision of the game to try to cut off the II Corps from Toll Gate Bridge and isolate the enemy corps. This decision was the most important one of the battle.

 

Before this the Confederates were successfully defending their Reich Ridge line. They were susceptible at Hughes Ford but the Yankees had shown no inclination to move in that direction. Swanson could have stayed on the defensive and likely held out for the remainder of the day and been able to more substantially contribute to the defense of Crums Ford later on when the I Corps attacked. But, instead, Swanson chose to attack. Why? And was it a good decision?

 

For Swanson the decision was made because he was “not convinced that they have enough men to break through my line at Toll Gate.” Also, because of the Federal attack stalling, he hoped “that an opportunity will soon arise where I can isolate all their units on our side of the river.” The weather played a role as well as the Federal guns across the river would only be able to fire as far as the poor conditions allowed them in the heavy rain. Swanson wrote that, “At 1 PM it should be heavily raining for two hours and visibility will be down to 7 hexes so if I move against them it will be then.” After waiting a number of turns for the last possible reinforcements to reach him from Crums Ford he decided to attack. “The Federals have next to nothing on our left at Toll Gate and they are starting to move more artillery to our side of the river. It looks like all their artillery on our side is exposed. I'm moving in. They will have to fall back to protect their artillery or launch attacks across my whole line. I'm committed now to try and destroy them while the heavy rains remain. I must severely damage them now before the weather improves and they get reinforcements.” And with that order the attack began. He did mention to Hively the risky nature of the endeavor when he wrote, “I will act carefully at Toll Gate and not attempt any isolation of the Union forces on our side of the river until I am sure of success as failure to wipe them out would be a disaster and promptly lose us the battle.”

 

Based on the available intel to Swanson, and the forces available to him, he took a risk worthy of a Stonewall Jackson and launched a decisive attack on the most vulnerable part of his enemy that he could identify. It was a brilliant move which should have resulted in the isolation and possible capture of nearly all of the II Corps. So, why didn’t it?

 

There are a number of reasons. To begin with, to quote George Pickett, “I’ve always thought the Yankees had something to do with it.” Let’s start by giving credit to a masterful performance by Mallory and the II Corps. Mallory’s men were constantly under their leaders control and always within their command radius. This limited the routs and helped units recover from disruption promptly to rejoin the fight. Mallory was aware of the Mixed Organization Penalty and how he needed to try and keep his brigades separated to nullify that penalty. He understood the proper use of zone of control and, when possible, used units to block as much ground as possible using their zone of control to slow the Rebel attacks. He also had cavalry forces which, when mounted, could also prevent enemy infantry from launching a melee to take hexes. Lastly, the Union artillery, though somewhat hampered by the heavy rain, was still well positioned east of the river to provide point-blank supporting fire the closer the Rebels got to their ultimate objective. The Union defensive effort here was masterful!

 

For the Confederates their attack was bold and properly thought out. But the attack lacked two key elements which ended up costing them the battle. To start with there simply weren’t enough men attacking. Swanson spared all the men he could but made two critical errors in this regard. First was that he left too many men at Hughes Ford (the Louisiana Tigers) and only brought over their access numbers after the first wave of the attack on Toll Gate Bridge had been repulsed. The Louisianans formed a second wave but were too weak to make any additional progress and were repulsed. Second, the earlier decision by Swanson to decline reinforcements from the south was very short-sighted. It should have been clear that the position at Hope Bridge was infinitely stronger than it needed to be and that nearly all of Heth’s Division could be spared for operations elsewhere. Had either of Heth’s three largest brigades (Anderson, Pettigrew, Davis) been available to Swanson he likely could have taken the Toll Gate Bridge. Had two or more been available to him it is further possible he might have taken the bridge and been able to capture the whole of II Corps handily. Instead, the Rebs remained focused on Hope Bridge far longer than they needed to.

 

Why was there such focus on the Toll Gate Bridge? John Brogden. When you play opponents long enough you begin to know their tendencies and reputations. Swanson and Hively knew Brogden to be a hard fighter and someone to watch out for in their game. Numerous times they commented on the forces in the south being under the aggressive Brogden and needing to make sure they were properly prepared. Brogden’s reputation went a long way to win this battle for the Federals. It likely kept a full division tied down in the south while all the real fighting happened far to the north. Even when it was more clear that the Federals had marched away from Hope Bridge the shadow of Brogden remained and for much of the battle four Confederate brigades, about 6,500 men, stayed at Hope Bridge confronting just six New York regiments. The Rebels could have desperately used Heth’s men in the north on day two. While two brigades did eventually reach the fighting at Crums Ford, and one played a key role there, the rest of the division might as well have stayed in Virginia.

 

The lack of having enough men at the right place at the right time was the first key element to the Confederate repulse at Toll Gate Bridge. The second key element was that they were poorly organized and led once they were engaged near Toll Gate Bridge. Swanson’s men had taken a beating at Toll Gate Bridge earlier in the day. The worst hit of all of his brigades was the Texas Brigade. Yet it was this same brigade which formed the main part of the attack on Toll Gate Bridge. Reinforced by elements of Hays’ damaged brigade and Law’s reduced brigade the attackers were already fatigued and cut up even before they attacked. Nearly all of the brigade commanders for the attacking units were either incapacitated before or during the attack. The replacement leaders could do little to keep their men moving forward and routs became common. Lastly, because of their reduced numbers, Swanson had no choice but to mix up the organizations to make as strong as front as he could facing the enemy. This might have worked if the men were well led or fresh but they were neither. The Mixed Organization Penalty added to their woes and the attack sputtered out just short of its goal.

 

The fighting raged on even after the repulse of the Confederates at Toll Gate Bridge. The action at Crums Ford was critical and Brogden did a good job there of forcing his way across. But the limited space caused problems which nearly led to disaster numerous times. Once more, had the men of Heth’s Division suddenly arrived at this moment the tide could have been turned and thousands of Federals captured. Instead, the Confederates were once more repulsed and driven back as their numbers were not enough to defeat the Union masses. The Confederates were always a brigade short at the critical moments of this battle.

 

In the end the battle was ultimately decided through attrition. That element of my multiplayer games is an important one. Even after the defeat Swanson commented that, “Although casualty limits killed me in this one, I also like them a lot.” The limit forces the players to make more decisions about how and where to commit their forces in the battle. The Confederate army could have continued the battle on paper. Armies can always fight “on paper”. But there is a point at which an army can no longer hold together and then begins to break apart. I set that number at 35% (this could be argued anywhere from 25% to 40%) and the Confederates were fast approaching that percentage. With the odds all against them it was time to retreat and return to northern Virginia.

 

This was a really great battle. As always I try to find a lesson to be learned from my battles and I believe Mallory’s exemplary use of command and control was that lesson here. Without his meticulous attention to detail, it is likely that the II Corps collapses under the pressure of Swanson’s attack. Swanson’s bold gamble was a fine example of the risks commanders must be willing to take in battle. He wagered everything on the attack and followed through with it as long as he could. We bystanders can argue whether it was the “wisest” move but from our position above the battlefield and with perfect hindsight that is easy. At the time and moment of the game though I believe Swanson made one of the best battlefield decisions I have seen in his decision to attack. It was a brilliant move which just didn’t pay off.

 

I wish to thank all my participants for their cooperation and help putting this together. These AAR’s of mine are an amusing little hobby which relies on the participants to share their thoughts in real time as they play and to take any subsequent commentary by yours truly with a grain of salt. Thanks for letting me observe fellas! Hope we do it again soon!